Race Relations and Community Development: The Education of Blacks in New Orleans, 1862-1960. by Devore, Donald E
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1989
Race Relations and Community Development:
The Education of Blacks in New Orleans,
1862-1960.
Donald E. Devore
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Devore, Donald E., "Race Relations and Community Development: The Education of Blacks in New Orleans, 1862-1960." (1989).
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 4839.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/4839
INFORMATION TO USERS
The most advanced technology has been used to photo­
graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm 
master. UMI films the text directly from the original or 
copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies 
are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type 
of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the 
quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, 
colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, 
print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a 
complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these 
will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material 
had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­
produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the 
upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in 
equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also 
photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book. These are also available as 
one exposure on a standard 35mm slide or as a 17" x 23" 
black and white photographic print for an additional 
charge.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have 
been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher 
quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are 
available for any photographs or illustrations appearing 
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Order Number 9025300
Race relations and community development: The education of 
blacks in New Orleans, 1862-1960
DeVore, Donald E., Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical CoL, 1989
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Race Relations and Community Development: 
the Education of Blacks in New Orleans, 1862-1960
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural a uu Mg chanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of History
by
Donald E. DeVore 
B. A., Southern University at New Orleans, 1974 
M. A., University of New Orleans, 1983 
December 1989
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express special thanks to my 
dissertation advisor, Gaines M. Foster, for providing 
scholarly guidance, timely suggestions, and critical 
analysis throughout the research and writing of this 
dissertation. His assistance, good cheer, and expressions 
of encouragement helped immeasurably, without which I could 
not have commpleted this task. I am also grateful to 
members of my committee— Robert Becker, Mark Carleton, 
Thomas Durant, and Burl Noggle— for their important 
analytical and interpretive suggestions, and Robert Becker 
for also editing an earlier draft. Raphael Cassimere, Jr. 
and Joseph Logsdon of the University of New Orleans gave me 
valuable suggestions and shared with me their knowledge of 
black New Orleans. I owe both a debt of gratitude. Over 
the past several years I have received assistance from 
numerous archivists and librarians at the University of New 
Orleans, New Orleans Public Library, Tulane University, 
Louisiana State University, Dillard University, Xavier 
University, and Amistad Research Center. Beatrice Owsley 
and Clive Hardy of the Archives and Manuscripts/Special 
Collections Department at the University of New Orleans, 
however, deserve special mention for their assistance. In 
writing this dissertation I have also benefited from the 
kindness and consideration of many friends and colleagues.
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I am also indebted to Karl Roider for providing me with an 
opportunity to complete my dissertation.
As always, however, my greatest indebtedness is to my 
family. My wife, Joyce, has been a source of encouragement 
and has performed countless tasks, including proofreading 
every draft. My son, Toure Rashad, was a source of help 
and inspiration, and along with Joyce created a home 
environment conducive to reflection and writing. In 
addition, my mother and siblings have given me emotional 
and spiritual support throughout my educational pursuits.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements..................................ii
Abstract .......................................  v
Introduction.................................   vii
Chapter I: Education and the Politics of Race,
1862-1877 .......................................   1
Chapter IX: Education and the Struggle for Blacks' Proper
Place, 1877-1900   53
Chapter III: Education and the Making of a Protest
Tradition, 1900-1945   93
Chapter IV: Education During the Jim Crow Era,
1900-1945 .....................................  129
Chapter V: Education and the Pursuit of the Golden Fleece,




Vita .......................................  291
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Abstract
Throughout the history of the United States 
individuals and groups have used education as a means to 
improve their status in America— economically, politically, 
and socially. When slaves gained their freedom between 1862 
and 1865, they, too, looked to education as a way to 
ameliorate the harmful effects of over two hundred years of 
slavery. In New Orleans freedmen and those free before the 
war viewed education almost as a panacea to the many 
problems within the black community. Black New Orleanians 
realized, of course, that the gains derived from education 
would take time to filter throughout the entire community.
During the antebellum period New Orleans' free blacks 
had accumulated a certain degree of wealth and supported 
educational attainment for its members, and beginning in 
Reconstruction, led in the struggle for improved education 
for the entire black population. During Reconstruction 
blacks won inclusion into the public school system, and for 
several years many blacks attended desegregated schools.
The end of Reconstruction, however, brought eventual 
disfranchisement and the triumph of a racial ideology that 
sought to impose on blacks the status of second class 
citizenship. This view found expression in the type of 
education whites thought blacks should receive.
This study suggests that many blacks in New Orleans 
refused to accept the permanency of limited education or
v
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white supremacy. Devoid of political power, however, 
blacks used a strategy of petition and protest to school 
officials to gain educational improvements for the black 
community. Between 1900 and 1945 that strategy produced 
improvements, but by the end of World War II, black 
education still lagged behind the educational opportunities 
given ;.*hites. In 1948 black leaders abandoned the strategy 
of protest and petition and decided to use the federal 
courts to gain educational parity within a separate school 
system. Their goals shifted again in 1952, and they filed 
suit to end school desegregation in New Orleans. The legal 
assault to desegregate the schools was part of the larger 
black effort for racial equality.
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Introduction
With the growth of cities during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, public education assumed a greater 
degree of importance in America. From its origins in New 
England, the idea of public education spread west and 
south. Massachusetts, with its eminent educator Horace 
Mann, led the way and sent many educators to distant cities 
and towns to start public school systems. Throughout the 
nation, community leaders came to view education as a means 
to produce better workers and more informed citizens, as 
well as Americanize the immigrants.
In 1841 the crusade gained its first victory in 
Louisiana. During a period of relative prosperity, the 
Louisiana legislature appropriated $7,500 for public 
education in New Orleans with the stipulation that the city 
expend an equal amount. After agreeing to accept the 
offer, city leaders turned to the task of selecting a 
person to administer the proposed school system. They 
asked John Shaw, a friend and colleague of Horace Mann, to 
assume the job of starting a public school system.
Although he knew the difficulties he would face, Shaw 
accepted the challenge and arrived in 1841 to begin his new 
duties. Many New Orleanians would benefit from his effort, 
despite the initial reluctance of many of them to support 
the idea of public education because of its association
vii
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with the idea of "charity." Two groups of New Orleanians, 
however, could not participate in the pioneering 
effort— free blacks and slaves.
Blacks, some as slaves, others as free men, had been 
among the first settlers in the New Orleans area. The 
city's population increased during the colonial and 
antebellum periods, and slavery grew as well. In that 
sense, New Orleans was a typical southern city. New 
Orleans differed, however, because in addition to an 
increase in slaves, the city had experienced an increase in 
its free black population. The racial policies of the 
French and Spanish contributed to the growth of the free 
black population; the granting to them of certain 
privileges not given to slaves then produced color and 
class divisions within the black population.
But the transfer of Louisiana to American control and 
the arrival of Anglos and immigrants between 1820 and 1850 
led to a decline in the privileged position of free blacks. 
When the public school law went into effect, free blacks 
along with slaves were excluded. Nevertheless, both slaves 
and free blacks knew that city leaders had taken an 
important step toward progress. Two decades later they 
would have a chance for inclusion. Their struggle for 
inclusion, of course, had to await the Civil War and the 
liberating guns of Union soldiers.
viii
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New Orleans' brief participation in the Civil War 
provided blacks with an early opportunity to seek that 
which had been denied to most of them during slavery—  
education. They possessed few doubts that public education 
was crucial to black advancement. During federal 
occupation, beginning in April 1862, Union soldiers started 
teaching black soldiers and civilians. The Army increased 
its role in 1863 and 1864 and established schools for 
blacks. In 1865 the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands assumed the task of coordinating black 
education. Two years later Bureau officials transferred 
most of the Freeedmen's Bureau schools to the New Orleans 
public school system. Over the next century black 
education in New Orleans became inextricably linked to 
questions of race and politics.
The New Orleans black community was fortunate that it 
contained a large number of blacks who had been free before 
the Civil War. The antebellum free black community already 
had a tradition of education and, after the war, provided 
leadership in the black struggle for education in New 
Orleans. That leadership, along with the fervent desire 
of the freedmen to learn, helped to establish an 
educational tradition within the entire community. In 
addition to the indigenous members of the black population, 
blacks from other cities and rural parishes settled in New 
Orleans after 1863. Although largely poor and uneducated,
ix
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many of these new immigrants possessed leadership qualities 
and some formal education. With enfranchisement following 
the 1868 Constitutional Convention and the subsequent 
increase in political participation, the aspirations and 
expectations of the black community soared. Blacks existed 
in an environment, however, that remained hostile to their 
complete civil and political emancipation. Even in a less 
threatening setting blacks would have labored under severe 
handicaps. They had to contend with the emotional and 
psychological adjustment to freedom and their new 
independence. Their status remained unclear; white leaders 
continued their attempts to prevent them from voting. 
Moreover, with little political tradition, or experience to 
call on, blacks seldom translated voting strength into 
political power. Nonetheless, political participation, 
economic advancement, improved race relations, and 
educational opportunity formed the crux of their agenda for 
progress, and they pursued it assiduously.
Their four-point agenda revolved around access to 
quality education. Sharing the larger community's belief 
that education was important for advancement, black leaders 
adopted strategies to increase the educational 
opportunities of the black community. They formed various 
organizations to promote improved education. The 
educational campaign also served as a cohesive element in 
the black community. Tactics and strategies changed over
x
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time, and in part, reflected the tenor of race relations 
within the city. But the struggle for educational 
opportunity remained constant for over a century. In 
improved education resided the hopes and aspirations of the 
New Orleans black community.
Although some blacks in New Orleans attended private 
or parochial schools, the vast majority attended public 
schools. Between 1862 and 1960 blacks experienced 
exclusion, segregation, and integration within the public 
school system. Several distinct stages and themes 
characterized black education in New Orleans between 1862 
and 1960. In the first stage, from 1862 to 1869, blacks 
sought inclusion into the public school system, but 
primarily relied on the Union Army and the Freedmen's 
Bureau for education. During the second stage, 1869 to 
1877, blacks gained suffrage, and used their new political 
power to demand and receive improved, as well as, 
desegregated schools. The next stage, though not well 
defined, lasted from 1877 until the turn of the century.
In this period blacks lost suffrage and had to return to 
petitioning officials for educational improvements. The 
fourth stage spanned the years 1900 to 1945 and started 
with the familiar petitions. As the period progressed, 
however, the number of petitions increased and featured 
more assertive language. Black leaders and parents also 
organized themselves in an effort to win concessions from
xi
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school officials. During the fifth and final phase of this 
study, from 1945 to 1960, blacks abandoned mere petition 
and persuasion and resorted to the federal courts to gain a 
quality education for blacks.
This study will essentially focus on the century long 
attempt by black New Orleanians to acquire a public 
education that would enable them to combat racism, 
oppression, and develop their community. It is a study of 
people and a community and their reasons for and attempts 
to receive a quality education. It is a study more about 
black aspirations and organized resistance to racism and 
discrimination than it is about the legal and extra-legal 
efforts by whites to keep blacks in a subordinate position 
in society. It will also examine the endurance of black 
protest in New Orleans and advance the argument that black 
New Orleanians never fully accepted the inferior status 
that whites attempted to assign them.
Efforts by white leaders to deny blacks an adequate 
education were symptomatic of the larger effort to define 
the appropriate position for blacks in the city's social 
order. Therefore race relations and their impact on black 
education will also form a part of this study, as well as, 
how blacks perceived education as the foundation for a 
strong and viable black community. Blacks made important 
educational and community gains by surmounting adverse 
conditions brought on by slavery and discrimination.
xii
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chapter One
Education and the Politics of Race, 1862-1877
On 26 April 1862, a year after the start of America's 
Civil War, Union military forces under the command of 
Commodore David G. Farragut captured the important 
Confederate port city of New Orleans. The brevity of their 
city's participation in the war chagrined New Orleans 
whites and astonished its blacks. One of the city's 
leading newspapers perhaps best captured the sentiments of 
white New Orleanians: "We have devoted freely of our men,
our substance, and our exertions, to the defense of our 
beloved city, and have nothing wherewith to reproach 
ourselves, in the way of dereliction or neglect of duty, to 
accomplish that object. We have not succeeded."1
The entire fabric of the New Orleans community would 
eventually experience the transforming effects of the 
victorious Yankees, who condemned not just slavery but all 
facets of southern life. The northern critique of the 
South extended to its economy, which they considered 
stagnant; the social structure, which they considered 
rigid; and its politics, which they believed the bastion of 
a slaveowning elite.2 Moreover, northerners charged that 
the South's agrarian economy and reliance on slave labor 
contributed to a neglect of education. They noted that
1
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poor, uneducated whites retarded the South's growth as much 
as the uneducated slave.3 The increased urbanization of 
New Orleans during the antebellum period, however, meant 
the city diverged from the common southern pattern. It had 
established a public school system in 1841. Under the 
energetic leadership of John A. Shaw, an educator 
recommended by Horace Mann, the system overcame initial 
apathy, hostility, and financial problems, and by the start 
of the Civil War its stability and permanency were no 
longer in doubt.4 Thus, when reform-minded northern 
soldiers and, later, missionaries arrived in New Orleans, 
they found a system of public education modeled after the 
idea of universal education prevalent in many northern 
cities, especially those in New England. The problem in 
New Orleans, unlike other southern cities, was not 
entrenched widespread opposition to public education, but 
rather whether support for public education could be 
extended to include blacks.
Before the fall of New Orleans in 1862, the 
institution of slavery precluded any debate or 
consideration of public education for free blacks and any 
education for slaves. Although it was true free blacks 
enjoyed many privileges in antebellum New Orleans— the 
right to own property, enter contracts, inherit and will 
property, and legally marry— they could not attend public 
schools.5 Free blacks in New Orleans managed to amass a
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certain amount of wealth and supported several private 
academies. Additionally, some free blacks sent their 
children to study in France or hired tutors.6 Many less 
prosperous free blacks benefited from the generosity of 
Madame Bernard Couvent. A free woman of color, Madame 
Couvent willed several thousand dollars for the formation 
of a school for impoverished free black children. This 
school eventually became the Institution Catholique des 
Orphelins Indigents. Other free blacks received 
instructions from a small group of black nuns, the 
congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family, as well as 
at a school run by Carmelite nuns.7
Many slaves in the New Orleans area risked their 
safety in an attempt to gain an education. Since education 
remained a dangerous, furtive enterprise, it is difficult 
to assess accurately how many slaves achieved a degree of 
education. In New Orleans the limited autonomy that came 
with city life probably facilitated the black quest for an 
education.8 Scholars estimate that at least five percent 
of the South's slave population had learned to read by 
1860, although the historian Eugene Genovese suggests that 
the number exceeded five percent.9 Given the greater 
freedom of New Orleans slaves and their interaction with 
the area's free blacks, slave literacy in New Orleans 
probably did surpass five percent. But as another scholar
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concluded, "the overwhelming majority of the Negroes in New 
Orleans during this period were illiterate.1,10
Such figures and an environment hostile to black 
education meant that in the spring of 1862 black New 
Orleanians faced a daunting task.11 Although after the 
fall of New Orleans whites accepted the termination of 
slavery, they remained resolutely determined to preserve a 
social order erected on the rock-solid foundation of white 
supremacy. The quantity as well as the quality of black 
education became an important issue in determining the 
shape and texture of post-Civil War New Orleans. Despite 
the obstacles, blacks embraced the challenge with vigor and 
optimism.
Beginning in 1862 black New Orleanians embarked on 
their lengthy, trouble-filled journey to acquire an 
education. Although some free blacks had supported and had 
been exposed to education before 1862, the number of 
illiterate blacks seeking education far surpassed the 
ability of the black community to provide it. The small 
private schools continued to exist and even increased in 
number after the federal occupation, but public education 
quickly became more important than private schools in 
meeting the educational needs of the black community. The 
reason was simple; most blacks could not afford to pay the 
tuition required by private schools. Black education in 
New Orleans during occupation and Reconstruction benefited
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first from the initiatives of the Army and the Freedmen's 
Bureau and later from inclusion into the public schools.12
Almost immediately after their arrival in April 1862 
Union soldiers joined the movement to provide education for 
blacks. The effort lacked direction and structure until 
Union officials, responding to the requests of Army Chaplin 
Thomas Conway and black leaders, began to consider the 
etablishment of black schools. A decision by Union 
officials in September 1863 to allocate 3,000 dollars to 
defray the cost of educating 250 indigent students marked 
the start of direct financial involvement in black 
education. In October 1863 and March 1864 Major General 
Nathaniel P. Banks gave black education a significant boost 
by first authorizing the creation of black schools and 
later by ordering creation of a Board of Education to take 
charge of black education.13 The chairman of the Board of 
Education, B. Rush Plumly, voiced satisfaction with the 
initial start and believed, "the aptitude to these Colored 
children to learn is equal to that of the men of color for 
the act of war. Neither of them is excelled in their 
respective places, by any race on record."14 Black parents 
shared Plumly's enthusiasm; the number of students 
continued to increase. In all, 3,220 blacks attended 
school by December 1864, only nine months after Bank's 
initial decree. Clearly blacks had taken advantage of this 
educational opportunity.15
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The schools established by the Union Army represented 
the first organized attempt by a public agency to educate 
southern blacks. And Plumly would not be the last official 
to speak glowingly of the freedmen's determined capacity to 
learn. A year later, another Board of Education official, 
Mortimer A. Warren, wrote favorably about an advanced 
grammar school class. "I wish that this room of the 
Lincoln School might have a visit from all scoffers of 
Negro education. I shrink from no comparison with any 
other school of children, of the same age of any other 
color, of any other city, of any other clime or time."16 
Warren did not reserve his comments only for some budding 
educational elite. Capturing the educational mood of the 
black community, Warren noticed: "A thirst for knowledge
has been kindled in young and old which will not soon die 
out. It is talked of at home, it is preached from the 
pulpit.... In passing along the streets one not 
infrequently hears groups of dusky children rehearsing to 
one another, or to delighted parents their progress...."17
During the first year of operation most of the schools 
were single classrooms in rented houses. They usually bore 
the name of the teacher who had started them: Miss
Strong's School, Miss Buggie's School, Miss Clarkson's 
School, or Mr. Williams' School. Most of the teachers 
labored alone as teacher and principal. Enrollment, 
attendance, and classroom decorum varied tremendously
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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during the first year of operation. Few, if any, of the 
students had been exposed to the structure of a formal 
classroom. Nonetheless, the rod, a fixture in nineteenth 
pedagogy, and the threat of dismissal soon produced 
acceptable classroom behavior.18 “The children are 
remarkably attentive in class and making progress," 
reported J.H. Ford, one of the school site inspectors.19
Ford, a school inspector hired by the Board of 
Education, continued to dutifully submit his weekly 
reports, commenting on such things as the instructional 
program, attendance, behavior, and school needs. He was 
generous with his praise and unsparing in his suggestions 
and criticisms. Overcrowding remained a concern at some 
schools, but apparently Board of Education officials 
managed to alleviate the worst of it by opening additional 
schools. Board records fail to reveal what officials 
believed represented an acceptable class size. The 
prevailing wisdom, however, seemed to have been influenced 
by the dimension of the classroom. Cramped quarters, 
rather than a predetermined teacher-pupil ratio, indicated 
overcrowded conditions.20
The schools visited by Ford during that typically hot 
New Orleans summer stressed the traditional three "Rs", 
reading, writing, and arithmetic. The classes were 
ungraded, coeducational, and often included students who 
ranged in age from six to eighteen.21 Individual student
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performance cannot be gleaned from the reports of Ford or 
other officials. Only statements such as "The pupils know 
their lessons well" and "Mr. Williams' school is in a 
flourishing condition," indicate the students' educational 
progress. On one occasion, Ford noted, "at no time during 
the last three months have they been doing so well as this 
week. The teachers are constantly on the alert, order 
generally prevails, and the drowsiness which invaded many 
of the schools at the commencement of the warm season, has 
been succeeded by a lively activity. The progress of the 
pupils is very satisfactory."22
Not all students progressed, unfortunately. To obtain 
a more objective assessment of student performance, the 
Board of Education for Freedmen directed school officials 
to administer a common examination. School officials held 
the examination on 24 September 1864, but chose to test not 
all of the students, but only a randomly selected sample. 
Through misinformation, incompetence, or unavoidable 
circumstances, some of the students scheduled for testing 
missed the exams. Moreover, one teacher "had performed her 
duty so remissly during the three months preceding the 
examination, that not one of her scholars was sufficiently 
qualified to take part in the proceedings of the day.1,23 
Still, in the opinion of Ford, who compiled the report, the 
"result of this first exhibition was deemed highly 
satisfactory by the Examiner.1,24 One hundred and seventy-
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five students took the exam, which tested their knowledge 
in reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography. Several 
teachers and their students garnered specific praise, among 
them Mr. P. M. Williams, a black principal and his wife. 
Ford expressed some concern with the achievement in writing 
and arithmetic and targeted those subjects for increased 
emphasis in Board of Education schools. On the other hand, 
many students scored well in reading, spelling, and 
geography. Considering the substantial handicaps under 
which students, teachers, and school officials labored, the 
September exams were cause for praise. If queried, many 
blacks would have undoubtedly shared Ford's conclusion 
that, "notwithstanding the many drawbacks and difficulties 
with which the schools have had to contend during the 
year...the first exhibition must be regarded as highly 
successful, honorable alike to teachers and pupils,..."25
After the Civil War ended in April 1865, the Board of 
Education became a part of the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands.26 A significant consequence 
of the absorption of the Board of Education was a complete 
reorganization of the schools. The reorganization occurred 
in September 1865 just before the start of the 1865-1866 
school year. Three of the changes involved the creation of 
the Office of the Superintendent, graded classrooms, and 
the establishment of school districts. School principals 
reported to the City Superintendent, who in turn reported
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to the General Superintendent of Education in Louisiana. 
Instead of the previous practice of many small schools in 
close proximity to each other, under the district plan 
school officials consolidated the small schools into large 
units in the hopes of gaining greater efficiency and 
control.27
New Orleans comprised one of the state's seven 
divisions and possessed nineteen schools after the 
completion of the September reorganization. The 
overwhelming majority of students received instruction at 
the primary and intermediate levels, which generally 
consisted of grades one through five. Indeed, only four 
schools— Garrison, Lincoln, Sumner, and Douglas— had 
grammar school students, a total of 167. Three of the 
schools, Conway, Lincoln, and Banks, offered night classes, 
although they only accounted for a small percentage of 
total enrollment. The Bureau also sponsored a Normal 
School to train teachers and a school for industrial 
training. Two hundred and sixty students attended the 
Industrial School.28 Instructors continued to emphasize 
reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography. In the main, 
students made satisfactory progress, drawing praise from 
teachers and school officials.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table l
Freedman's Bureau Sponsored Schools
i n  29New Orleans Area After Reorganization.
Schools Number of Students Number of Teachers 
+ Principals




General Howard 376 7
Frederick Douglass 691 12
General Banks 609 11
General Butler 186 5





Soule Asylum 51 1
Industrial 260 4
Gretna 217 4
LA Avenue 119 3
Cadiz Street 181 3
Greenville 48 1
Totals 5624 104
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Between April 1864 and November 1865 schools for 
blacks in Louisiana had cost the federal government 333,165 
dollars.30 Reorganization, satisfactory progress, nor 
lavish praise, however, prevented the enactment of a 
measure calling for a monthly tuition fee. The new tuition 
policy, adopted by the board in January 1866, went into 
effect on 1 February amidst concern that enrollment might 
drop by more than fifty percent.31 Money to finance the 
schools had come from a five percent state tax on assessed 
property.32 The tax, imposed and collected by the federal 
occupying forces, encountered determined opposition from 
whites who resented taxes that financed black schools.33 
Whites also believed that the withholding of tax payments 
would undermine the federal occupation and hasten the 
departure of the federal troops. The failure of Bureau 
officials to collect sufficient taxes to pay for the 
schools doomed the idea of free education.
Under the tuition plan each principal received a 
monthly allotment of tickets priced at $1.50 each. In 
theory, students unable to purchase tickets were to be 
excluded from school. In actuality, many teachers with 
kind hearts allowed students who paid part or even none of 
the tuition to remain in class. For example, the principal 
of the General Banks School sold a ticket for a dollar "to 
a poor boy who could get no more."34 Such generosity was 
not an isolated incident. In the month of June, the
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Frederick Douglass School had an average attendance of 
eighty-six, yet only seventy-five students paid tuition.33 
The tuition policy, as well as the practice of allowing 
students to evade it, continued until the local public 
school system absorbed the Bureau schools. Nevertheless, 
as some had feared, the tuition policy did contribute to a 
marked decrease in enrollment, only 1,359 students attended 
schools in February 1866 compared to 5,330 in December 
1865.36 The decrease in enrollment convinced black leaders 
and Bureau officials that black education would not grow 
without inclusion into the city's public school system.37
The New Orleans public school system had somehow 
managed to remain in operation during the war years and the 
peace that followed. Although the school house doors 
remained open, the school system did experience some 
problems. In September 1862 the city council approved an 
ordinance that authorized the establishment of a Board of 
Education comprised of the mayor, the chairman of the 
Bureau of Finance, the chairman of the Bureau of Streets 
and Landings, and the City Treasurer. The Bureau of 
Education exercised complete control over the public 
schools and delegated responsibility to four Boards of 
Visitors, each representing one of the four city 
districts.38
By August 1866 the school system had experienced three 
more reorganizations. In June 1864, a city ordinance
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abolished the Bureau of Education and created a 13 member 
Board of Directors elected by the city council. A 
subsequent ordinance, approved in August 1865 created a 
twenty-four member Board of Directors appointed by the 
mayor. Half of the members received one year appointments; 
the remaining twelve served for two years. Not satisfied 
with this plan, the council in July 1866 passed an 
ordinance that provided for still another structural 
change. Board membership remained at twenty-four, but now 
six members had to come from each district. The 
Commisssion Council, rather than the mayor, received the 
power to appoint all of the members. One constant remained 
throughout the several organizations— city coffers financed 
the school system.39 That arrangement created conflicts 
between the Board of Directors and city officials regarding 
school expenditures, maintenance, and construction. Only 
on rare occasions did the Board of Directors receive the 
appropriations they thought necessary to manage the school 
system. The successive reorganizations and budget battles 
had little direct effect on blacks. From 1862 to 1867 
black New Orleanians remained outside the public school 
system. Their exclusion, of course, represented the will of 
the white community, not the choice of blacks.
Blacks used subterfuge and petitions in seeking 
inclusion in the city's school system. Some fair-skinned 
blacks simply attended all white schools and returned after
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school to their black communities. Some blacks of lighter 
hue passed undetected and permanently into white society. 
"Passing" to gain access to public education had its 
perils. White New Orleanians in general and school 
officials in particular remained vigilant in their efforts 
to keep their world and schools free from black 
encroachment, despite the fact that some blacks were fairer 
than those who protected the bastions of white supremacy. 
School board minutes for the 1860s revealed several 
references to school children suspected of "passing." In 
September 1862 the Board of Directors, by nine to one, 
voted that principals should forward cases of doubtful race 
to the board. Two weeks later the board reversed itself, 
fearing the number of cases would be too high. Instead 
they gave principals the authority to determine the racial 
status of students suspected of "passing." Some principals 
still referred specific cases to the entire board for 
cons iderat ion.40
The practice of "passing" was only available to a 
small number of blacks. The majority of the black 
population needed a more direct and effective method to 
attain public education. Then, too, "passing" no matter 
how laudable the purpose, represented a rejection of a 
black identity. And black leaders in the 1860s took pains 
to stress the dignity and worth of the black race and 
strenously denounced attempts to label blacks as inferior.
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Blacks were in an assertive mood and wanted, as well as 
expected, to share fully in New Orleans' social order. For 
them the Civil War marked a new departure; they wanted 
change and opportunity, not later in some distant land, but 
immediately and in New Orleans.
Among other things, blacks wanted inclusion in the 
public school system. During the state Constitutional 
Convention of 1864 it appeared that blacks would indeed 
receive a public education. The delegates voted to 
establish a dual public school system but refused to 
stipulate the manner of funding. A plan based on 
allocating the taxes each race paid to the separate school 
systems encountered opposition from black leaders and 
General Banks.41 The delegates decided to leave the matter 
of funding to the legislature, but the legislature refused 
to act. In New Orleans the local school board also 
rebuffed appeals by blacks for public funds to assist 
private educational efforts. In September 1865 black 
representatives of the Colored Indigent's School asked the 
board for $4,000 to help meet expenses for the 1865-1866 
school year. After referring the request to the Committee 
on Finance, the board voted no, maintaining it had "no 
right to appropriate funds for any purpose other than the 
support of the public schools proper of this city."42
The board's and the state's refusal to finance black 
education occurred, in part, because of the continued
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political powerlessness of blacks. Black leaders like Dr. 
Louis C. Roudanez, publisher of L1Union and the New Orleans 
Tribune. had fought without success for suffrage. They 
even presented their case in person to President Abraham 
Lincoln who later privately expressed the opinion that 
educated blacks with property and military service should 
receive the vote.43 Black suffrage remained a request 
unanswered because most whites shared the view of J. P. 
Montanot, a state representative from New Orleans. "I am a 
native of Louisiana," Montanot asserted, "and when this 
state extends to the Negroes the right of suffrage, I shall 
leave it forthwith and go to China."44 But the 
Congressional elections of 1866 brought more enlightened 
men to national office, the political climate changed 
perceptively, and both affected black education.
On 3 April 1867 the Board of Directors passed a motion 
to establish a five member committee to study the 
possibility of providing public education to black 
students.45 Board members also agreed to petition the 
Commission Council for authority and sufficient funds to 
establish black schools. Having refused for several years 
to provide any financial assistance for black education, 
why did the board change its position? The November 1866 
Congressional elections sent a clear but unheeded message 
to local and state officials that the moderate, pro-South 
phase of Presidential Reconstruction had run its course.
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The Reconstruction Acts in March 1867 sent a signal that 
Louisiana white leaders could no longer ignore. The state 
legislature responded with a law authorizing the 
establishment of separate public schools for blacks. By 
April 1867, black leaders were not only discussing 
inclusion, but integrated education as well. Therefore, 
the board's action represented an attempt to at once follow 
a legislative mandate but also preempt the integrationists 
and gain control of black education.46 The ploy worked, at 
least for a time.
Nevertheless, the board's proposal immediately became 
embroiled in a political tempest. The Commission Council 
approved the school board's request to establish separate 
black schools, but Mayor Edward Heath vetoed the measure.47 
He did so because he considered it "unjust to a very large 
number of citizens of New Orleans." Heath wanted the 
membership of the board increased to include blacks, "or a 
new board elected in which they should be fairly 
represented by their own race." He also maintained that
• • * 48the Council's 70,000 dollar appropriation was inadequate.
The Council managed to override the mayor's veto, and after 
both sides reached a compromise, the Council gave the 
school board authority to establish black schools and 
appropriated $70,000 for the effort.
The action of the Commission Council represented the 
time-worn gesture of closing the barn door after the horses
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had escaped. The Council vote in October 1867 merely 
acknowledged what had transpired over the previous two 
months. In August school officials had agreed on a plan to 
incorporate black schools. The board passed a motion 
empowering its president to appoint a committee composed of 
two men from each district "for the object of opening 
schools for the education of Colored children." The motion 
passed by the slim margin of eight to six. Some of those 
who voted against it explained that they opposed the motion 
because they doubted whether the board had the legal 
authority to establish black schools.49
Further support for the conclusion that the board's 
decision to educate blacks stemmed from a desire to 
forestall a drive for integrated schools came later. On 4 
September the board passed a resolution authorizing an 
investigation of "all the schools now in operation for the 
education of Colored children in the city to ascertain and 
report to this board the number and location of said 
schools; the number and salaries of teachers; the number of 
pupils; [and] how said schools are supported." To conduct 
this study the president selected a committee, "the 
Committee of Colored Schools." The committee received the 
additional task of determining what black school 
supporters— teachers, parents, patrons, and directors—  
thought about joining the public school system. Finally
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the board asked it to ascertain black sentiment concerning 
"mixed schools.,,so
The committee discharged its duty thoroughly and 
quickly. Only twelve days later, the president called a 
special meeting to hear the committee's report. Lengthy 
and detailed, it contained considerable information on 
black schools in the city. Of prime importance to school 
board members, the report disclosed the attitude of the 
heads of black schools pertaining to integrated schools. 
Most respondents, black and white, thought that separate 
schools were best and believed blacks favored them.
Reverend Steptoe, a black teacher in charge of a school 
housed at the Fourth Baptist Church, stated "separate 
schools were best for the present." William Finney, the 
black principal of Soule' Chapel School, also favored 
separate schools and ventured that "mixing the Colored and 
White in the same schools will excite prejudices and create 
ill-feeling and dissension between the races." John H. 
Collins, the white principal of a school on Gravier Street, 
spoke in favor of separate schools and charged that "the 
only people clamoring for mixed schools were black 
politicians and mulattoes. "S1
The contention that audacious black politicians and 
frustrated mulattoes were the only segment of the black 
population "clamoring" for integrated school deserves 
attention. Admittedly, most respondents favored separate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
schools, but several of them affirmed the principle of 
common schools or offered what they thought were adequate 
rationales for separation. For example, P. M. Williams, 
the head of the School of Boys and Girls on Gravier Street, 
initially stated "that the Colored children have a right to 
go to any public school...." He then tempered that bold 
statement with the observation that "under the 
circumstances existing in the city at present, it is 
advisable and for the best interests of all classes that 
separate schools should be established for white and 
colored children...." Other principals used the term,
"best interest," or like Reverend Steptoe, "best for the 
present," in explaining their support for separate schools. 
Their caution reflected the fact that black New Orleanians 
lived in a hostile environment, with many whites 
antagonistic towards black education and adamantly opposed 
to integrated schools.52
Nonetheless, board interrogators encountered several 
other individuals who spoke out forcefully for mixed 
schools. Most notable among them was the irrepressible 
Miss Edmonia G. Highgate, a black woman from Syracuse, New 
York. Miss Highgate admitted that "mixing the races now 
may create difficulties and injure the cause of education 
for the time being." She expressed confidence, however, in 
the eventual success of integration. She added that, in 
her opinion, intelligent black parents viewed integrated
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schools as their right. Despite her views, she gained the 
respect of the committee which thought her "a very 
intelligent, and apparently; highly educated lady.’1 E. 
Tinchand, a black Creole educated in France and the 
principal of a school in the Second District, also 
supported integrated schools, as did Bertrand Aggeret, the 
white principal of a small school on Ursuline Street.53
Ignoring the views of dissenters and buoyed by the 
comments favorable to separate schools, the board busied 
itself with establishing black schools. The school board 
Committee contacted and reported on seventeen black 
schools. Each of the city's four districts contained at 
least two.54 The first and second districts had six 
schools for blacks, the third district had two, and the 
fourth district had three. The size, affiliation, and 
sponsor of each school varied. At least eight of the 
schools were somehow affiliated with the Freedmen's Bureau, 
seven were private schools associated with an organization 
or an individual, and two were church affiliated. The 
financial support of the Freedmen's Bureau had been reduced 
substantially. Eleven of the seventeen schools charged 
tuition, ranging from $1.50 to $3.00 a month. The Bureau 
only provided funds for rent and textbooks at cost to the 
eight Bureau schools contacted by school officials. The 
importance of education to black families and the black 
community was poignantly dramatized by their efforts, from
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meager incomes, to pay the cost of their children's 
education.55
The board empowered the Committee on Colored Schools 
to assume responsibility for securing teachers and locating 
buildings for the black schools. The board intended to 
establish the schools within the structure of its system 
but did not commit itself to employ teachers presently in 
the black schools they contacted or to use current school 
buildings. Several newspaper announcements calling for 
teacher applications and buildings suitable for schools 
produced good results. Between 17 September and 2 October 
the board received ninety applications. Slightly less than 
half of the applicants enjoyed board certification and were 
eligible for immediate employment. The remaining forty 
seven had to take a competence exam for certification. 
Unfortunately, only six of them passed the exam. Still, 
the board had a sufficient pool of applicants, and the high 
failure rate did not hinder recruitment.56
The work of school officials and the educational 
aspirations of many blacks merged in October 1867 with the 
opening of the first public schools for blacks in New 
Orleans. During the same month, school officials 
established nine black schools. The Committee on Colored 
Schools also took measures to gain supervision over black 
schools still controlled by the Freedmen's Bureau.
Committee members met with Ephraim S. Stoddard, City
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Director of Freedmen's Colored Schools. At the meeting, 
described by one participant as "most pleasant and 
cordial," the conferees reached an agreement to transfer 
the schools to the Board of School Directors of the City of 
New Orleans.57 The transfer, completed on 15 November, 
included teachers, buildings, furniture, and equipment.
The Bureau transferred eleven primary schools to the board 
which brought the total number of new black public schools 
to twenty. Average daily attendance at the schools stood 
at sixteen hundred. Obviously pleased with the initial 
venture into black education, Superintendent William Rogers 
pronounced "the results thus far...most satisfactory" and 
requested authority to "expand departments as necessary." 
Superintendent Rogers, as well as the black community, 
expected and anticipated increased black enrollment. And 
concerned black citizens must have been optimistic when a 
board member proudly proclaimed "nothing has been omitted 
to make them [black schools] as efficient as any of the 
schools of corresponding grade in the city."58
By the close of 1867-1868 school year, black 
enrollment had reached thirty-five hundred and, with 
consolidations and closings, the number of black schools 
stood at fifteen. Black parents thought the figures 
encouraging; some school officials, however, held a 
different view. Reporting to the school board in May 1868 
Assistant Superintendent Alexander Dimitry cautioned the
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board that it "may have created a situation that will get 
out of hand by establishing education for blacks, it fuels 
interest and expectation." Dimitry added that the number 
of applications increased daily, which put a strain on 
existing classroom space. In fact, he disclosed, black 
students had already been turned away because of 
overcrowding.59
Dimitry's statement on overcrowding might explain the 
continued effort of blacks to gain entry into white 
schools. Blacks with few or no Negro features continued to 
circumvent the system of race segregation. One school, 
Bayou Road, in the downtown section of the city, reported 
twenty-nine students suspected of belonging to the "other" 
race. Even with inclusion, the idea of "passing" remained 
an option for many blacks. Their actions, in part, 
reflected the substandard condition of black education. 
Blacks realized that the white schools received, and would 
continue to receive, the largest share of the board's 
educational dollars. For example, the 1868 projected 
school budget submitted to the City Council totaled 396,900 
dollars. School officials planned to allocate only 65,000 
dollars of that to black schools.60 The continued 
inequitable distribution of school funds gave additional 
impetus to the push for desegregated schools.
There were no polls conducted in the 1860s and 1870s 
to ascertain what the masses of black New Orleanians
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thought about desegregated schools. The city's black 
leadership, however, made its views very clear. The most 
successful black newspaper in the 1860s, the New Orleans 
Tribune. which articulated the agenda and ideology of black 
leaders, strongly favored integrated schools. A typical 
editorial supporting mixed schools declared: "Separation
is not equality. The very assignment of schools to certain 
children on the ground of color is a distinct violation of 
the first principles of equality."61 Political 
developments soon demonstrated that many in the black 
community agreed.
The refusal of white leaders between 1862 and 1864 to 
extend suffrage and civil equality to wealthy and educated 
blacks, who were free before the Civil War, forced free 
blacks to form a bond with their less fortunate brethren. 
Therefore, in the 1860s white racism helped unite the black 
community, and segregation institutionalized it for the 
next one hundred years. New Orleans' free black 
population, eighty percent of which was mulattoes, out of 
necessity linked its political and civil liberation with 
that of the former slaves. That is not to say, however, 
that cleavages did not exist within the black community. 
Blacks, both formerly free and newly freed, carried certain 
cultural traits into post-Civil War New Orleans, not least 
of which was a language difference. Many free blacks spoke 
French exclusively or were bilingual. Indeed, their first
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newspaper appeared in French, L1Union. Their relative 
wealth also separated free blacks from freedmen.
The free blacks initial attempts to distance 
themselves from the former slaves, however, had less to do 
with skin color than perceived status based on wealth and 
education. Free blacks had no more inclination to 
associate with poor whites than they had to associate with 
poor blacks. In the main, wealth and education determined 
leadership in the black community during Reconstruction 
(and, of course, in the white community as well). Light- 
complexioned Creoles worked and associated with black- 
Anglos without dissension related to skin color. 
Disagreement over tactics, strategy, and conflict over the 
spoils of victory contributed more to black disunity than 
color prejudices.
For both the wealthy and the poor, the much awaited, 
and long campaigned for, black political participation 
arrived in 1868. Political empowerment enabled black 
leaders to alter their strategy. Instead of petitioning 
and supplicating public officials from a position of 
weakness, black leaders now had the political power to 
demand. Although black voters did not possess the 
numerical strength to dominate city and state politics, 
blacks nevertheless became a force and elected officials 
had to address their demands. High on the list stood a 
quality, integrated public school system. Blacks believed
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that continued race segregation in the schools reinforced 
the prevailing system of white superiority and black 
inferiority. That belief, coupled with the very tangible 
evidence of discrimination in school expenditures, helped 
to sustain the desegregation effort.62
During one of Louisiana's many constitutional 
conventions, this one in 1867, blacks managed to secure the 
inclusion of a measure prohibiting segregated schools.
This convention, convened under congressional oversight, 
contained a total of ninety-eight delegates.63 Fifty of 
them were black, with twelve of those from New Orleans.64 
As a group they possessed talent and diverse backgrounds. 
They represented "firm Republican party men who had support 
from the party and shared many of the same attributes: 
education, shrewd natural ability, military service, 
business ownership, and professional careers."65
The convention met in New Orleans on 23 November 1867 
and completed its work approximately fifteen weeks later. 
The delegates, both black and white, brought certain 
ideological and pragmatic objectives to Mechanics Institute 
Hall, the convention site, and they hoped to put a definite 
imprint on Louisiana's future. Ninety-six of the delegates 
were Republicans, but events during the course of the 
convention demonstrated the utter uselessness of party 
labels.66 The convention, historian Roger Fischer has 
argued, contained three distinct-factions. Sixteen members
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from the country parishes he considered white Unionists, 
and approximately thirty, mostly non-native whites, he 
labelled Radicals. The fifty black delegates formed a 
third faction.67 It would be a mistake, however, to 
suggest that any of the factions, especially the black 
group, was homogeneous. Generally, though, black delegates 
coalesced around two principles: universal suffrage and 
elimination of legal distinctions based on race.68 They 
hoped to codify in the constitution a new racial era for 
Louisiana. "Many of the convention delegates had little 
experience in exercising political power and had worked in 
an unfriendly atmosphere," observed a student of the 
subject, but "these limitations did not prevent them from 
establishing a workable structure of government."69
The black delegates played an important role during 
the convention, chairing or sitting on all of the various 
committees. They helped to produce one of the more 
enlightened and democratic constitutions in the state's 
history.70 In the true spirit of American constitution- 
making, compromise and moderation prevailed. Although the 
provisions granting suffrage co blacks and assuring them 
equal treatment alarmed many members of the white 
community, given the mood of Congress expressed through the 
Reconstruction acts and visible in the form of federal 
troops, most whites realized black enfranchisement 
represented a fait accompli. Then, too, some whites had
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heeded the words of the ex-Confederate war hero, General 
Pierre G. T. Beauregard who "urged Louisianians to accept 
the facts that Blacks would vote and work at influencing 
that vote."71 Despite the charges of "Africanizing" the 
state, whites resented the increasing political power of 
northerners more than the potential voting strength of the 
freedmen.72
Blacks were also interested in leadership, or rather
who would lead, but were most concerned with securing
"radical" legislation to promote civil and political
equality.73 Prior to and during the constitutional
convention, the New Orleans Tribune implored the black
community and its leaders to remain focused on the stated
objectives of universal suffrage and equality before the
law.74 Commenting on the potential of the convention as an
means for change, a Tribune editorial stated:
In a community where we have been so long 
laboring under a denial of justice, in a 
community where customs rather than laws 
perpetuate a constant discrimination between 
White and Colored children, it is a matter of 
necessity to provide in the new Constitution for 
the enforcement of impartial treatment to all 
men, women and children. This is the peculiar 
feature that the Constitution of 1867 will have 
to bear, a feature determined by the very spirit 
and the perverted customs of the Community for 
which that Constitution is to be made.75
Several of the delegates at the convention wasted
little time in attempting to negate, through constitutional
enactments,- "the perverted customs of the community"
regarding separate schools. James Ingraham from Caddo
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Parish and Dr. George Wickliffe of New Orleans introduced
measures pertaining to public education. Ingraham wanted
"the establishment of at least one Free Public School in
every parish of the State" and thought black and white
students should "attend school in the same school
houses."76 Wickliffe proposed a more comprehensive plan,
encompassing higher education, funding, and governance.
Wickliffe's "ordinance" contained eleven articles. Article
one of his proposal embodied the basic principles of civil
equality which blacks hoped to achieve.
The Legislature shall establish free public 
schools throughout the State, and shall provide 
for their support by taxation or otherwise. All 
children of this State between the ages of six 
and eighteen, shall be admitted to the public 
schools in common, without distinction to race, 
color, or previous condition. There shall be no 
separate schools established for any race.77
Without recorded debate, the president of the
convention, James G. Taliaferro, referred Ingraham and
Wickliffe's proposals to the Committee on Education. This
thirteen member committee, chaired by John Lynch, a white
northerner and former major in the Union Army, contained
six black and seven white delegates.78 In addition to
Lynch, one other white member had recently migrated south,
Peter Harper. Enough disagreement existed among the
members that it proved impossible for them to reach a
consensus. The most important, but not the only,
hinderance to unity was the issue of whether or not the
state should conduct its public schools "without
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distinction of race, color, or previous condition." Four 
members opposed the idea of desegregated schools and issued 
a minority report. Two of the four were transplanted 
northerners, Lynch and Harper, the other two, John Barrett 
and G. Snider had lived in the South before the war. Their 
minority report not only revealed their opposition to 
desegregation, but also to state control of education. For 
example, they wanted the members of the legislature to have 
the power to abolish the office of State Superintendent of 
Education by a two-thirds majority "whenever, in their 
opinion, said office shall be no longer necessary."79
Seven members, five blacks and two whites, signed the 
majority report. In scope and specificity, the proposal 
closely paralleled the measures introduced by Wickliffe.
It, too, forbade segregation in public schools; created, 
empowered, and set the salary of a State Superintendent of 
Education; and mandated the establishment of a state 
university in New Orleans, a normal school for teacher
training, and institutions for persons insane, visually and
• • • 80 audio impaired, and mentally deficient. The report was
in harmony with the thinking of many black New Orleanians
"that in order to have only one nation and one people, we
must educate all children in the same public schools."81
After receiving the committee's report the entire 
convention voted on various articles pertaining to 
education. Most of them aroused little debate or
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opposition and gained quick acceptance by the delegates.
As anticipated, however, the issue of desegregated schools 
aroused considerable discussion. By a vote of sixty-one to 
twelve, the delegates adopted article 134 which, except for 
two significant changes, mirrored the proposals of 
Wickliffe and the committee. Unlike Wickliffe's proposal, 
the bill that passed mandated the opening of "at least one
school in every parish throughout the State," and raised
82the school age limit to twenty-one. All of the black 
delegates, present and voting, cast their ballots with the 
majority. Six of the fourteen northerners serving as 
delegates and the six white southerners voted against 
Article 13 4.83
Several of the dissenters explained their negative 
votes. G. Snider of DeSoto Parish maintained Article 134 
"will be the great means of defeating the Constitution on 
the day of ratification." George Dearing refused "to 
inauguarate a system of schools in the present immoral 
state of society which I am forced to believe will have 
such a demoralizing influence." W. Jasper Blackburn, of 
Claiborne Parish, claimed to be "a friend of all men, and 
more especially of all children, regardless of race or 
color," Nonetheless, as a pragmatist he thought mixed 
schools would "break up our free public school system, or 
at least virtually exclude the Colored children from all 
participation therein." Another dissenter, William
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McMillen, before the Civil War a resident of Ohio, believed 
the inclusion of Article 134 would "defeat the organization 
of a complete and thorough common school system in the 
State.”84
The comments of McMillen, Blackburn, Dearing, and 
others contained a few common threads. They knew that the 
sixty-one yes votes to the contrary notwithstanding, most 
whites in New Orleans and throughout the state opposed the 
idea of mixed schools. Indeed, as Dearing pointed out, 
many whites opposed free public schools of any type. The 
delegates who voted no thought that insistence on mixed 
schools would lead to resistance and a general revolt 
against public schools. At the time of the convention, 
only New Orleans had more than a rudimentary public school 
system. And its system faced chronic financial 
difficulties. White apathy and hostility against mixed 
schools, they reasoned, would doom public education. To 
dissenters the choice was not between mixed schools or 
separate schools, but between separate schools or no 
schools. Peter Harper, who had served as a captain in the 
33th United States Colored Infantry, summed up that view 
when he declared: "I vote no, being anxious that a system
of schools might be established whereby all the children of 
the State may be educated, and being confident that this 
article of the Constitution will do much to defeat a 
desirable result."85
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Deference to white southern sensibilities, no matter 
how pragmatic, and allegiance to the "too soon” theory had 
by 1867 become a familiar refrain to the black community.
In one of several perceptive editorials criticizing the 
"too soon" advocates, The Tribune raised the rhetorical 
question, if not now, when? "When will the right time 
come? Is it, per chance, after we will have separated for 
ten or twenty years, the two races in different schools and 
when we shall have realized the separation of this nation 
into two peoples? The difficulty, then, will be greater 
than it is today."86 By the summer of 1867, five years had 
elapsed since the arrival of federal troops and the 
euphoric expectations that the Civil War was more than an 
epic conflict to restore the Union and end slavery, but 
also a battle to make the principles of democracy and 
equality a reality for six million black southerners. Five 
years had passed and many blacks shared the sentiment that 
"too soon" was rapidly becoming "too late." But hope is 
the enemy of cynicism, and as the delegates met in 
Mechanics Hall during the winter of 1867-1868, hope ruled 
the day. When the delegates finally adopted the 
constitution, including an article prohibiting separate 
schools, it appeared that maybe "too soon" had given way to 
"now."87 In April 1868, Louisiana voters went to the polls 
and voted 51,737 to 39,076 in favor of ratifying the
» • Q Qconstitution.
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The constitution provided Louisiana with a new system 
of government; legislators, however, had to transform the 
principles embodied in the document into workable laws. 
Anticipating the eventual adoption and ratification of the 
constitution and the subsequent call for statewide 
elections, Republican leaders in early December 1867 
expressed a need for a nominating convention to select
• • 89candidates for state office. The Republicans convened m  
January 1868 and produced a bi-racial slate of candidates 
headed by Henry Clay Warmoth for governor and Oscar J. Dunn 
for lieutenant governor. In selecting Dunn, the party 
attempted to placate a group of blacks, headed by Dr. Louis 
C. Roudanez, who had insisted on the selection of a black 
candidate, Francis E. Dumas, for governor.90
To many white New Orleanians, the new state 
constitution and subsequent laws were too enlightened and 
democratic, especially the ones pertaining to desegregated 
schools. Attempts to bring about mixed schools produced 
massive opposition. The school board refused to institute 
desegregation and continued to assign students to race 
specific schools. In fact, opposition forces managed to 
delay the effective start of desegregatgion until January 
1871.91
The city's white press vehemently opposed all efforts 
that undermined the dominant position of the majority 
population. But nothing enraged the shapers of public
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opinion more than the thought and prospect of integrated 
schools. Even the sharing of political power failed to 
elicit the same degree of editorial virulence. None of the 
newspapers exercised restraint or adopted a wait and see 
position. "The schools now established in this city have 
been founded by white people for white children," stated 
the New Orleans Times.92 A letter to the Times from "Fair 
Play" considered it "unjust to us poor people who cannot 
afford to send our children to private schools," to face 
the choice of mixed schools or no schools.93 By 1867, the 
white press, as well as citizens like, "Fair Play," stated 
they did not object to the idea of educating blacks, but 
they wanted it done in separate schools.
Not just the actions of rabid racists, but the caution 
of white Republicans delayed the start of desegregated 
schools in New Orleans. Many persons in favor of a unified 
system of public education urged caution in pursuing 
desegregated schools. Thomas W. Conway, State 
Superintendent of Education from 1868 to 1872, was one such 
individual. Conway gained his position as part of the 
Republican electoral surge of 1868. A former Chaplain in 
the Union Army, the New York native had held various 
positions related to freedmen between 1863 and 1868— at one 
time serving as Superintendent of the Bureau of Free Labor 
and Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau in
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Louisiana.94 He had also aided the struggle for black 
suffrage.
Conway, along with many others, believed that support 
for public education rested on fragile ground and the 
entire common school effort could collapse under the weight 
of too stringent a demand for mixed schools, especially in 
the rural parishes. In Conway's opinion, "the question of 
mixed or separate schools, however important in itself, 
must be conceded to be secondary to that for which alone 
schools, either mixed or separate, exist. The end is 
greater than the means."95 His views, of course, closely 
resembled the statements made at the constitutional 
convention by opponents of school desegregation. Conway 
thought the public schools suffered because of "the 
indifference, amounting to virtual opposition, which, in 
large sections of the state, has obstructed every endeavor 
for the establishment of public schools."96 He predicted 
that time would lessen the prejudices and passions of men 
and separate schools would suffer the fate of slavery.
The seductive allure of time itself as an agent of 
positive change did not appeal to New Orleans' black 
leaders. They consistently and repeatedly demanded mixed 
schools. Neither the abolition of slavery nor the 
acquisition of the ballot had resulted from a change of 
heart among southern whites. Union guns had secured the 
former and Republican ideology the latter. Armed with the
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vote and buoyed by the presence of federal forces, blacks 
saw little reason for gradualism. Then, too, little 
evidence existed in New Orleans to indicate a softening of 
white attitudes towards the freedmen. The haunting spector 
of the 30 July massacre at Mechanics Hall, where a white 
mob wounded or killed hundreds of blacks, persisted years 
after the event.97 Democrats, pledged to the status quo, 
controlled city politics, and the white press remained 
hostile. After fighting for six years to gain the vote and 
an opportunity for a public education, blacks doubted 
"time" would favor their cause.
The refusal of the board to institute desegregation 
eventually made Conway discard his cautious stance on mixed 
schools. He wrested control of the schools from the board 
by allocating state education funds to ward boards. The 
incumbent board unsuccessfully appealed Conway's decision 
to the Eighth District Court of Judge Henry C. Dibble, "a 
Northern-born Radical." In March 1871, at the urging of 
Conway, the state legislature passed a bill that 
restructured the school board. The new bill created a 
thirteen member board with one representative from each of 
the city's thirteen wards and the city's treasurer served 
as an ex-officio member. The State Board of Education 
appointed the members and selected Judge Dibble to 
represent the Second Ward. The new board also contained 
three blacks— P. B. S. Pinchback, John R. Clay, and Blanc
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F. Joubert. With this reorganization and "friends" of 
black education in power, the administrative impediment to 
desegregation disappeared.98
In January 1871 the experiment in desegregated 
education began. Just how many schools actually had 
students of both races is impossible to determine. During 
this period, school officials reported enrollemnt figures 
without regard to race. Moreover, there are no extant 
minutes of the school board for the period July 1869 to 
January 1875. Comments by contemporaries, however, 
indicate that at least one-third of the public schools 
experienced some desegregation between 1869 and 1877."
"Some of the schools of the city are almost wholly white, 
others are partially mixed, while some of the best grammar 
schools are about half and half," reported a Methodist
journal, "Colored scholars are in our high schools, and
• 100 also m  our State Normal School." Several months later
the Weekly Louisianian stated that one-third of the schools
were mixed.101 Interest by blacks in desegregated schools
remained high throughout the period.
The number of blacks attending desegregated schools 
would have been higher if school officials had elected to 
assign students to specific schools. Instead, school 
officials instituted an open admission plan.102 Not 
realizing the depth of desegregationist sentiment within 
the black community, school officials hoped their freedom
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of choice policy would keep desegregation to a minimum.
The open admission policy, however, failed to thwart 
desegregation. A knowledgeable student on the subject 
placed the number of black students who attended 
desegregated schools at 500 to 1,000.103
In a study on New Orleans school desegregation during 
Reconstruction, Louis Harlan identified twenty-one to 
twenty-five schools attended by both races.104 Districts 
two through seven contained eighteen of the desegregated 
schools in 1872.105 The concentration of desegregated 
schools in slightly less than half of the city's thirteen 
representative districts reflected the residential pattern 
of the black community. Except for the three high schools 
opened to students from throughout the city, blacks 
attended desegregated schools located in their 
neighborhoods. The cost of transportation, if available at 
all, caused most students, black and white, to attend 
schools close to home.
Black leaders championed desegregated schools because 
they wanted racial distinctions eliminated from post-civil 
War society. Enfranchisement gave them an opportunity to 
transform their ideals into reality; New Orleans maintained 
desegregated schools from 1871 t > 1877. Blacks knew, and 
later events demonstrated, that desegregated schools and 
the other vestiges of civil equality depended on the 
retention of suffrage. Blacks also knew that most whites
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
wanted them removed from the political arena. As a result 
blacks welcomed any sign that indicated a softening of 
white opinion on matters of suffrage and civil equality. 
During this period blacks did find some whites who 
expressed a willingness to endorse black suffrage and civil 
equality.
By 1873 desegregated schools had not led to better 
race relations, rather a temporary and slight improvement 
in race relations helped sustain the mixed school idea.106 
The improvement grew out of the convergence of politics and 
education. Political expediency, not a change in attitude, 
forced some white leaders to reduce their attacks on 
desegregated education. White New Orleanians and the 
city's white press "actually sought to win the Negro's vote 
on a basis of recognizing his civil rights," explained one 
historian.107 Their acquiescence in an issue blacks viewed 
as a litmus test of the sincerity of whites' intention to 
treat blacks as equals made an attempted black-white 
political coalition possible in the 1870s.
The effort at compromise and conciliation culminated 
in the Unification Movement of 1873. Influential white 
business leaders believed that continued racial 
polarization reflected in disputed elections and sporadic 
violence would lead to the state's ruin. Indeed, many
thought the state under Republican party rule had long
» 108 since entered a state of decay. Moreover, most whites
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blamed northern opportunists for what they considered 
rampant political corruption and mismanagement. Business 
leaders, acting on the assumption that "the great port 
metropolis needed political stability to achieve economic 
prosperity" attempted, albeit briefly, to charter a new
• 109course m  New Orleans' race relations. Isaac N. Marks, a 
wealthy New Orleanian with diverse business intersts, 
emerged as one of the leaders of the movement. Other white 
leaders included General P. G. T. Beauregard, James I. Day, 
and Judge William M. Randolph.110
Attempts at "unification," of course, had to include 
the participation of blacks. Concerned about the level of 
violence and racial animosity, many black leaders endorsed 
and supported the Unification Movement. Louis C. Roudanez, 
a black physician and recognized leader in the black 
community, pledged his support.111 In addition to Roudanez, 
other black participants included Aristide Mary, Lieutenant 
Governor Caesar C. Antoine, and George Y. Kelso, a state 
senator.112 Not all Republicans were enthusiastic about the 
movement's potential, though. The New Orleans Republican, 
for example, questioned the wisdom of joining any political
• 113 •movement other than the Republican Party. With all of 
its alleged faults and political vices, the Repulican 
Party, in the opinion of many blacks, represented the party 
of liberation and black enfranchisement. They remained 
reluctant to venture into unchartered waters. The
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architects and supporters of the unification plan thought 
they had developed the perfect means to achieve political 
peace and economic prosperity in post-civil War Louisiana. 
And perhaps they had. After several months of discussion 
and planning, a citizen's committee comprised of fifty 
black and fifty white leaders— a racial composition 
strikingly similar to that of the 1867-1868 Constitutional 
Convention— presented its list of recommendations to the 
public.114 As a citizen committee devoid of legal 
legitimacy, the Committee of One Hundred sought widespread 
public support and presented its views as "An Appeal for 
the Unification of the People of Louisiana.1,115 Commenting 
on the proposals contained in the "appeal," one scholar 
noted, "no group of Southerners in the Reconstruction era 
was willing to go farther in harmonizing race relations 
than the authors of this document....1,116 The unifers hoped 
to secure black support for a political alliance dedicated 
to honest government, free from out of state influence. In 
return, blacks would be guaranteed political and civil
• tl7equality.
The Unification Movement, centered in the city and led
primarily by New Orleanians, received little support
• 118 outside the area. Except for a well attended mass
meeting on 15 July 1873, the Movement failed to produce a
viable black-white political coalition. Ushered in during
the promise of spring, the Movement losts its momentum
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after the July meeting. Why did the Movement fail? Blacks 
doubted the ability of white leaders to make good on their 
promises. The shouts of one white participant at the 
meeting questioning whether Marks would send his children 
to mixed schools did not allay their fears. The shouting 
spectator, more than Marks, reflected the sentiments of 
white New Orleans. The primary cause of the Movements' 
failure, however, rested with the refusal of whites to 
accept racial equality.119 The rejection of the principles 
of equality also affected black education.
The same fear of, or better aversion to, racial 
equality also undergirded white opposition to desegregated 
schools. The conservative disavowal of violence and other 
extra-legal means of popular protest eventually waned in 
the face of the seemingly intransigent radical Republican 
governments. Failure to reach a qtick settlement during 
the disputed state elections in 1872 resulted in the 
establishment of rival governments, both claiming 
legitimacy.120 Para-military gatherings became an accepted 
form of political expression. The White League grew in 
strength and boldness, and the level of violence increased 
during the spring and summer of 1874.121 The term massacre 
became a familiar one to the black community. In September 
1874, at the "Battle of Canal Street," the tide turned
perceptively and permanently in the direction of the White
122 • •League and the Democrats. Within that milieu of violence
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and distrust the public schools existed, some still 
desegregated.123
To many black New Orleanians, desegregated schools 
represented the promise of black enfranchisement and civil 
equality. To whites they illustrated its perils. On 14 
December 1874 some whites turned to mob violence to 
accomplish what they could not as yet do legally—  
resegregate the schools. Initial signs of unrest occurred 
at the Girls Upper High School located in the uptown 
section (above Canal Street) of the city. Several black 
students and their teachers from Coliseum School came to 
the school to take their high school entrance exams. The 
principal refused to allow them to do so, stating it 
violated a directive she had received from Superintendent 
Charles Boothby. The students, all white, demonstrated 
their agreement with the principal by threatening to 
boycott the school until they received assurances that 
school officials would not admit blacks. The graduating 
seniors went even further and signed a petititon vowing not 
to accept their diplomas until school officials settled the 
matter.124
The disturbance at Girls' Upper High School quickly 
spread, fueled by the white press. On 15 December, a group 
of men physically attacked Superintendent Boothby for 
alledgely insulting several students from Girls' Upper 
High. Boothby denied the accusation, and the principal,
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teachers, and students at Girls' Upper High corroborated 
his statement. As Superintendent of the Schools, Boothby 
had become a prime target for whites who were dissatisfied 
with desegregated schools. The attack resulted from 
frustration, and the alledged insult to female students, 
was merely an excuse.125
Blacks at several other schools also experienced 
violent manifestations of white discontent. When black 
students attempted to apply at Boys' High School, a group 
of whites prevented it. By this time the whites, most of 
them students, had gained approving names like "youthful 
regulators" and "young board of directors," from the white 
press. Spurred on by their new notoriety, the group 
visited the Girls' Lower High School, located below Canal 
Street, and attempted to expel the black students in 
attendance (in a community where many blacks were 
indistinguishable from whites, the young toughs had a
» 12/5difficult task determining racial identity). They 
succeeded in disrupting the attempts of blacks to enter or 
remain in the high schools. Their success then led to 
similar disturbances at several primary and grammar 
schools, and continued white harassment led eventually to
• • 127fights between blacks and whites.
During the several days of unrest, the police could 
not restore order; faced with the prospect of escalating 
violence, the school board closed the schools. They
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reopened on 11 January 1875 amid relative calm. The board 
thought it wise to give Superintendent Boothby authority to 
close any school threatened with disturbances.128 Minor and 
sporadic clashes continued throughout the remainder of the 
school year, but there is no evidence that Boothby closed 
any of the schools.129 He did contend, however, that "the 
violent attacks upon many of our schools in December," 
contributed to a higher than normal rate of absenteeism in 
January and February.130 New Orleans' experiment in 
desegregated schools, unique to the South, continued 
despite the upsurge in violence in December 1874. Some 
schools remained desegregated until the administration of 
Governor Francis T. Nicholls.
Did the reality of the desegregated system equal the 
expectations blacks had for the system? Did black students 
in fact receive a "better" education in mixed schools? The 
available evidence supports a qualified yes to these 
questions. During the period of desegregation, blacks 
attended all of the city's high schools. After the 
absorption of the Freedmen's Bureau schools, and before 
effective desegregation, the city only provided blacks with 
schools through the grammar level. Moreover, "nearly all 
the mixed schools were classified as Grammar A Schools, 
which had more teachers and a higher salary scale, and sent 
more graduates to the high schools than the Grammar B
• 131 • •Schools and Primary schools." Desegregation, at least in
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theory and to a degree in practice, expanded over three­
fold the number of schools available to blacks.
Inclusion into the public school system did not, of 
course, eliminate the myriad of problems related to black 
education. Many black students, like their white 
counterparts, attended substandard, overcrowded, ill- 
equipped schools, often receiving instruction from 
unqualified teachers. During Reconstruction, the entire 
system of education in Louisiana was in an experimental 
stage, made more difficult by the exigiences of war and its
aftermath. As recently as 1862, New Orleans possessed four
distinct school systems, representing the city's four 
municipal districts. Only the Second Municipal district 
had attempted to provide adequate funds for its schools.
During Reconstruction, opposition to taxes for 
education increased as charges of political corruption
• • , 132 • •became more frequent and vitriolic. Historian Horace 
Mann Bond's contention that, "in Louisiana, the scarcity of 
funds for operating the schools resulted in an almost 
complete absence of public funds outside of the large
t 133cities," gave too much credit to New Orleans. In truth, 
the situation in New Orleans was only slightly better than 
in the rural parishes. Each of the three superintendents 
often commented on the lack of school revenues. "For many 
years the appropriations for public education in this 
city— always inadequate— have remained about the same, in
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disregard of the increase of population," lamented one of 
them, John B. Carter.134
During the period of school desegregation, school 
officials focused on the many problems associated with 
administering a growing school system chronically short of 
revenues. Black leaders and parents also concerned 
themselves with the larger issue of how to provide the city 
with good public schools.135 Enough opposition to the mixed 
school idea remained, necessitating constant vigilance and 
defense of the experiment in desegregated education.
The organization of the New Orleans Schools remained 
the same throughout the 1860s and 1870s, consisting of 
primary, grammar, and high schools. The overwhelming 
majority of students attended primary or grammar schools.
To meet the demand for them, the city's thirteen districts 
contained at least two, or often, more schools. For 
example, in 1872, nine of the thirteen districts had four 
or more grammar or primary schools. The Twelfth District 
possessed the most schools, twelve, and had the third 
largest school age population.136 Only three schools 
offered instruction beyond the grammar grade level. 
Enrollment throughout the period decreased at the higher 
grade levels. During the 1872-1873 school year, for 
example, 16,259 of the 19,747 primary and grammar students
1*V7were between the ages of six and twelve.




in the New Orleans Public Schools, 1867-
Year Black White Total
1867 4,378 17,190 21,568
1868 3,626 18,379 22,005







Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
Many students entered school house doors for the first 
time because of the educational initiatives of the 1860s 
and 1870s. State Superintendent of Education, William G. 
Brown expressed the new emphasis on universal education, 
"There is no force as powerful to lift mankind from a 
position of dependence and narrow, circumscribed life as 
education. It is the laborers' faithful friend and 
counselor, standing sentinel to guard his liberties, to 
render a helping hand in the hour of perplexity and doubt, 
the good genius that enables him to overcome the 
difficulties and embarrasments of the hour, and achieve
139success." Brown's comments represented an appreciation 
of the role education could play in the development of the 
black community. When Brown left office in 1877 blacks had 
taken the first steps toward community development and 
educational attainment. It was already apparent, however, 
that each succeeding step would be met with resistance.
The first stage of educational attainment had involved a 
struggle for inclusion and desegregation; the next stage 
involved the contest to decide blacks' "proper place."
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Chapter Two
Education and the Struggle for Blacks'
Proper Place, 1877-1900
Recent scholarship has provided a corrective to the 
belief that the Hayes-Tilden election of 1877 represented a 
sharp and abrupt change in the decade-old program of 
Congressional Reconstruction. Hayes' decision to withdraw 
the last of the federal troops from the South was only one 
of many significant events that helped return the South to 
"home-rule." Before 1877 even the staunchest 
interventionist realized, given the level of white 
hostility and violence, it would take a major commitment by 
the federal government to sustain effective black political 
participation. The nation's leaders, however, thought it 
best to return the "Negro Question" to the region where the 
problem resided— the South. Northerners, as well as 
southerners, turned their attention to what they considered 
a more important agenda, the building of an industrialized 
North and a New South with an industrial emphasis. The 
importance of protecting the civil rights of blacks paled 
in importance by comparison.1
In the mid-1870s public interest in education 
declined as city leaders— both black and white—  
concentrated on the raging battle for political control of 
the city. The competing groups camouflaged themselves with
53
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party labels, but they fought over whether newly 
enfranchised blacks would continue meaningful political 
participation. The black community, led by such political 
stalwarts as P.B.S. Pinchback and C. C. Antoine, eventually 
lost the battle for political participation and with it 
some of the educational momentum generated between 1868 and 
1877.2
Blacks in general, and those in New Orleans in 
particular, did not passively acquiesce in the decision to 
reduce them to an inferior status in society. Throughout 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century, they 
continued their attempts to vote and to influence political 
decisions. Nevertheless, the status of blacks deteriorated 
in small increments, not in one climactic fall. More than 
the decline in political participation, however, adversely 
affected black education. The amount of money spent on 
black schools depended on the health of the city's economy, 
the attitude of white political leaders, and the level of 
protest by black leaders and parents.3 Black education, in 
other words, remained hostage to white political supremacy, 
inadequate revenues for the entire system, and racist 
thought concerning the proper level of education for 
blacks.
The resolution of Louisiana's second disputed election 
of the decade brought, along with ''home rule," Robert M. 
Lusher back into office as State Superintendent of
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Education, replacing William G. Brown. During the period 
of the Republican ascendancy, Lusher had served as 
Louisiana's agent for the Peabody Fund and administered the 
fund to finance a private school system for whites.4 He 
returned to public office in 1877 determined to amend "the 
anomalous provisions of Articles 135 and 136 of the State 
Constitution." With the Democrats in power Lusher 
expressed confidence that the new legislature would not 
"delay in replacing these articles by more acceptable 
provisions for the mental instruction and moral training of 
the two races, in separate schools, with equal facilities 
and advantages for both."5
Lusher, described by one scholar as a "dogmatic white 
supremacist," had no intention of providing blacks with 
equal school facilities.6 In his estimation blacks should 
receive, at most, a primary school education in preparation 
for employment as unskilled workers. He was less 
interested in providing equal education than he was in 
implementing resegregation. Lusher believed "that nine- 
tenths of our colored fellow citizens prefer separate 
schools for the education of their children, and that the 
desire to enter white schools, in contravention of the 
natural law, is peculiar to children of mixed white and 
colored blood, whose parents have always been free."7 To 
satisfy the black Creoles, who he thought did not want to 
associate with dark-skinned blacks, Lusher proposed the
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establishment of a three tiered school system with separate 
schools for whites, black creoles, and blacks.8 Operating 
a dual system would prove costly enough and the three 
tiered system never took hold.
Lusher directed his attention to New Orleans, where 
desegregation still existed. Before Lusher could implement 
his plan of school segregation he had to remove the 
incumbent school board whose members had blocked "the 
sunlight of peace and reconciliation," by allowing mixed 
schools.9 Using the appointive power contained in a new 
school act of March 1877 and following recommendations made 
by the state legislature, Lusher appointed eight members to 
the new twenty member school board. The other twelve 
members were named by the Board of Administrators 
(Commission Council). The school superintendent and the 
city treasurer served as ex-officio members. Four of the 
new members were black— George H. Fayerweather, Louis A. 
Martinet, Joseph A. Craig, and Pascal M. Tourne. All of 
them except Craig had received state appointments.10 
During their bid for control of state government, the 
Democratic "Redeemers" had promised to assure continued 
black participation in politics. They made it clear, 
however, that black participation would be minor.11 The 
four black appointees represented an attempt by the 
Democrats to keep their promise, at least for a time.
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The new board organized on 4 April 1877 and elected 
Thomas J. Semmes president. It named William 0. Rogers 
Superintendent, a post he had held in the 1860s. Rogers, 
like Semmes, and most of the board members, wanted the 
schools resegregated as soon as possible. But certain 
problems, primarily a lack of revenues, forced them to 
retain mixed schools until the end of the school year.
They spent the next two months trying to operate the school 
system on a 25,000 dollar a month budget.12
On 6 June board member Archibald Mitchell moved "that 
a committee of three be appointed, who in conjunction with 
the superintendent shall report at their earliest 
convenience what changes may be necessary to effect a more 
thorough discipline in the Public Schools...."13 
Mitchell's motion may have been vague, but his colleagues 
understood its intent. The appeal for a "more thorough 
discipline" was actually a call to resegregate the schools.
President Semmes appointed Mitchell, Joseph Collins, and 
Robert Bartley to the committee. Less than three weeks 
later the committee had completed its report.
At a special meeting on 22 June the board sought to 
codify white sentiment for a racially segregated school 
system. Mitchell outlined the rationale for it in his 
committee's report to the board. "Personal observation and 
universal testimony," he stated, "concur to establish the 
fact that public education has greatly deteriorated since
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colored and white children were admitted indiscriminately 
into the same schools." Detrimental effects of 
desegregated schools, the committee members contended, 
included a decline in white enrollment since white parents 
refused to send their children to desegregated schools. 
Blacks also suffered because of the "turbulent spirit" of 
whites, manifested most demonstratively in the school 
disturbances of December 1874. Mitchell was "not reluctant 
to recommend separation because [he] believe[d]...both 
races favor[ed] separate schools." To give added weight to 
their proposal the committee members pointed out that they 
believed northern cities such as New York, Philadelphia, 
and Cincinnati also had separate schools.14
Desegregated schools were not the only practice under 
attack at the special meeting. To their horror, supporters 
of public education learned that the same three member 
committee recommended the discontinuation of all high 
schools. The committee offered the familiar reason for 
such a drastic step— a lack of funds. But Mitchell went on 
to explain that "whilst recommending the measure as a 
financial necessity alone we do not deem it improper to 
state that we do not regard our High Schools as 
indispensable requisite to an efficient system of public 
education, and are inclined to believe that teaching 
advanced studies at the public expense is an abuse of our 
educational system."15 The committee's report and
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Mitchell's statement in support of closing the high schools 
indicated the lack of broad based support for public 
education in the city of New Orleans. The lack of 
financial support by the community hampered the entire 
educational system, especially the educational 
opportunities for blacks. The board, however, decided to 
defer action on the two proposals until the next meeting.16
Black leaders responded to the proposal to resegregate 
the schools by appealing to Governor Nicholls to intervene 
before the board voted. Aristide Mary, a black landowner 
who had been active in the struggle for suffrage and civil 
rights, led a delegation of blacks who met with the 
governor. The group denounced the board's plan, but 
Nicholls simply replied that his pledge to promote black 
equality did not include support for desegregation. 
Frustrated in their attempt to gain the support of 
Nicholls, black leaders tried a more direct approach.18
When the board met on 3 July 1877, a large delegation
of blacks attended and presented a lengthy petition
protesting separate schools. Again, Mary provided
leadership and counsel to the black protestors. The board
received the petition, took no action on it, and proceeded
with its agenda. Without rancor or rhetoric, the spokesman
for the segregationist forces, Archibald Mitchell, offered
a motion to resegregate the races:
Whereas: This board, in the performance of its
paramount duty; which is to give the best 
education possible with the means at its disposal
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to the whole population, without regard to race, 
color or previous condition, is assured that this 
end can be best attained by educatina the 
different races in separate schools.
The proposal to resegregate the schools passed by a
vote of fifteen to three. Three of the black members cast
the only dissenting votes— Martinet, Fayerweather, and
Toume. The other black member, Joseph Craig, voted with
the majority.20 Why did Craig vote to end the experiment
with mixed schools? Neither Craig, nor any other member,
gave a reason for his vote so a definitive answer remains
elusive, but available evidence suggests one or two
plausible reasons. Craig supported the Democratic Party
and according to one source was the founder of a "colored
conservative club."21 The term "conservative" in Craig's
case probably meant an acceptance of the "Redeemers" pledge
of peace between the races based on a policy of "separate
but equal." Craig's vote could have reflected the belief
that separate schools would lead to improved race
relations. On the other hand, his vote may have been
merely a gesture to the politicians that placed him on the
board.22
Craig's vote, of course, had no influence on the final 
decisions to resegregate the schools. Even if blacks had 
voted as a "block" they were, as Governor Nicholls aptly 
phrased it, "sandwiched in" without control. The 
significance of Craig's vote lies outside the school board 
and its decision to resegregate the schools, but within the
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black leaders had waged a battle for suffrage, civil 
equality, and acceptance into the larger society. Some of 
their deeds during Reconstruction were petty and venal, but 
the articulated ideology that made it possible for them to 
serve had its tap-roots deep into basic American values—  
democracy, equal opportunity, and equality before the law. 
The withdrawal of federal troops, its impact powerfully 
more symbolic than real, and the inauguration of the 
Nicholls administration presented the black community with 
its first ideological crisis. At what point should 
principles give way to pragmatism? Craig's vote signaled 
the beginning of that ideological struggle. He had 
apparently chosen not to fight on principle but to seek a 
practical accord with white supremacists. But the men of 
principle had not yet surrendered the field.
The board acted on its segregation motion during the 
summer recess, therefore, concerned black leaders had time 
to formulate a response. It is difficult to assess how 
many blacks favored desegregated schools or accepted the 
pragmatism implicit in Craig's vote. At least two views 
existed within the community. Many blacks had never 
enjoyed the benefits associated with desegregated schools.
At most only twenty to twenty-five percent of black 
students attended mixed schools. Yet all had suffered 
verbal abuse, mob intimidation, and physical violence in
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the cause of desegregation. Those who had gained little if 
anything from integration, but still suffered as much from 
white violence, considered segregation as a possible 
prerequisite to ending race-related violence. Therefore, 
some blacks welcomed the return to segregated schools, 
though were neither as vocal nor as organized as those who 
remained committed to the battle for an integrated 
society.23
Blacks held several meetings throughout the city in 
response to what they considered a crisis. According to 
the Weekly Louisianian, a local black newspaper, attendance 
at the meetings was "large and enthusiastic." The 
participants adopted resolutions condemning the board for 
violating the 1868 State Constitution that had prohibited 
the establishment of separate schools. Black leaders 
thought they had legitimate grounds for legal action and 
decided to contest the board's decision in court.
Attorneys filed a suit in the Sixth District Court on 
behalf of Paul Trevigne, a black teacher, former editor of 
L'Union, and former school board member.24 The presiding 
judge, N. H. Rightor, issued a temporary restraining order 
forbidding the school board from proceeding with the 
resegregation plan.25
On 23 October 1877, however, Judge Rightor lifted the 
restraining order and dismissed Trevigne's suit. He ruled 
that Trevigne had failed to show personal injury and had
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filed the suit after the board had resegregated the
schools. By using these grounds to dismiss the suit, Judge
Rightor skirted the central issue in the case— the
constitutionality of the board's plan. Article 135 of the
1868 Constitution forbade separate schools, yet the school
board had adopted and instituted measures to accomplish
what the constitution would not allow. Rightor chose not
to attempt the difficult task of reconciling law with
(’'immunity sentiment. The next judge to hear a similar case
from the black community displayed no such misgiving.26
Arnold Bertonneau, a black merchant, Civil War
veteran, and delegate to the 1867-1868 Constitutional
Convention, also filed a suit opposing resegregation.27
Bertonneau attempted to avoid the legal fate of Trevigne by
demonstrating specific injury from the school board's
policy. He attempted to register his children in the
Fillmore School without success and in his suit charged the
school board and its agents with violating his civil
rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article 135 of the
28State Constitution.
Judge W. B. Woods did not reach a decision until 
fifteen months later; in the meantime the black and white 
communities argued the merits of the case in the press.
The New Orleans Times. anti-black but without the virulence 
of the New Orleans Daily States, came out forcefully in
29favor of separate schools. The Times' editors thought
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Pinchback had orchestrated the continued struggle for mixed 
schools and speculated that he was "too shrewwd a man to 
cherish such an absurd and impractical scheme, too adroit 
and frugal a politician to waste time in pursuit of a 
chimera." The combative and equally committed Pinchback, 
through his newspaper, the Louisianian, replied that, "As 
citizens and taxpayers entitled to the protection of the 
courts, we are therein to prevent the perpetuation of a 
great wrong upon us. . . .1 Articulating the hopes of many 
blacks, Pinchback optimistically stated, "we do not despair 
of ultimate success.1,31
In February 1879 Judge Woods reached his decision in 
favor of the school board. The establishment of separate 
schools based on race was not a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, according to Judge Woods. He compared racial 
separation in schools to sex separation, a widely accepted 
practice. Under the desegregation policy adopted by the 
board, "both races are treated precisely alike. White 
children and colored children are compelled to attend 
different schools. That is all. The State, while 
conceding equal privileges and advantages to both races, 
has the right to manage its schools in the manner which in 
its judgement will best promote the interest of all."32 
Judge Wood cited an Ohio law, upheld by the Ohio Supereme 
Court, that required separate schools. The Daily Picayune 
agreed and provided an extension to the judge's remarks:
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" . . .  the constitution of the United States does not 
create schools or confer on any body any right in any 
school in any state. Hence, the constitution of the United 
States cannot be invoked to set aside or modify any 
regulations on the subject of education that the State may 
choose to make.1,33 The courts eventually extended that 
belief to cover all areas of race relations in the South.
The struggle for desegregated schools revealed some 
interesting truths about race relations, politics, and the 
role of education in post-Reconstruction New Orleans. The 
argument that separate schools repesented inferior schools 
would have to await the bitter lesson of experience. Black 
efforts at desegregation at this time centered on the 
proposition that the schools should serve as an example of 
racial harmony to the larger community. "Every 
discrimination which is maintained against us is a blow 
upon us," the editor of the Tribune had argued, "and will 
have an influence to postpone the realization of equality 
before the law and impartial protection to our people."35 
Separate schools represented the antithesis of a nation of 
"one people," the Reconstruction goal of the black 
community.
Whites also interpreted desegregated schools as a 
harbinger of a nation of "one people," and that is why they 
fought to eliminate them. Any type of interaction between 
the races that failed to demonstrate or buttress white
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supremacy, whites viewed as an attempt by blacks to gain 
social equality. Less than one generation removed from the 
institution of slavery, whites had little tolerance for the 
twin evils of mixed schools and social equality. The state 
elections in 1876 failed to answer all of the political and 
social questions of the day, but did lead to a white 
consensus on the separation of the races. Although 
Archibald Mitchell, other school officials, and city 
leaders expressed a willingness to provide blacks with 
educational opportunities, they emphatically rejected 
desegregated schools.
Race relations, politics, and education remained 
intertwined during this period, with improved black 
education inextricably dependent on the retention of 
effective black suffrage and a degree of racial harmony 
within the community. Race relations, but more important, 
the education blacks received, declined over time: 1877 
marked a great departure but not a sudden end. Before the 
complete ascendancy of the "radical racists" in the 1890s,
36blacks continued to vote, though not always freely.
Blacks continued to hold elective and appointive offices
until the turn of the century. The numbers decreased
37significantly, however, in the 1880s and 1890s.
Nonetheless, their presence and the black vote helped to 
forstall the harsher manifestations of white supremacy that 
surfaced in the 1890s and reigned until the 1940s.38
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The State Constitution of 1879, enacted after the 
Redeemers' gained power, did not place any specific 
disabilities on black suffrage and the delegates passed a 
resolution "assuring the Negro that his newly acquired 
rights would not be jeopardized or imparied.I|39 Nearly two 
decades would pass before Louisiana voters gained another 
opportunity to express their views on the subject. Several 
provisions in the 1879 Constitution affected the black 
community, two of them related to education. The 
constitution addressed the issue of desegregated elementary 
and secondary schools by making no reference to them at 
all.40 On the other hand, the constitution contained a 
race-specific article (231) regarding higher education. 
Rather than use a constitutional measure to exclude blacks 
from the existing universities attended by whites, it 
stipulated that, "The General Assembly shall also establish 
in the city of New Orleans a university for the education 
of persons of color; provide for its proper government, and 
shall make an annual appropriation of not less than five 
thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars for its 
maintenance and support.1'41
In 1880 lawmakers passed the necessary enabling 
legislation and Southern University, nurtured into 
existence by black politicians P.B.S. Pinchback and T. T. 
Allain, opened in 1881 as a state university for blacks.
It opened at a time when many blacks had abandoned the
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belief that a racially integrated society could exist in 
the South. Southern University represented an attempt by 
some blacks to live and adjust in the post-Reconstruction 
South. For nearly four decades Southern would provide 
black New Orleanians with their only source of public 
secondary education. Integrationist sentiment lingered, 
however, and some prominent blacks assailed Pinchback for 
his support of Southern.42 Pinchback faced the issue 
squarely and admitted that establishment and attendance at 
Southern "will deprive us of a great part of our civil 
rights." Nonetheless, in words strikingly similar to those 
of W.E.B. DuBois over a half century later, Pinchback 
attempted to justify his position. "However true this may 
be," he asserted, "it is but sentimental when we recognize 
the fact, that there is not in this state, nay, I venture 
to say in the whole South a single institution of learning 
where the colored and white children are educated 
together....What we want is education, whether it be 
acquired in a mixed or colored school it must be had....I|43
Pinchback's pragmatic pronouncements failed to 
convince his critics. Some opponents believed that the 
acquiescence of black delegates at the Convention gave "the 
appearance of consenting to their own debasement." Support 
for Southern, they charged, "helped to create a system they 
knew would deprive the black children of the advantage of
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education available to other children in the state." Much 
of the criticism against Pinchback and other black 
supporters of Article 231 came from the black Creole 
community. Aristide Mary referred to the Article as the 
"Black League in the Constitution."44 Mary and other 
critics argued "that this line of demarcation, once 
established, chiefly by their consent, would serve as the 
basis and the pretext for other measures contrary to the 
interests and rights of our citizens."45 Both groups had 
seen the future; the quarrel between them centered on how 
best to respond.
The immediate effect of "home rule" on black education 
was a return to segregated schools admist pronouncements of 
equal facilities. School officials provided secondary 
education to blacks by conducting a high shool in a rented 
building. Although separated, black students in the high 
school classes had "skillful and experienced teachers, and 
the school appear[ed] to be steadily increasing in favor 
among the class which it is designed to benefit," 
Superintendent Rogers stated. Sixteen blacks enrolled in 
the secondary school that first year and twenty-five the 
next. Attendance at the school declined during the 1879- 
1880 school year, and the board discontinued secondary 
education for blacks.47
The decision to abolish the black high school could be 
excused as wise and prudent because of the reduction of
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students. Indeed, school board members often defended 
their actions by pointing out that few blacks had taken 
advantage of high school facilities when they were 
available. But the board's refusal in subsequent years to 
reestablish the school when demand increased demonstrated 
its failure to recognize the changing educational needs of 
the black community. Nevertheless, even after the public 
high school closed, blacks did have access to a high school 
education. Unlike their counterparts in many other areas, 
black New Orleanians benefited from the establishment of 
several colleges founded to educate the freedmen. Of the 
four black colleges established in the two decades after 
the Civil War— New Orleans, Leland, Southern, and Straight 
Universities— Southern was the only public college. 
Throughout their early existence the colleges attempted to 
address centuries of black educational neglect and provided 
instruction beginning at the primary school level.49
Such alternatives to public education relieved some of 
the pressure on school officials to enhance educational 
opportunities for blacks. Several years after 
discontinuing the black high school, school officials 
cooperated with Southern University to have eligible public 
school children transferred to Southern for secondary work. 
The agreement developed from a series of meetings between 
members of the Southern Board of Trustees and school board 
members. Southern officials agreed to admit students who
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had completed the sixth or seventh grade and to stop 
admitting students below that level. The agreement worked 
to the advantage of the board, since it eliminated the need 
for the board to offer secondary education to blacks. The 
board maintained some control over admission to Southern by 
requiring Southern officials to give entrance examinations 
only to students recommended by the superintendent. The 
board also exercised influence by apparently subsidizing 
the tuition of students who entered Southern after 
completing grammar school. The first group of students 
admitted to Southern under the new arrangement started 
school in January 1885.50
Perhaps the black community believed that the 
secondary facilities provided by several colleges 
adequately met its needs. Before the turn of the century 
the school board received few petitions or communications 
from black citizens complaining about inadequate high 
school facilities. In the early twentieth century the 
upsurge in petitions requesting a black high school 
represented the black community's response to the declining 
availability of private secondary education.51 The decline 
occurred, in part, because of the desire of the area black 
colleges to become colleges in fact as well as in name. As 
the colleges grew they started to offer and emphasize a 
college level course of study. They no longer wanted to 
provide extensive work at the high school level. Their
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reorientation also reflected the moderate, but nonetheless 
discernible, growth in black educational advancement. A 
final factor in the changed focus of the black colleges was 
the growing belief that the black community needed a 
trained professional class of teachers, ministers, 
physicians, and lawyers.52
The average black, however, entertained no such lofty 
professional goals. Obtaining a grammar school education 
constituted a formidable enough quest. Between 1877 and 
1900 much of the collective energy of the black community 
centered on public education at the primary and grammar 
grades. The larger community shared the same concern. 
Therefore, education and public school policy were main 
points of interest in the city. Black leaders knew that if 
white education suffered black education would fare much 
worse. They watched and sympathized with white community 
leaders as they attempted to administer a school system 
chronically short of money. Revenues for the schools came 
from state and city appropriations, and the poll tax.53 
The board rarely received the amount requested in its 
budget to the city council. The poll tax, the only tax 
specifically dedicated to education, accounted for a small 
percentage of the annual budget. For example, in 1878 the 
poll tax collected only totaled $746.25. New Orleanians 
paid the poll tax reluctantly, when they paid it at all.
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The superintendents who held office during this period 
spoke often of the need for additional school revenues.
"Our schools cannot be conducted successfully," 
Superintendent Rogers disclosed, "as now organized, upon 
uncertain revenues."55 In the Democrats' zeal to undo the 
work of the Republicans, monies appropriated to education 
plummeted.56 The school budget for a typical year during 
Reconstruction, 1 July 1874 to 30 June 1875, was $480,496. 
In December 1877, Rogers submitted the first budget under 
the Democrats to the commission council requesting 
$303,678. Were the Democrats more efficient? No, the 
saving came from a 40 percent reduction in teachers' 
salaries.57 An inadequately financed educational system 
victimized not just blacks but the entire community; blacks 
suffered disproportionately, but they did not suffer alone.
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Table 3














Supplies and Current Expenses 6,541.20
Sites and Buildings 2,500.00
Furniture 1,406.45
Total 279,316.15
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With little financial support from either the city or 
the state, the school system passed through one financial 
crisis after another. Insufficient school revenues worked 
a tremendous hardship on the teachers. They labored for 
small salaries that sometimes fluctuated annually and they 
often went months without any compensation. For example, 
New Orleans teachers received no pay between September and 
December 1878. The next year brought little relief as they 
went from October 1879 to March 1880 without pay. The 
board attempted to borrow fifty thousand dollars to meet 
the January and February payrolls for 1880 but was unable 
to. The sad litany of unmet payrolls continued throughout 
the 1880s.60
Financial problems affected more than the salaries of
school teachers. The lack of revenues often forced school
officials to postpone needed repairs to deteriorating
buildings. Although the city owned the schoool buildings,
the mayor and council members contended that the school
board was responsible for their maintenance and repairs.
School officials, on the other hand, believed the
responsibility rested with the city and constantly asked
council members for money to make repairs. Their requests
usually fell on unreceptive ears because the city also had
61pressing budget problems. An occasional infusion of cash 
and a upsurge in civic pride sometimes led to a favorable 
response, though. School board members employed a more
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direct but just as ineffective approach in August 1877. In 
a letter to the mayor and Commisssion Council, they 
outlined the urgent maintenance needs of many of the 
schools and threatened not to use the buildings unless the 
city funded repairs. When the council still refused to 
provide the money, board members, conscious of the need "to 
protect life and limb" of the students, voted to make 
emergency repairs not to exceed a cost of two thousand 
dollars. The maintenance and repair of school buildings 
remained a problem for the board.62
Segregated within a system that experienced constant 
revenue shortages, could not always pay its teachers, and 
failed to make timely repairs on its buildings, how did 
black education fare? Did the state of black education in 
New Orelans during the post-Reconstruction period justify 
Pinchback's pragmatism regarding segregation? Or, did 
events prove Aristide Mary correct? The highly visible 
black campaign for suffrage, civil equality, and 
desegregated schools, had existed alongside problems 
related to employment, housing, and adjustment to
63freedom. Black leaders and parents expressed and 
demonstrated a commitment to education throughout the 1880s 
and 1890s, but could not always translate the commitment 
into practice. Black public education in the years 
immediately following the black compromise of 1879
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appreared to justify Pinchback's position. But Mary had 
cast his glance farther into the future, and realized that 
a principle once conceded was difficult to recover. The 
educational needs of the black community expanded, the 
narrow view of whites on the same subject did not. But 
that took two decades to develop; in the interim blacks had 
to slowly build and maintain an educational tradition. It 
started at the primary and grammar school levels.
The attitude of school officials at the beginning of 
the period reflected the paternalistic ideology of the 
Redeemers and continued to exist for several years after 
the Redeemers had suffered the political fate of their 
Republican predecessors. "Whether in improved methods of 
instruction, modes of discipline, school accomodations or 
provision for the convenience and comfort of teacher and 
scholar, "Superintendent Rogers maintained in 1878, "there 
has been no distinction to the prejudice of any class.65 
Several years later Rogers expressed similar views. "They 
share impartially in all educational means at the disposal 
of the board," he stated. Roger's successor in office, 
Ulric Bettison, echoed Rogers'sentiments and both wanted to
67see an increase in black enrollment.
As several scholars, most notably C. Vann Woodward, 
have contended, race relations in the years following 
Reconstruction remained in a state of flux that affected 
black education.68 When school officials spoke on the
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subject of black education they usually assured the black 
community of continued support. Whites had not yet seized 
on the idea of using education, or more accurately the 
denial of education, as a means of oppression or black 
degradation.69 Rather than promoting oppression, 
degradation, or schooling them for slavery, many whites 
shared Superintendent Rogers' view that schools would 
assist blacks in "acquiring habits of industry: learning,
directly or indirectly, those lessons of virtue and 
intelligence, which are designed to make them better, more 
useful, as individuals, and as members of society"70
School officials translated their statements into 
policy by attempting to provide blacks with adequate school 
facilities. During the first year under the resegregated 
system blacks had the use of twenty-three primary and 
grammar schools. Two of the schools, McDonogh Nos. 5 and 
6, were "fine large, brick buildings, ornaments to the 
city."71 When school superintendents made recommendations 
for new buildings and maintenance they usually included 
black schools. As a result, the conditions of black
■ wschools were comparable to white schools/21 This would 
later change but did indicate that at one point "forgotten 
alternatives" existed.
Black public school enrollment remained static and in 
some years declined. School officials used several 
reporting categories to monitor student attendance— number
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of students registered, number enrolled, average of daily 
roll, and average daily attendance. Absolute comparisons 
are virtually impossible because school officials did not 
use the same reporting categories each year. Additionally, 
at times they reported figures by calendar year and at 
other times by school year. Available statistics, however, 
provide a good indication of changes in school attendance. 
In 1877 the number of blacks enrolled in school stood at 
4,338 and a year later had risen to 6,856, an increase of 
2,518. The average attendance was 3,025 in 1877 and 5,625 
in 1878. By the 1887 school year enrollment and attendance 
had experienced a sharp decrease. Only 6,029 enrolled in 
school and the average attendance for the year was 3,042. 
Enrollment had increased to 6,013 during the 1898-1899 
school year with an average attendance of 3,746.73 An 
upsurge in black enrollment did not occur until the 
twentieth century.
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Table 4
New Orleans Public School Enrollment74
Year Black White Total
1877 4,338 15,169 19,507
1878 6,856 17,294 24,150
1879 6.654 17,670 24,324
1880 5.595 15,316 20,911
1881 5,473 18,928 24,401
1882 5,540 19,427 24,976
1883 4,511 17,130 21,641
1884 4,955 18,227 23,182
1885 4,752 19,579 24,331
1886 5,306 19,555 24,861
1887 6.029 19,620 17,954
1888 6,042 20,930 26,972
1889 4,858 16,278 21,136
1890 5,426 17,974 23,400
1891 5,592 17,617 23,209
1892 5,436 18,454 23,840
1893 4,929 18,559 23,488
1894 5,441 19,829 25,270
1895 6,126 21,274 27,400
1896 5,855 22,673 28,528
1897 6,117 23,597 29,713
1898 6,013 23,509 29,522
1899 6.221 24,549 30,770
1900 6,662 24,859 31,521
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The black students who atteneded school received until 
the 1890s a "range of studies...common to all the 
schools."75 The emphasis remained on English, math, 
writing, history, geography, and penmanship. The level of 
difficulty and specific topics covered varied at each grade 
level. All schools, including those for blacks, used the 
same books. Unfortunately, during this period parents 
often had to purchase the necessary books for their 
children, so many students attended school without books or 
other school supplies. Black students who enrolled in 
school and attended regularly progressed at the same rate 
as white students. Age-grade averages for 1887 revealed no 
consistent statistical differences— blacks had lower 
figures for some grades and higher for others. Teachers, 
with limited oversight from the principals, determined 
student promotion. Attendance, class performance, and 
exams served as the standard criteria for promotion.





Male Female Male Female
First 8.6 8.6 8.0 7.6
Second 10.2 10.1 9.8 9.4
Third 10.6 11.1 10.7 10.4
Fourth 11.1 11.4 11.8 11.4
Fifth 11.8 12.8 12.8 12.2
Sixth 12.5 13.5 13.1 13.2
Seventh 13.9 13.9 13.6 13.7
High School Entrance Examination Questions77
History, Geography and Civil Government
1. For what do we remember John Cabot? John Smith? 
Thomas Jefferson? Henry Clay? Abraham Lincoln?
2. Name the states bordering the Mississippi River.
3. What war was waged during Polk's administration?
Name the two generals who most distinguished themselves in
the war.
4. What three departments of government were established
by the Constitution? What is the duty of each?
Grammar
1. In what three ways may a dependent clause be used?
Give an example of each.
2. Write a single declarative sentence; a simple 
interrogative sentence; a simple imperative sentence; a 
simple exclamatory sentence.
3. Correct the following: "Lets you and I go in" "I do 
not know who to blame." "Indeed herewith I send you a 
dollar." "He spoke of you failing to come." "He consulted 
Webster and Walker's dictionary."
4. Analyze by diagram or otherwise: "He gave me an apple
this morning.
Etymology, Penmanship and Composition
1. What is a prefix? A root? A suffix?
2. Write a composition of not less than one hundred words
on one of the following subjects: Mardi Gras,
Public Schools, Iron; or, you may write a letter.
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Arithmetic
1. Define greatest common divisor. Define least common 
multiple. Find the greatest common divisor of 374, 714, 
and 1,020. Find the least common multiple of 15, 30, and 
60.
2. (a) Find the value of 231.04 + 2.64/.024-2.64 x .024. 
(b) Find the cube root of 2.3 to 3rd decimal place.
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The public school curriculum continued to emphasize 
academic subjects with a few business related courses 
offered in the high schools. Black instruction followed 
the same trend, but without the business courses. Neither 
blacks nor whites received manual or industrial training in 
the public schools. School officials first gave serious 
consideration to manual training in 1896 because of 
interest generated by the Mechanics' Dealers' and 
Lumbermen's Exchange.
The group forwarded to the board a copy of a 
resolution that described the benefits of manual training 
in glowing terms. They wanted the establishment of a 
minimum of two manual training schools. The board 
responded by naming a special committee to gather 
information concerning manual education and the feasibility 
of such a course of study in New Orleans. The special 
committee wasted little time and issued its report at the 
next meeting.78
The board members learned that national interest in 
manual training had increased because of the Centennial 
Exposition held in Philadelphia in 1876. There spectators 
and educators had marveled at the sophistication and skill 
of the work done by Russian and Swedish children. New York 
led the way and started offering manual training at five 
public schools in 1888. After its inception in New York, 
the manual training idea quickly gained favor throughout 
the country. The committee members thought it was time for
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New Orleans to join other leading cities and recommended 
that the board secure permission from the State Board of 
Education to begin offering manual classes. Although 
enthusiastic, the committee members suggested a cautious 
start. For secondary students they recommended providing 
instruction in wood working and the proper use of tools. 
Participating students would receive two hours of 
instruction twice a week. After agreeing to make changes 
if necessary, the full board adopted the report. Budget 
limitations, however, prevented the board from implementing 
the recommendtion. Even if it had gone into operation, the 
proposal did not include blacks.79
School board members failed to consider manual 
training for blacks because by 1896 the educational 
aspirations of the black community and the board's 
commitment to black education had diverged. The 1890s and 
the following decade were the "crucial" period for blacks. 
The genteel paternalism that had existed at the start of
onthe 1880s had all but disappeared by 1890. The white 
South had closed ranks on the "Negro Question" as 
effectively as it had done on the "Slavery Question" forty 
years earlier. Moreover, during the process, northerners 
were conspicious by their silence, at least as voices of 
dissent.81
Louisiana joined the rush to Jim Crowism in 1890 with 
the passage of a railroad car bill mandating separate but 
equal seating for blacks and whites. Other segregation
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laws followed, separating or excluding blacks from street 
cars, railroad terminals, restaurants, hotels, and places 
of entertainment.82 The laws had little to do with 
altering existing behavior. They represented the 
ideological statement of a dominant group. Many blacks 
would later leave the South as some had already done, most 
noticeably in the 1870s. Most stayed, however, and some 
resisted.
"It was in 1890 that the Citizens' Committee was 
formed, when a return to exaggerated fanaticsim about caste 
or segregation once again alarmed the black people.... We 
were face to face with a government determined to develop 
and establish a system by which a portion of the people
Mwould have to submit to the rest." So began an account 
by one of the participants who tried to prevent the 
complete legal subjugation of black New Orleanians. The 
black response to the railroad segregation law encompassed 
all the elements of legal protest in America. Various 
elements of the community's black leadership participated 
in the protest, but the black Creoles were the driving 
force throughout the period of litigation.84
Louis A. Martinet emerged as the leader of the protest 
against the railroad car bill. Martinet, a former state 
representative, school board member, and attorney, had 
recently started publishing the Crusader, a black 
newspaper. In his editorials, Martinet attempted to 
recapture the militancy of the New Orleans Tribune which
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had ceased publication in 1870. As the "men of Tribune"
had done before him, Martinet promised to fight without 
AScompromise. Martinet and other black leaders tried to 
defeat the bill before it became law. They first formed 
the American Citizens' Equal Rights Association, drew up a 
protest petition and presented it to the legislature.
Intimately aware of the support throughout the South 
for segregation laws, they "protest[ed] against the passage 
of any class legislation now pending before the General 
Assembly, or which may hereafter come before the honorable 
body...." They appealed to the legislators to remain true 
to their professed values of justice and equality, and 
found it "difficult to conceive how any caste legislation 
can maintain the sacredness of these truly American
principles  " They also offered a Biblical argument:
"men should not do unto others what they do not wish should 
be done unto them." Blacks knew the proposed laws "would 
be a free license to the evilly-disposed that they might 
with impunity insult, humiliate and otherwise maltreat
oeinoffensive persons...." For all those reasons and more 
they appealed," in the name of God and the constitution... 
that the chalice of political bitterness may be snatched 
from the grasp of intolerant persons and made to melt into 
the sacred fires of patriotic mercy."87
Political expediency rather than adherence to the 
siren call of justice and morality temporarily halted the 
march of Jim Crowism. The legislature still contained a
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few black members, and they opposed the railroad bill.
After the bill fell three votes short of passage in the
Senate, the New Orleans Times Democrat chided the Senate
"because it placed Louisiana in opposition to the other
Southern States, and ...the failure will be misunderstood
by the Negroes and produce unpleasant results."88 A bill
once defeated could, of course, rise again. This one did.
On 10 July 1890 Act 111, "to promote the comfort of
passengers on railway trains; requiring all railway
companies carrying passengers on their trains, in the
state, to provide equal but separate accomodations for the
white and colored races...," became law.89
Martinet castigated the black "political men" for
their naivety at best or, at worst, their crass dishonesty.
"They worked," according to Martinet, "with might and main
against the bill, no doubt, but after it was too late."90
Many of the black legislators aligned themselves with the
state's infamous lottery interest and voted for the
lottery's extension, ostensibly in exchange for white
support to defeat the separate railroad car bill. After
the lottery bill passed, Act 111 gained approval three days 
91later. Protest and the legislative process having 
failed, blacks turned to the guardians of equality under 
the law— the courts.
An appeal to blacks within the city and throughout the 
country enabled the Citizens Committeee to raise enough
gomoney to test the constitutionality of Act 111. Between
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1892 and 1896 the case moved slowly through the judicial 
system before the United States Supreme Court rendered its 
decision on 18 May 1896. In Plessv v. Ferguson the Supreme 
Court gave legal sanction to "separate but equal," which 
was, even then, no longer a "thin disguise." Judge John M. 
Harlan's lengthy dissent notwithstanding, race relations in 
America for the next half century would be governed by the 
idea that, "Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial 
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the 
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the 
difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and 
political rights of both races be equal one cannot be 
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the 
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.1,93 But 
there was more.
In 1896 and 1898 white Democrats found the definitive 
answer to the "Negro Question." Confronted with a brief, 
but potentially worrisome, alliance between dissatisfied 
blacks and whites under the Populist banner, Democrats took 
measures to reduce the effectiveness of poor white voters 
and eliminate black voters.94 After a harrowing, though 
successful, reelection campaign in 1896, Governor Murphy J. 
Foster supported a more restrictive suffrage bill. Act 89 
went into effect on 1 January 1897.95 By 1898 the number 
of black voters in the city had dropped from 14,177 to 
3,089.96
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The Democrats followed the registration law with a 
call for another constitutional convention to permanently 
disfranchise blacks and poor whites. The convention 
convened in February 1898. "We are all aware that this 
convention has been called by the people of the State of 
Louisiana principally to deal with one question," the 
president of the convention reminded the delegates, "and we 
know that but for the existence of that one Question this 
assemblage would not be sitting here today." "My fellow- 
delegates, let us not be misunderstood! let us say to the 
large class of people of Louisiana who will be 
disfranchised under any of the proposed limitations of the 
suffrage, that what we seek to do is undertaken in a 
spirit, not of hostility to any particular men or set of 
men...." Ernest B. Kruttschnitt, went on to add "that the 
Question which we are trying to solve here is one which 
imperils the integrity of the future government of the 
State of Louisiana.1,97 Several weeks later Kruttschnitt 
presided over another "assemblage," and in his capacity as 
president, called the school board meeting to order.98
Racism and discrimination was more than the emotive, 
ritualistic, and sadistic random killing of blacks.99 It 
was organized, purposeful, and directed towards maintaining 
the dominance of whites over blacks. School board members 
pursued a policy of limited education for blacks. School 
officials no longer expressed concern about low black 
enrollment or made references to maintaining equal
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facilities for blacks. The new policy damaged black 
educational advancement in two ways. First, it came at a 
time when school officials begem to expand educational 
opportunity for whites, which widened the gap between white 
and black education. Second, the limited educational 
policy of instruction at the primary grade level was 
diametrically opposed to the black community's desire to 
use improved education as an aid in community development.
In 1900 blacks reached their educational nadir within
the public school system. Ironically, a request to extend
kindergarten classes to some black schools providced the
occassion for whites to eliminate even more services for 
100blacks. Instead of granting or refusing the request, 
several board members thought it offered "a favorable 
moment at which to call attention of the board to the work 
of our colored schools and suggest a change in the 
curriculum and character of work to be done in these 
schools.”101 These members suggested that the board 
discontinue grades six, seven, and eight in the black 
schools. In the remaining grades— one through five— they 
wanted "to make that education useful, thorough and 
practical as far as it goes, and to fit him and her for 
that sphere of labor and social position and occupation 
which they are best suited and seem ordained by the proper 
fitness of things."102 The board adopted the new policy and 
instructed the Superintendent to put it into effect for the 
next school year.
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By 1900 the idea that blacks only needed a primary 
school education with limited manual training had become 
the dominant philosophy throughout the South. Education 
for blacks would not entail training for occupations which 
placed them in competition with white workers. When whites 
thought of the ideal type of black education they thought 
of Hampton Institute located in Virginia and Tuskegee in
103Alabama. School board members wanted New Orleans to join 
the rest of the South by offering blacks the "proper" kind 
of education. Education for black advancement had been 
replaced by education for black oppression. Through 
custom, law, and school board policy white New Orleanians 
had defined what they considered blacks' proper place. 
Blacks rejected the policy of limited education, however, 
and through their leaders organized to secure improved 
educational opportunities. Less optimistic about achieving 
a nation of "one people," than they had been, but 
nonetheless determined to fashion an educational agenda to 
fit their needs, blacks started the quest for parity within 
the framework of "separate but equal."
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Chapter Three
Education and the Haking of a Protest Tradition, 1900-1945
At the dawn of the twentieth century the prospects for 
improved education appeared gloomy for black New 
Orleanians. From the mid-1870s, their at first gradual and 
then accelerated loss of political power was followed by 
similar losses in education. The four black colleges 
located in New Orleans still offered academic training at 
the grammar and high school level. They all charged 
tuition, even though minimal, it prevented many blacks from 
attending them.1 The public school system was the only 
source of education for most blacks. Black community 
leaders refused to accept the mandate of white leaders to 
use education as a means of oppression. They had their own 
idea of their proper place in New Orleans society, and that 
their place was not the bottom.
In 1900, 77,714 blacks lived in New Orleans out of a 
total population of 287,104. Only 5,509 blacks, though, 
attended the city's public schools. Decisions by school 
officials, therefore, directly affected only a small 
percentage of the black community. But the issue always 
involved more than the educational interest of the black 
students actually enrolled. Educational access and 
opportunity were community goals with larger significance.
93
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Barred from politics through legal and extra-legal means, 
segregated in or denied acess to public accommodations, and 
employed in mostly menial jobs, education became a way out 
of the quagmire. The quest for improvements in education 
became the only sustained form of protest and agitation 
directed against the citadel of white political power and 
supremacy. Between 1900 and 1945 the tactics and 
strategies changed, but the goals and focus remained the 
same— improved schooling consistent with the principles of 
full citizenship and equality.
Black education existed within the larger framework of 
race relations in the city. Therefore, improvement in 
black education, especially gaining additional facilities, 
sometimes involved more than the presence or absence of 
sufficient revenues. Early in the twentieth century whites 
in New Orleans attempted to increase the spatial separation 
of the races; as a result, they developed a heightened 
sensitivity to black schools in areas with a large white 
population. Residential patterns over a century in the 
making came under scrutiny. Not only did whites want to 
prevent black encroachment, in some cases they attempted to 
remove blacks from schools and institutions they had 
occupied for several decades. One of the more contentious 
examples involved attempts by school officials to build a 
replacement for the Bayou Road School. The Bayou Road 
incident provides a typical example of the difficulties
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blacks encountered in their fight for improved schools.
Blacks living in the Sixth Ward, a working class 
neighborhood below Canal Street, had attended the Bayou 
Road School since the 1880s. The Sixth and Seventh Wards 
contained most of the city's black Creoles. By 1910 Bayou 
Road, located at the intersection of Bayou Road and 
Derbigny Street, was one of the few schools still conducted 
in a rented building.2 It was also overcrowded and in a 
state of physical deterioration. The Bayou Road Parents' 
Club informed the board of the problems and requested 
immediate improvements and additions to accommodate the 
pupils. The board refused to commit itself to constructing 
a new building but promised to rent another building for 
use as an annex and to make some repairs on the present 
structure. When whites in the neighborhood learned of the 
proposed annex, they protested. After referring the 
protest to the Committee on Teachers and Instructions, the 
board decided not to alter its plans. The board members 
refused the request because the lease for the building had 
been signed and "Bayou Road Colored School has been 
established there for a number of years."3
The addition of the annex alleviated the problem of 
overcrowding but left the board with another rented 
building in need of substantial repairs. Conditions at the 
school worsened and evoked a strong letter of condemnation 
from the city's Board of Health. In response, John
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Wegmann, the chairman of the Committee of Buildings and 
Grounds, inspected the school. Wegmann acknowledged the 
bad conditions but thought the Board of Health official had 
exaggerated and possibly over-dramatized the conditions. 
Nonetheless, Wegmann considered the buildings unsuitable 
for school purposes. "It is the best we have, however, and 
I can conceive of nothing that can remedy the situation, 
unless it be the building of a new school somewhere in the 
neighborhood." Wegmann examined and quickly dismissed the 
possibility of using the McOonogh No. 18 School, an 
abandoned white school located about a mile and a half from 
Bayou Road, as a replacement. He considered it to be in 
worse condition than Bayou Road.4
In February 1914 the board finally initiated plans to 
build a new school to replace the two rented buildings. 
School officials examined seventeen possible sites before 
deciding to purchase a large tract of land encompassing the 
old school. Several factors influenced the board's 
decision, but one of the more prominent considerations was 
its belief that using part of the old site would prevent "a 
protest from neighboring property owners."5 That proved 
more hopeful than prophetic; a sustained and angry protest 
would eventually develop.
Almost a decade passed before school officials 
actually built the new school. Several factors contributed 
to the delay. When school officials first made the
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decision to replace Bayou Road, the city had responsibility 
for building schools and acquiring sites. But in 1914, 
despite a "strong plea" from the board because of 
conditions at Bayou Road, members of the Commission Council 
stated that the city could not afford to purchase the site 
for the new school. Consequently, board members voted to 
lend the city enough money to make the purchase as well as 
to build another black school. Using funds from the board, 
the city purchased both tracts in the summer of 1914.
After acquiring the land, however, the city still did not 
build the school because of a lack of funds.6 Meanwhile, 
the situation at the Bayou Road School had grown 
progressively worse. Officials from the Board of Health 
closed the school in September 1914 and refused to reopen 
it until the board made needed repairs. A year later, on 
29 September, a storm tore into the city and damaged most 
of the schools, including the annex to Eayou Road.7 Work 
crews under the supervision of board and city officials 
eventually managed to repair most of the damaged schools, 
but several, including the Bayou Road Annex, had to be 
demolished.8
The affects of World War I came to the city, receded, 
and the Bayou Road School remained as overcrowded and 
dilapidated as ever. Finally, in 1922, construction 
started on the long overdue replacement for Bayou Road. 
Almost immediately intense opposition developed and exposed
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the state of race relations in New Orleans. Numerous 
whites appeared before the school board and left little 
doubt that whites expected and demanded the bulk of the 
community's resources. Any concessions made to blacks had 
to occur after city leaders satisfied the needs of the 
majority population. White opposititon to the building of 
Bayou Road, therefore, centered not only on its location 
but on the scale of the project. School officials planned 
to build a school comparable in quality to schools built 
for white students.
The first protest came in July 1922 when a group of 
whites from the neighborhood around Bayou Road attended a 
meeting of the school board. One protestor complained that 
the location was not in a black area. Another stated that 
property values "would depreciate with the erection of a 
large modem school, that negroes would move into the 
neighborhood, and that such a condition would prove 
obnoxious to the residents of that section." A third 
suggested that the board either build another school in a 
neighborhood with a large black population or convert an 
older white school into a school for blacks and give the 
new school to whites. School board President, Daniel 
Murphy, reminded the protestors that the school had 
occupied its present site for approximately fifty years.
The previous board had considered similar objections,
Murphy added, and despite the sentiments of the group,
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blacks in that area needed school facilities. With 
surprising candor Murphy charged "that no matter where the 
board decided to locate a colored school protest would 
arise." Percy Moise, elected to the board in 1920, 
informed the delegation that he would entertain 
alternatives that satisfied the group, but at the same time 
provided for the educational needs of students in the Bayou 
Road area. The meeting ended with the understanding the
Aboard would delay making a final decision.
At a January 1923 board meeting white citizens again 
voiced their opposition to the school. "To put from eight 
hundred to a thousand negroes in that section almost 
entirely inhabited by white people," according to one 
spokesman, "would be a very serious disadvantage to both 
races." Disavowing any hostility to the education of 
blacks, the speaker argued that "a more suitable location 
could be found for the negro school that would be less 
obnoxious to white residents of that section." Another 
member of the delegation used a different approach when he 
stated the location of the school "was just as unjust for 
the negroes as it was for the whites to establish a negro 
school in that vicinity; that there were vested rights 
involved and that it was an injustice to the negroes to 
force them to come a great distance to the school located 
in a white section." When questioned by board member Fred 
Zengel, the speaker admitted that he did not represent the
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black community.10
Percy Hoise and Zengel asked protestors for 
suggestions of what to do with students in the Bayou Road 
area if the board denied blacks access to the school. A 
female protestor suggested converting McDonogh No. 9 to 
black use, notwithstanding her own acknowledgement of the 
hazardous condition of the building. She thought it absurd 
for white students to attend McDonogh No 9 "while the 
Negroes would be given a school that was really a 
monument. "11
None of the speakers convinced the majority of the
board to deny blacks the new school. The "constructive"
plan that Moise hoped to find had not been presented.
Board president James Fortier, who had not entered into the
discussion, relinquished the chair so that he could speak.
Fortier used his opening remarks to dramatize his deep
conviction on the subject. He lived, he began, in the
Sixth Ward only "about twenty-four squares from the
proposed school, but [that] if he lived seventy-five
squares he would be as vitally interested as though he were
a resident directly across the street." According to
Fortier the issue "concerned the development and the growth
12of the entire city." Fortier did not want to see black 
homes or schools in predominantly white areas and lamented
the Supreme Court decision in Buchanan v. Warlev. which had
13declared residential segregation laws unconstitutional.
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In the absence of legal authority, it became important for 
agencies like the school board to prevent blacks from 
living in white areas.
Fortier recommended three possible uses for the 
school; none of them involved blacks. He wanted it used 
as a junior high school, an annex to Esplanade High School, 
or an industrial training school. Moise asked Fortier what 
he planned to do about the eight hundred black students 
scheduled to attend the school. Fortier thought school 
administrators could devise a plan to house the black 
students in other locations. Moise again voiced his 
support for the protestors but wanted a concrete plan to 
provide for the students. Moise reminded the protestors 
that the board had adhered to the established practice of 
building replacements for black schools on or near the 
original site-many of them he claimed had purchased their 
homes "with the knowledge that the Negro school existed in 
their midst." Nonetheless, Moise was willing to concede to 
white sensibilities by borrowing money to build another 
school for blacks in a different area. In the interim, 
however, he wanted to proceed with the scheduled opening of 
the school as a school for blacks.14
Fortier disagreed with Moise's position and wanted an 
unequivocal declaration from the board that blacks would 
not enter the school. Fortier viewed potential black 
enrollment as a threat to segregation and white supremacy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
But for once the familiar call to arms associated with the 
phrase "threat to white supremacy " failed to elicit the 
usual response. Moise made a motion that passed four to 
one to continue the plan for opening the school for blacks 
with the understanding that if the board received a 
workable plan to house the students, school officials would 
transfer the students immediately. Fortier cast the lone 
dissenting vote and remained determined to keep blacks out 
of the school.15
Fortier, expecting persistence more than justice and 
morality to triumph, called a special meeting less than a 
week after the board voted against his plan. Fortier 
unveiled the idea of "placing these pupils on part-time for 
the next five months, while a comprehensive policy was 
being devised to cover the entire field of negro 
education." Moise stated his objections in strong terms, 
and the meeting ended without a vote.16 Undeterred and 
correctly sensing that a viable plan would break the 
opposition, Fortier came to the next meeting better 
prepared. At it, he recommended placing the students in 
several schools in the area. Fellow member Daniel Murphy 
declared his faith in Fortier's sincerity, "but felt that 
since this was the first move on the part of the board to 
give the negroes a real substantial building, he deemed it 
unwise to defer the opening of the school as a colored 
institution." When Superintendent Gwinn stated that the
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area schools could accommodate the students by placing them 
on part-time status, board members Mrs. Arthur Baumgartner 
and Fred Zengel reversed themselves and supported Fortier. 
Baumgartner made a motion to defer the opening of the new 
school until Fortier had an opportunity to present his 
plan. The motion passed by a three to two vote. Moise and 
Murphy cast the dissenting votes.17
A bevy of activity ensued before the next meeting of 
the board. Emile La Branche, a black businessman, the 
black Republican politician Walter L. Cohen, and other 
black leaders called a mass meeting to protest the board's 
decision and to formulate a response. Members from the 
Colored Educational Alliance, New Orleans NAACP, the 
National Progressive Association for Negroes, and many 
interested black citizens attended the meeting. Their lack 
of suffrage left the blacks attending the meeting with few 
options. They could not threaten the board members with 
political reprisals. The group denounced the board's 
position and drew up a petition of protest. They chose 
LaBranche to serve as their chairman and spokesman and 
decided to present their petition at the next board 
meeting.18
Blacks received unexpected support from the New 
Orleans Times Picayune, one of the city's leading white 
newspapers:
Time and reflection have only served to confirm 
this newspaper's belief that the closure of the 
school and consequent denial for an indefinite
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period of elementary education to Negro children 
whose fathers and grandfathers learned their 
letters in the place now closed to them amounts 
to a grave injustice....Let us close the incident 
in the right and wise way by adopting the course 
counselled by every consideration of justice and 
equity.19
Some of the board members were also busy several days 
before the next meeting. Mrs. Baumgartner and Fred Zengel 
decided to personally inspect conditions at three of the 
schools scheduled to receive the influx of new students 
from Bayou Road. Both of them emerged from the inspection 
obviously concerned by what they had observed and would 
later share their findings with the other members.20
On 9 February a large crowd of blacks and whites 
assembled for the regular scheduled meeting at the 
Carondelet Street school board Office. Emile LaBranche 
presented the petition from the black community. He called 
attention to the fact that blacks in that area had needed a 
new school for decades and had made countless appeals to 
school officials. Over the years the "Parents Club had 
waited and the children had suffered," LaBranche stated.
"We now come to you," he closed, "and ask that you open to 
the colored children this school which has been built for 
them. There is no territory in the city of New Orleans 
where there is a greater need for educational facilities 
for school children than in the territory of the Bayou 
Road.... The redistricting does not make the schools any 
larger, nor nearer our homes."21
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LaBranche confined his arguments to the educational 
needs of blacks. The next two speakers, both white, 
labored under no such constraints. They believed that the 
use of the new school by blacks threatened segregation and 
white supremacy. Their views expressed mainstream southern 
thought regarding blacks.22 Elucidating what he considered 
the racial sentiments of the white community, one of the 
speakers maintained that "all of us of the Southland who 
are of the white race cure firm in one belief— and that is 
the supremacy of the white race and the segregation of 
these races in all things political and social." The other 
speaker argued placing blacks at the school would lead to 
fights and other disturbances between black and white
23children in the area.
Then Fortier rose to speed?. He criticized the 
newspaper articles supporting the board's original plan and 
declared the time had come to reassess black education. 
Fortier wanted the board to develop a comprehensive plan to 
provide blacks with vocational and manual training.
Fortier also angerily criticized the blacks who had the 
audacity to appear before the board and question its 
decisions. And he admonished his fellow members for 
establishing a dangerous precedent by reacting to the 
protests of blacks. Fortier's position was clear; he 
wanted the school used for whites. Fortier could not 
comprehend the board's attempt to provide a modern school
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for blacks, when, for example, "Our white boys of the 
Warren Easton High School are crowded and put into che 
basements."24 Despite his advocacy of a policy contrary to 
the educational needs of the black community, Fortier 
observed that his proposal would foster friendlier 
relations between blacks and whites. In his view the needs 
and aspirations of the black community did not enter into 
the prescription for improved race relations.25
Apparently neither Fortier nor the various groups 
realized Baumgartner and Zengel had changed their opinion. 
Baumgartner asked Fortier if he had visited any of the 
schools. He said no. Baumgartner then stated that she and 
Fred Zengel had visited the schools within the last week. 
She considered the conditions at the schools deplorable.
"We found the Valena C. Jones crowded to a great extent.
We found them in dark rooms in cottages rented by the board 
some time ago. We found the children three and four in one 
desk. I saw a condition in the Valena C. Jones [school] 
that I never knew existed in a school room before. "
Despite the horrible conditions at Jones, Baumgartner 
reported they were better than the conditions at Bienville. 
Zengel supported Baumgartner's bleak assessment and thought 
Fortier's plan to add more students to those schools 
impractical. After subsequent discussion failed to produce 
any new points, the board adopted a motion by Zengel to 
open the school for blacks within a week. Only Fortier
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voted against the proposal.26
What seemed a favorable vote for the black community 
was actually only a compromise. The members also declared 
their intent to build a replacement for the school and 
locate it in a predominately black neighborhood.27 In an 
irony probably lost on most contemporaries, the school 
board named the New Bayou Road school after Joseph A.
Craig, the black Reconstruction school board member who in 
1877 had voted with the white majority to resegregate the 
public schools. In 1927 when school officials finally 
transferred the black students to a new' school they 
transferred the name of the school with them.28
The Craig School controversy vividly illustrated the 
general dynamics of race relations and black education in 
New Orleans. The condition of black education reflected to 
a large degree the racial ideology of the dominant 
population. Whites in the South had definite views 
concerning the kind of education blacks should receive. 
Overcrowded schools, unsanitary buildings, rented annexes, 
and a general disregard for the educational needs of the 
black community stemmed from their desire to keep blacks in 
an inferior position in the social order.29 Moreover, as 
James D. Anderson pointed out, other ideological currents 
influenced black education. Anderson maintained that the 
debate "was not in any significant sense a conflict between 
exteme racists and moderate racists. There were racists,
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extreme and moderate, who both supported and opposed the 
idea of universal public schooling for blacks and whites. 
There were also extreme and moderate white supremacists who 
favored a racially restrictive form of universal
30education. What, if not race, determined black 
educational policy in the South? According to Anderson 
"conflicting conceptions of the relationship between 
political economy and universal education," were decisive.
A combination of northern philanthropists and southern 
reformers vied with the South's agricultural interests for 
control of the South's educational destiny.31 The two 
sides had different ideas on how to maintain a docile and 
stable work force. Southern reformers and their northern 
allies placed their faith in the socially redeeming powers 
of education. By contrast, the agriculturalists had no 
reason to abandon their traditional and effective methods 
of coercion and force.32 New Orleans urban environment, 
however, did not possess an agriculturalist-reformist 
dichotomy. The debate in New Orleans centered.on whether 
black education would serve as a means to improve the 
socio-economic position of blacks or as a brief way station 
to inculcate social deference and rudimentary skills in 
reading, writing, and arithmetic for a lifetime of menial 
labor. Racism was the key variable that united most whites 
in New Orleans in favor of limited education for blacks.
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The racist ideology, though triumphant, existed in the 
midst of alternate views on black education. The Bayou 
Road School controversy revealed the presence of three 
views regarding black education. Black leaders, of course, 
thought blacks should receive an education comparable to 
whites. They articulated their opposition to limited black 
education clearly and often. There were also some school 
officials, however, who advocated and supported improved 
black education, although their support stopped short of a 
belief in equal facilities and curriculum for blacks and 
whites. Another group, as characterized by James Fortier 
and most members of the white community, wanted a 
continuation of the policy of limited education for blacks- 
-education at the elementary level with some manual 
training. Nonetheless, black education progressed 
throughout the Jim Crow Era despite a vocal ideology of 
limited education for blacks.
The refusal of the school board to allocate sufficient 
revenues to black New Orleanians accounted for the poor 
condition of black schools. What philosophy or policy 
guided school board members when making budgetary 
decisions? How many members had clearly defined ideas on 
the desired purpose and scope of black education? Several 
members and school officials used the school board meetings 
as a forum in which to articulate their views on black 
education and race relations. At the beginning of the
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period several board members maintained that New Orleans
should duplicate the policy of other southern states and
limit black education to the primary grades, emphasizing
manual and domestic training. Advocates of the
primary/manual training school philosophy attempted to
fashion a program for the present as well as the future.33
When Sol Wexler resigned his position as President of
the board in 1916, the belief that the educational needs of
blacks differed from those of whites still prevailed.
Wexler admonished his soon to be former colleagues:
Do not neglect the negro in providing educational 
facilities. The welfare of the South can be 
greatly increased by better educational and 
uplift work among our negro population. Give 
them the rudiments of a good education up to the 
eighth grade, with specially selected subjects, 
and particularly teach them the domestic 
sciences, manual training and the vocations which 
will enable them to become more useful citizens 
and taxpayers.34
Several years later James Fortier echoed the 
sentiments of his predecessors. Fortier, an ardent white 
supremacist, thought "it absurd to follow any plan for the 
education of the negro which involved anything beyond 
reading and writing and the teaching of the trade; that the 
negro's place in life was to do the heavier manual work...; 
that it was absurd to attempt to teach negroes the beauties 
of Roman and Greek history...."35 Fortier wanted school 
officials to build schools that featured only manual 
training. Years after the death of Booker T. Washington, 
his legacy of promoting industrial education for blacks
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continued to influence the educational policy of most 
whites.
Of the men who served as superintendent during this 
period, the one who said the least about black education 
probably revealed the most. Warren Easton, who had the 
longest tenure of the superintendents, failed to mention 
the needs of black students in his annual reports from 1900 
to 1910. His omission indicated the low or non-existent 
priority given to black education. During Easton's years 
in office black education reached its lowest point. His 
actions alone did not contribute to that condition, but his 
policy of active neglect did little to arrest the trend.36
After the death of Easton in October 1910, Joseph 
Gwinn became superintendent. Almost immediately he found 
himself in the midst of a small tempest regarding the 
South's racial norms. After assuming office, Gwinn called 
a meeting of all the teachers, both black and white.
Unlike previous meetings, however, some blacks and whites 
sat in the same section, which drew condemnation from the 
school board. Effectively chastened, Gwinn declared: "In
the future all meetings of teachers called by the 
Superintendent shall be for white teachers alone or for 
colored teachers alone. I shall also discontinue the 
practice of holding joint meetings of white and colored 
principals.... In this connection I wish to state I am now 
and have always been opposed to any action which tends
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towards or seems to tend toward the breaking down of the 
color line.... ',37
Despite Gwinn's declaratory allegiance to segregation, 
he demonstrated an increased awareness of the need for 
improved black education. His opinion on black education 
did not mirror that of the black community, but it marked a 
new departure from the twenty-two years of active neglect 
under Easton. Gwinn maintained that manual and industrial 
training represented the ideal type of education for the 
minority population. Nonetheless, he conceded that 
"provisions should be made for the smaller class who are 
going to enter the teaching or other professions.n38 Black 
education not only suffered because of the narrow 
instructional limits whites attempted to impose, whites 
refused to adequately fund the programs they had outlined. 
Gwinn at least sought more funding and included black 
schools in his annual reports. Although such statements as 
"there is pressing demand for an evening school for colored 
youth," merely reiterated the many petitions and statements 
of the black community, blacks benefited from having 
someone in office not totally hostile to their educational
39interests.
Nicholas Bauer became superintendent in 1923, 
succeeding Gwinn. Bauer, a native and lifetime resident of 
New Orleans, continued the course chartered by Gwinn. He 
occasionally met with black parents and leaders.40 Bauer
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once vowed "that he would never be satisfied until every 
child in New Orleans, both white and colored...[received] 
full and adequate educational facilities."41
The policy of educational neglect and limitations 
pursued by Fortier and board members affected the quality 
and quantity of black school facilities. The white 
response to the Bayou Road School was not an isolated 
phenomenon. Protestors frustrated many attempts by school 
officials to supply blacks with additional school 
facilities. The Bayou Road incident was atypical only 
because it involved a school of considerable expense.
White protest usually centered on plans to convert existing 
white schools to black use. The historical residential 
patterns in New Orleans caused a dilemma for 
segregationists and school officials. In-migration and 
intra-city relocation kept the racial composition in some 
neighborhoods in a state of constant flux. The sword cut 
both ways— whites moved into black areas and blacks moved 
into white areas. School officials had the unenviable task 
of operating a dual educational system with limited 
resources amid black demands and white protests.42
Using money from the John McDonogh Fund, the city 
officials had built a school for blacks living in the 
westbank community of Algiers.43 In 1904, due to an 
"increasing number of white children in the vicinity of 
McDonogh No. 5," school officials proposed building another
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school and transferring the black students. On 14 April 
1905 the board adopted a resolution to convert the school 
and build one for blacks in another section of the city.44 
This represented a form of indirect urban planning along 
racial lines because adequate school facilities attracted 
additional residents.45 Blacks protested the change 
because school officials planned to build a school of 
lesser quality and wanted to transfer the black students to 
a rented church until the completion of the new school. 
Board members heard their protest, but decided to follow 
the original plan.
Blacks usually found themselves on the other side of 
the argument, favoring conversion. Between 1900 and 1945 
blacks attended several schools that formerly housed white 
students. For example, the board converted Zacharie, 
McDonogh Nos. 13, 17, 20, and Benjamin schools to black 
use.47 To prevent the conversions whites used several 
arguments in addition to the appeal to white supremacy. 
Julia Volz, chairwoman of the Fourth Ward Civic League, 
spoke out against the conversion of McDonogh No. 17 because 
"when Bienville founded the city of New Orleans he
jIQcertainly did not found it for the colored people." Few 
opponents of conversion used such a historical approach. 
Typical statements included the belief that property values 
would decline or that area businesses would suffer.
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Black leaders did more than react to the educational 
limitations whites attempted to impose. They identified 
their own needs. At various times the educational needs of 
the black community included additional schools to relieve 
overcrowding, improvement in the physical condition of 
existing schools, high schools, instruction in industrial 
and commercial training, and a better curriculum. The 
educational advances of the black community occurred as a 
result of the efforts of black leaders and parents.
Between 1900 and 1945 blacks formed a plethora of 
organizations dedicated to improved education. Many of 
them were small and focused on the needs of a particular 
school or neighborhood. All of the schools had "Mothers' 
Clubs" or "Patrons' Clubs." Judging from communication 
received by school officials, the school-centered 
organizations were active and to a degree effective.
Several ward based organizations such as the Third Ward 
Educational Association and the Seventh Ward Educational 
League attempted to address the needs of an entire ward.
In addition, city-wide groups like the Colored Educational 
Alliance, the Federation of Civic Leagues, and the 
Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance fought, as they 
had done in the Bayou Road incident, for educational parity 
and improvement.49
The organizations, through their leaders, attempted to 
gamer a larger share of the city's educational resources
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through communications and petitions to school officials. 
The tactic of drawing up lengthy petitions which detailed 
the ills and inadequacies of black schools remained a 
favored tactic throughout the first half of the century. 
Black leaders gathered statistics, conducted visits to 
individual schools, and then presented incontrovertible 
evidence of the actual condition of black schools to white 
officials. During most of this period the Colored 
Educational Alliance, founded in 1913, led the fight for 
better schools along with other key organizations.30
Seeking to stem the tidal-wave of repressive actions 
against blacks, a group of leaders organized a local 
chapter of the NAACP. The branch received its charter on 
15 July 1915 and counted among its active members Reverend 
Henderson Dunn, Walter Cohen, Thomas Bailey, Dr. Rivers 
Frederick, Constant C. Dejoie, Paul Landix, Dr. George 
Lucas, and Mrs. Ida Johnson. No other organization in New 
Orleans would work as long or as diligently for black 
equality. Most black leaders joined the branch, and 
leadership within the black community was virtually 
synonymous with leadership in the branch. Eventually, most 
issues involving education and race relations came through 
the branch office.51 The NAACP often served as an umbrella 
organization for the city's various black civic, social, 
religious, and fraternal groups. This was especially 
important for a black community with religious and color
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diversity. Since limited education affected the entire 
community, it was not difficult to forge alliances.
The various organizations provided a communication
network for black leaders but not the entire community. On
19 September 1925, the New Orleans Herald, which soon after
became the Louisiana Weekly, began publication under the
leadership of Constant C. Dejoie. Prior to its inception,
blacks, either out of a financial inability or
unwillingness, had not supported a race-specific newspaper.
After the demise of the Louisianian in 1882, no other black
newspaper, except for a promising but short run of the
Crusader, edited by Louis A. Martinet, attained the
subscribers and revenues to survive. The religious,
regionally-oriented but New Orleans based Southwestern
Christian Advocate provided some coverage of the black
community, but its anti-Catholic, pro-Methodist stand, and
its lack of clear editorial focus prevented it from
becoming a paper for the whole black community.52
The Louisiana Weekly avoided a similar identity crisis
and from the beginning espoused a clear mission. "We
believe," the paper declared in its debut edition, that
in matters pertaining to race, a newspaper should 
not straddle. There is only one course for a 
newspaper to take in matters pertaining to Negro 
life and that is the right side. Any attempt to 
side step and to "pussyfoot" is more harmful to 
the race than anything else. Negro newspapers 
are not the property of the individuals who have 
them in charge, but the property of the Negro 
public whose interests they should serve.
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Thereafter the Weekly remained steadfast and true to 
its stated alms. The paper not only echoed the sentiments 
of the black community, it helped to define vital issues. 
More than an organ of information and race chauvenism, it 
printed articles and editorials that challenged the 
prevailing social order. Inadequate educational 
opportunities made education one of the Weekly's major 
points of focus. "At the beginning of this next year," 
stated an editorial in December 1926, "we shall turn our 
attention to our schools, both public and private. We 
shall attempt to turn the spotlight upon the various 
institutions of learning which are training our 
young.— 1,54 The Weekly turned the spotlight on often and 
remained in the forefrunt for improved schools.
The paper contained more than "doom and gloom" 
articles. It frequently chided blacks for not doing enough 
to remedy the situation. When school officials instituted 
programs or allocated funds to enhance black education, the 
editors offered expressions of thanks. "The relieving of 
the exceedingly overcrowded condition in our public schools 
by the erection of modem buildings is a great step towards 
racial understanding and good will...."55 On occasions 
individual school board members received favorable 
comments. Mrs. Arthur Baumgartner, who had voted to allow 
blacks the use of Bayou Road School and the first female to 
win election to a school board seat, obtained an
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unsolicited endorsement because "she has made it her duty 
to visit all the Negro schools in the system and to see the 
equipment and meet the teachers and principals. She has 
been kind enough to visit their various affairs... her 
direct contact with the various schools has made her big 
heart feel our needs."56 Hoping that other members 
possessed if not big hearts then at least some, the Weekly 
expressed "faith in the good intentions of the board.1,57
When black leaders and the black community in general 
acted in bad faith or simply refused to act, the Weekly 
answered editorially. A lack of response to a school 
related problem led the Weekly to question the dedication 
of the Colored Educational Alliance. "Now is the time for 
some one to cause this League to awaken from its 
lethargetic indifference and function as it should, or 
cease to masquerade and keep some one that is sincere from 
working in the interest of the group."58 Good leaders 
often needed better followers and to that end the Weekly 
remained adamant. Consistent with the persistence of the 
self-help tradition, the paper implored blacks to do more 
to help themselves in throwing off the odious yoke of 
oppression and discrimination. "Too long have we as a 
group sat supinely by and with weeping and wailing bemoaned 
our lot... And now must we remember that only when we act, 
act as men, act as thinking men, act, act, act, will we 
find ourselves the recipients of these things that are our
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just and legal right."59
"It may be, since law makers and educators neglect 
us," an exasperated Louisiana Weekly editor stated,
"lacking militant members in the higher professional groups 
to fight for us, we may look hereafter to the laboring men 
to protect our interests and make the way for us."60 
Leadership within the black community, however, came 
largely from the professional class of physicians, 
dentists, clergy, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and teachers.
They fought for improved schools and attempted to impart an 
educational ethos to the black community. Throughout the 
twentieth century the number of black professionals 
increased. The early twentienth century emphasis on black 
self-help produced economic activity and entrepreneurs 
relatively free from white control. The absence of direct 
ties to the white community enabled some leaders to pursue 
a black educational agenda without the fear of economic 
retaliation from whites.
In a study on black professionals and the community, 
the black historian Carter G. Woodson documented and 
analyzed the level of community involvement of black 
professionals. Woodson criticized black physicians, but 
still concluded that "In spite of all the shortcomings of 
physicians...this professional class has done something for 
the uplift of the masses."61 That assessment also applied 
to other professional groups. Physicians and their
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professional counterparts, through monetary contributions, 
supported the various institutions within the New Orleans 
black community. Organizations such as the Urban League, 
N.A.A.C.P., Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. could not have existed 
without support from the professional classes.62
Woodson's macro-analysis of the relationship between 
black professionals and the community demonstrated that, 
"The Negro physician in another way has manifested interest 
in the community. To secure drainage and proper 
sanitation, additional school facilities and adequate 
compensation for Negro teachers and the like, the Negro 
professional man because of his outstanding position in the 
community has been forced to the front in making the appeal 
for those things which his people deserve."63 Leadership 
within New Orleans' black community mirrored Woodson's 
assessment and the physicians led the way. Many physicians 
worked for race advancement but several garnered 
exceptional accolades from the community— Drs. George 
Lucas, Joseph Hardin, Rivers Frederick, A. W. Brazier,
Lloyd B. Landry, and Leoneadas T. Burbridge.
A native of Scooba, Mississippi, Joseph Hardin 
migrated to New Orleans in 1890. Like many of the early 
black physicians in the city, Hardin attended Flint 
Medical College where he received his medical degree in 
1904 and decided to remain in New Orleans to start a 
private practice. In the mid-1890s Hardin developed an
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interest in politics and remained an active Republican 
throughout his life. His foray into politics soon led to 
involvement in other civic activities. In 1912 he helped 
organize the Fourth Ward Poll Tax Association as part of an 
effort to increase the number of black voters. Concern 
with his Seventh Ward neighborhood convinced Hardin to 
assist Alex Mollay in the formation of the Seventh Ward 
Civic League. Soon, similar organizations addressed the 
needs of particular wards and Hardin became instrumental in 
creating the New Orleans Federation of Civic Leagues. The 
Federation of Civic Leagues, as well as the ward-based 
civic leagues, attempted to solve community problems, 
especially those related to education and race relations.64
A contemporary of Dr. Hardin, George W. Lucas also 
devoted his time and talent to matters involving black 
advancement. A transplanted Texan who graduated from Flint 
Medical College in New Orleans, Lucas built a prosperous 
medical practice. His work as a physician, however, did 
not prevent him from becoming an active member in several 
organizations, among them, the New Orleans N.A.A.C.P., 
Dryades Street YMCA, the Knights of Pythians, and the Elks. 
He was more than a joiner, he was also a leader. For 
several years he served on the NAACP's national board. Dr. 
Lucas served as President in the 1920s during the Branch's 
successful challenge of New Orleans segregation 
ordinances.65 Lucas' career as physician-activist could
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have served as a model for Woodson's observation that, 
"Unless the Negro can exercise the same rights of citizens 
in voting and holding office, he cannot transfer the will 
of the race to the government. In organizing the people 
toward this end and in stiumalting their effort to battle 
for their rights, the Negro physician has contributed more 
than any other class, with the possible exception of the 
Negro lawyer."66
Rivers Frederick, another black physician, projected a 
less public profile than Hardin or Lucas and in the opinion 
of a biographer "allowed himself to be viewed only in non- 
controversial roles by the white community of New Orleans. 
He was seen as a humanitarian, a competent professional, 
and a champion of better medical care for blacks in 
Louisiana. With this special image, he was able to secure 
favors for many blacks from the white power structure."67 
Dr. Frederick played an instrumental role in the formation 
of the local NAACP Branch and remained a life member. He 
was also active in the Urban League and devoted time and
COgave money to solve problems within the black community.
Although Frederick did not match the visible community 
activism of Lucas and Hardin, he surpassed them in the 
practice of medicine. A native of Point Coupee Parish, 
Frederick came to New Orleans to attend Straight University 
and later Flint Medical College of New Orleans University.
He decided to seek his last year of medical school training
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in the state of Illinois. He received his degree in 1897 
and after stops in his home parish and several years 
residency in Central America, Frederick returned to New 
Orleans in 1908. Frederick returned to Louisiana because 
of his "growing desire to return to the place of my birth 
in order to help train young Negroes for adequate service 
in the growing field of medical practice, badly needed 
among our people."69 Unfortunately, shortly after his 
arrival in the city, Flint Medical College closed its doors 
for the last time. Blacks desiring medical training had to 
travel to Nashville, Tennessee to attend Meharry Medical 
College, or to the nation's capital to attend Howard 
University. The opening of Flint-Goodridge Hospital, 
however, in 1916 gave Frederick an opportunity to train 
young black doctors in his capacity as staff physician and 
Chief of Surgery.70 Dr. Frederick, and other physicians 
who labored under less than ideal conditions, provided 
blacks with medical care not readily available anywhere 
else.
Black physicians did not work alone in the fight for 
better education. Percy P. Creuzot, a dentist, gained the 
respect of the community because of his tireless efforts 
for improved schools. For several years, he served as 
president and chief spokesman of the Colored Educational 
Alliance. James Gayle, a Seventeenth Ward businessman, 
served at various times on the Republican State Central
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Committee, led voter registration drives, and served as 
President of the local NAACP Branch. Arnold Moss, a 
successful businessman and member of a host of 
organizations, provided leadership in the city's Tenth 
Ward. Women were also active. Mrs. Deborah Guidry, a 
devoted teacher and social worker, contributed to the 
success of the NAACP sponsored suit against residential 
segregation. Miss Fannie C. Williams, a native of Biloxi, 
Mississippi, became one of the most respected educators in 
the city. She served as principal of Valena C. Jones 
Elementary School for thirty-three years and started 
several educational and social programs without monetary 
assistance from school officials. As head of the Valena C. 
Jones Normal School, Miss Williams had a direct influence 
on many black teachers in the school system.71
No study of early twentieth century black leadership 
in New Orleans would be complete without mentioning Walter 
L. Cohen. A native New Orleanian of free parentage, Cohen 
grew up amid the high expectations of Congressional 
Reconstruction. He later became a protege of Henry Demas, 
a black legislator from St. John Parish, who managed to 
retain his senate seat long after the assault on black 
political participation in the 1870s. In the 1890s Cohen 
became prominent in Republican politics at the local and 
state levels which enabled him to gain recognition from the 
national leadership of the Grand Old Party. After the
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election of William McKinley as president in 1896, Cohen
72received the position of Registrar of Lands. Cohen and 
other black Republicans repeatedly foiled attempts by 
whites to purge them from the Party.73 Cohen once 
complained that "If the success of the Republican party in 
this state meant the elevation in any respect of the Negro 
they [white Republicans] would rather see the Republican 
party defeated."74 In addition to his involvement in 
Republican Party politics, Cohen remained committed to the 
struggle for improved black education. Until his death in 
December 1930, Cohen worked closely with Dr. Hardin as a 
member of the Seventh Ward Civic League.75
Several ministers provided leadership to the 
educational movement and countless others used their Sunday 
sermons and neighborhood influence to preach the gospel of 
education. Reverend Henderson Dunn and Bishop Elijah Jones 
were among the educational leaders in the city. Reverend 
Dunn migrated to New Orleans from the Thibodaux area and 
attended Straight University. After graduating in 1903, he 
taught school for several years and in 1908 assumed the 
pastorate of Central Congressional Church. Included in his 
congregation were many of the black professionals of the 
city. Many of them were graduates of Straight College 
which received support from the Congregational Church.
Bishop Jones presided over the Eighth Episcopal District of 
the African Methodist Episcopal Church. Bishop Jones also
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edited the Southwestern Christian Advocate and used its 
pages to promote education.76
The black perception of the purpose of education, as 
well as the kind of education blacks needed, differed 
markedly from those responsible for public education.
Black leaders refused to accept the limitations imposed by 
the white community. The New Orleans black community 
agreed with a Mississippian who thought, "no subject opens 
a broader field for discussion among our people, no subject 
needs to be talked more, and no subject should be given 
more thought by them than the subject of education."77 
Blacks in New Orleans went beyond discussing and thinking; 
they acted. In 1900 more black children remained outside 
the school doors than inside. A steady increase in 
enrollment, however, reflected confidence that "An 
education for your child is better than forty acres and a 
mule. The mule may die, the title of the land may be
7fldefective, but an education abideth eternally." Leaders 
like Reverend Dunn and Reverend Elijah Jones used terms 
such as "immediate" and "imperative" when assessing and 
advocating black education. They also stressed the role of
79the parent.
Through public meetings, communications to school 
officials, and the local press blacks expressed their 
educational objectives. They expressed them through the 
various neighborhood and community organizations as well as
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through recognized and respected community leaders. Racism 
and discrimination directed at the entire black community 
helped to blur class and color distinctions among blacks 
and facilitated black unity. Limited educational 
opportunities provided a focus for their collective efforts 
and the beginning of a sustained protest tradition.
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Chapter Four 
Education During the Jim Crow Era, 1900-1945
Through the various organizations they formed to 
improve education for the black community, black leaders 
fought for specific objectives. Using protest, petitions, 
and constant pressure on school officials, they won some 
victories. Their protest strategy centered on three areas. 
First, black leaders sought to expand black educational 
opportunity by forcing school officials to provide black 
students with high, vocational, and evening schools.
Second, they fought for improved conditions within the 
schools —  improved curriculum, better buildings, and a 
reduction in overcrowding. Third, they attempted to gain 
an all black teaching corps and salary equalization for 
black teachers. Although blacks had made gains in all 
three areas by the end of the period, educational 
opportunities for blacks remained unequal to those 
available to whites.
One of the more glaring examples of the school board's 
policy of limitation was the lack of high school facilities 
for blacks. School officials at least acknowledged a need 
for vocational training and admitted the public school 
should provide it. Of course, they did very little to 
provide it. But school officials did not even admit a need
129
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for a black high school, and black leaders usually had more 
success winning monetary concessions than in changing the 
board's opinion of the proper education for blacks. The 
school board's decision in 1900 to reduce black education 
to the fifth grade forced blacks to temporarily abandon 
their efforts to secure secondary schools for blacks. It 
made little sense to launch an aggressive push for a high 
school when public education ceased after the fifth grade. 
Then, too, Southern University located in New Orleans still 
offered high school courses. Between 1900 and 1910 blacks 
worked to regain grades six through eight.1
The closing of Southern University in 1913, and its 
removal to Baton Rouge in 1914, however, led to a change of 
strategy. Many whites and blacks thought Southern's 
location in an urban environment prevented it from becoming 
a vocational and agricultural training school for blacks 
from throughout the state. Black leaders in the rest of 
the state argued that New Orleans had three other black 
universities and that alone justified the removal of 
Southern. State officials including Governor Luther E.
Hall, his predecessor Jared Sanders, and State 
Superintendent Thomas H. Harris supported the move. Joseph 
S. Clark, a black educator who would later become president 
of Southern, actively worked for Southern's relocation.
Most blacks in the city opposed the move, but support for 
the change did emerge from individuals affiliated with
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Straight University. According to one account, Straight 
acted because of self interest— the elimination of a rival 
free university.2
New Orleans school officials, also acting from self 
interest, passed several resolutions opposing the removal 
of Southern because it would create an educational void 
that blacks would put pressure on them to fill. Indeed, in 
July 1913, as soon as it appeared doubtful that Southern 
would remain in New Orleans, blacks did ask school officals 
to "make arrangements for a colored high school, as the 
pupils formerly attending Southern University are now 
deprived of the State High School...." A month later a 
group of parents from McDonogh No. 6 asked that at least 
the seventh grade be added when school opened in the fall. 
The board agreed to add the seventh grade in 1913 and the 
eighth in the following year, but still refused to open a 
high school.3 Between 1914 and 1917 blacks repeatedly 
petitioned the school board for a black high school. Each 
time board members denied the request.
Blacks did not abandon their attempts to sway the 
board, however. Education could not aid black community 
development without public secondary schools. By 1900 high 
schools, once only for the elite, were becoming a source of 
social mobility for the sons and daughters of the white 
working class.4 The whole idea of social mobility for 
blacks, however, contradicted whites' belief in the
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inherent inferiority of blacks. Segregation forced New 
Orleans' white leaders to concede the need for a small 
number of blacks to receive academic high school training. 
They recognized that a separate black community needed 
physicians, teachers, lawyers, and clergymen, but they 
nevertheless refused to allocate public funds to assist in 
the training of a professional class.
In January 1917, 823 New Orleans children completed
the eight year elementary school course of study in the
public schools. Most of them looked forward to attending
one of the four public high schools— Warren Easton, Sophie
Wright, Esplanade High, or Francis Nicholls. School
officials had built the schools within the last six years
and they represented a capital outlay of nearly two million
dollars. The city's architect, E. A. Christy, and
Superintendent Gwinn had visited several midwestem cities
to learn of the latest in school design and equipment.5
They wanted to ensure that New Orleans would have high
school facilites unsurpassed in the South. Care also went
into formulating the curriculum. Warren Easton offered
college preparatory courses as well as commerical classes
in bookkeeping, banking, and typing. Wright and Esplanade
High were college preparatory schools for girls. Nicholls
£offered vocational training for females. Seventy-one of 
the 823 students, however, could not attend the four public 
high schools— they were black.
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But in 1917 that changed. Years of agitation, along 
with an increasing number of black grammar school 
graduates, finally convinced the school board to open a 
high school for blacks that fall. For this venture, school 
officials did not plan any fact gathering trips or 
appropriate a large capital outlay. They simply 
transferred white students from McDonogh No. 13 and 
converted it to black use. Blacks would have preferred a 
modern high school in a less commercial part of the city. 
They accepted the building because they were realists and 
black grammar school graduates needed a high school 
education. The school opened in 1917 as McDonogh No. 35, 
and would eventually win acclaim for academic excellence.7 
John Hoffman, a Tougaloo, Mississippi graduate of 
Wilberforce University and Michigan Agricultural College, 
served as its first principal.8
The curriculum at McDonogh No. 35 featured the 
traditional college preparatory courses. To graduate 
students had to complete a mix of required and elected 
subjects in English, Latin, history, science, music, 
mathematics, and physical education. "Credit for these 
subjects," according to a resolution adopted in September 
1917, was "to be given on same basis as in the white high 
schools."9 Except for the general science textbook, blacks 
used the same books as whites. Eighty-two children 
enrolled for the fall semester and an additional sixty-one
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in the spring. Only one spring graduate from the 
elementary school failed to enroll at McDonogh No. 35 in 
the first year. A need had existed for a black high 
school, and blacks took advantage of the new opportunity.
Like the leader of any pioneering effort, McDonogh 
35's principal wanted the school to show immediate signs of 
success. Assessing the first year of operation Hoffman 
noted, "From the beginning, both pupils and teachers have 
joined in their efforts to set a high standard of 
efficiency and promote a spirit of good will in the 
school."10 The staff and students also experienced some 
success in eliminating opposition from whites in the area. 
"This wonderful spirit seems to have had its effect on the 
residents in the immediate vicinity," Hoffman reported,
"and whatever opposition or uncertainty they may have 
expressed in the beginning has evidently been swept 
away."11 Hoffman realized that the growth and success of 
the city's first black public high school depended on 
fostering good relations with neighboring whites.
Meeting the educational needs of blacks, not improving 
race relations, was the school's mission, however. How 
well did it succeed? From the start the school faced a 
dilemma, or rather a crisis of identity. Although McDonogh 
35 was established as a college preparatory school, Hoffman 
wanted it to "meet the larger needs of the community." As
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the only black public high school in the city, Hoffman 
believed the school should offer a diverse curriculum. He 
therefore sought to expand the curriculum to include 
vocational education and thought "that courses in Wood 
Working and Domestic Science will be extremely desirable 
for our pupils."12 In later years he advocated 
introducting courses in plumbing, printing, and automobile 
mechanics. Citing the opportunities available for 
employment in those fields, he believed, "the majority of 
the boys will greatly benefit by such a chance to fit 
themselves for practical service."13 By 1927 vocational 
classes had become a part of the curriculum, and a 
contemporary observed, "For a number of years the manual 
training department of the Negro high school made all the 
work desks for the whole system, [and] the cooking 
department takes care of the daily lunches...."14
Emphasis on vocational training failed to hinder the 
school's academic development. Hoffman stressed academic 
attainment with the same zeal with which he advocated 
vocational expansion. At the conclusion of the first year 
he mentioned the "excellent showing made in the Department 
of Science." He credited its success to the teachers and 
students who "worked enthusiastically during the entire 
year to build up a first-class department." The 
mathematics department drew praise for helping students 
develop "clear and concise reasoning" skills. The history
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classes "awaken in the pupils a higher sense of duty and 
patriotism through a knowledge of the development of 
civilization and nations." Hoffman expressed less 
satisfaction with the English teacher and wanted "a teacher
of marked ability and special training in English " To
enhance the academic environment the students formed a 
debating society and attended lectures presented by guest 
speakers. With the school's growth the board hired 
additional teachers.15
McDonogh No. 35 continued to provide quality education 
by overcoming obstacles. For example, shortly before 
school opened in 1923, the school board inexplicably voted 
to suspend the teaching of Spanish, chemistry, and physics. 
That action jeopardized 35's standing as a college 
preparatory school and caused concern within the black 
community. The board reacted slowly in reversing its 
position and waited until the following year to restore the 
subjects.16 The popularity and success of the school soon 
produced overcrowding and a continued commitment by blacks 
to secure additional high school facilities.17
In addition to a need for secondary schools, blacks 
also needed educational facilities for students unable to 
attend school during traditional school hours. Black 
children failed to attend school for the same reason many 
whites did— they simply lacked interest. On the other 
hand, large numbers of black and white youths worked and
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could not attend regular day school. In 1910, of the
city's population of persons 7 to 20 years old 45.7 percent
of blacks in the age group attended school compared to 54.2
percent for the entire city. In 1920 approximatley 58
percent of blacks between 7 and 20 years old attended
school. Figures for the entire city were slightly better
19at nearly 60 percent. Several educational trends at the 
beginning of the century involved attempts to expand 
educational access. The start of evening schools 
significantly expanded educational opportunities for white 
youths in the city. School board members voted to start an 
evening school at the Boys High School for the 1903-1904 
school year. The school opened on 2 November with 142 
students. Enrollment reached 180 before the end of the 
session five months later. In addition to classes in 
English, reading, math, geography, and history, students 
received instruction in typing, bookkeeping, and 
stenography. Increased enrollment led Superintendent 
Easton to request additional evening schools. When the 
1911-1912 school year started, nine evening schools 
operated throughout the city.20 None of them admitted 
blacks.
The evening school curriculum offered a vivid look 
at the relationship between educational access and enhanced 
employment opportunities. The curriculum expanded from the 
initial three commercial courses to include classes in
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manual and industrial training, domestic science, and 
additional commercial classes. When necessary, school 
officials fashioned a curriculum to meet a specific need or 
objective. During the winter of 1907-1908 white New 
Orleanians became upset by what many regarded as an 
inordinate number of blacks in the federal civil service. 
Some whites charged that the area black colleges provided 
their students with special instruction to prepare them for 
the federal exam. Superintendent Warren Easton immediately 
organized a class at one of the evening schools to prepare 
whites for the test.21 He soon reported "excellent results 
by pupils of the Civil Service Class of Evening School No. 
1" Seven out of the eight evening school students who took 
the test passed; one of them earned the highest grade on 
the letter carrier exam.22 Neither the educational 
inequalities nor the tangible benefits of educational 
opportunity escaped the attention of the black community.
Blacks wanted school officials to provide evening 
schools for them as they did for white youths who worked. 
Between 1900 and 1918 evening schools remained a high 
priority.23 Expressing the frustration many blacks felt 
over the board's refusal to provide evening schools, an 
editorial in a religious newspaper "Question[ed] the right 
of a people to rule who are so nearsighted and thoroughly 
selfish as to refuse the petition of an element of the 
citizenship that is loyal, though poor and helpless."24
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Although blacks did not benefit initially from the 
expanded educational opportunities associated with evening 
schools, they welcomed the new program. They knew, as one 
scholar observed, that "the southern educational revival 
widened the gap between the schooling of whites and blacks 
at the same time that it extended opportunity for both
aegroups." Once a new program for whites became 
operational, black leaders and parents increased their 
requests and demands for the same programs. Constant 
denials by the board failed to lessen their resolve and 
persistence often produced favorable results. For example, 
after countless appeals and petitions the school board 
established an evening school for blacks in November 1918. 
Despite its restrictive admission requirements— males had 
to be employed six hours a day and instruction could not 
extend beyond the fourth grade level— the evening school 
experienced immediate success. Enrollment reached 398 
during the first year of operation.26
The DuBoi s ian-Washingtonian debate over manual 
versus academic training for blacks had little relevance to 
blacks in New Orleans because school officials refused to
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adequately fund vocational training for blacks.28 Despite 
the opening of McDonogh 35 and the start of evening 
schools, exclusion or limited educational opportunities 
served as the operational philosophy of school officials. 
James Fortier and other school board members consistently 
expressed the belief that blacks should receive, almost 
exclusively, manual, industrial, or domestic training, but 
budgetary problems prevented them from putting the idea 
into practice. It was cheaper to teach blacks Greek and 
Latin than sewing and carpentry. Indeed, even in white 
schools, vocational training developed slowly because of a 
chronic shortage of revenues. At the beginning of the 
century no students received industrial training.29
Community groups wanted industrial training in the 
white schools and frequently pressured school officials to 
furnish it. When the Mew Orleans Educational Association 
requested the introduction of manual training in 1900, 
board members promised to act when funds became available. 
Dr. James H. Dillard, representing the Public School 
Alliance, pledged the support of his organization for any 
plan to start industrial training. Some individuals and 
groups went beyond speeches and petitions. Joseph Kohn, a 
businessman and president of the Chamber of Commerce, 
offered to donate one thousand dollars toward the purchase 
of industrial training equipment. Kohn later extended the
30same offer for equipment for a black school. The board
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accepted both offers.
Community efforts to secure industrial education 
received the enthusiastic support of the various 
superintendents. Warren Easton actively sought to start an 
industrial program in 1901. With plans still dormant 
several years later, he informed the board members that 
industrial education was not a "fad."31 He suggested they 
establish a program in the high schools or in a separate 
vocational training school. The board began seriously to 
study Easton's recommendation in the spring of 1905 and 
referred the matter to the Committee on Elementary and 
Secondary Schools.32 Unable to reach a decision on whether 
to start the program in the high or elementary schools, the 
board waited five years before taking action. In 1910, 
school officials decided to start industrial training in
33several white elementary schools.
Most whites agreed that blacks needed manual 
training, and of course, some insisted they needed no 
other. Black leaders and parents also embraced manual 
training but thought blacks needed other training as well. 
Blacks knew that even in a race-neutral society, varied 
intellectual abilities and vocational interests 
necessitated a diverse school curriculum. The idea that 
schools should prepare students for work was a cardinal 
principle; few dissented from it. The struggle for 
vocational training remained an integral part of the
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development of the black community. The occupational 
status of black New Orleans necessitated and justified such 
an approach.
The majority of black males employed in the city 
worked as unskilled laborers. For example, in 1920 blacks 
constituted 27 percent of the population, but nearly 45 
percent of the persons engaged in domestic and personal 
service. Looked at another way, foreign-born white males 
had more professional jobs than black males (619 to 462). 
Four-times as many blacks, however, lived in the city, 
100,930 to 25,992.35 In 1950, black laborers outnumbered 
the white laborers almost two to one. Earning capacity, of 
course, depended on occupational status. As a consequence, 
in 1944 black median income was fifty percent less than
36that of whites. Black leaders and black parents 
attempted to enhance and expand the occupational options of 
black youths through vocational training.
Kohn raised his initial offer from one thousand 
dollars to twelve hundred dollars for industrial equipment 
in a black school. Citing a lack of funds, school 
officials still failed to take advantage of the offer, 
notwithstanding the requests from blacks and the 
recommendations of the superintendent. "Facilities for 
trade and industrial education are needed for the colored 
youth in the upper grammar grades," Superintendent Gwinn 
stressed in 1912. On another occasion he admitted that
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"nothing has been done to supply facilities for industrial 
education for the negroes. All recognize the great need 
for this training for the youth of that race."37 At one 
point the board considered building an extension to the 
Thorny Lafon School to house several industrial classes. 
Board members abandoned that plan, citing the expense of 
what was actually a relatively modest construction cost of 
$2,250. At the same time they had appropriated $100,000 
for the vocational training of six thousand white 
students.38
Finally, in 1918, school officials authorized the 
construction of a three room annex for manual training at 
Lafon. Several years after making his pledge Kohn sent the 
board a twelve hundred dollar check.39 Eighteen years into 
the twentieth century, blacks and their supposedly "proper" 
education met. By 1927 many other black schools, 
including McDonogh 35, offered manual or domestic training. 
Female students received instruction in sewing and cooking, 
and males learned printing, carpentry, and bricklaying.40
Vocational instruction in various elementary schools 
and at McDonogh 35 provided only a partial solution to the 
problem of inadequate black vocational training. Blacks 
and school officals acknowledged the need for a trade 
school for elementary school graduates. Whenever the 
subject came before the board, however, a claimed 
insufficiency of funds prevented the board from acting.
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Into the financial void, and to the relief of the black 
community, stepped representatives of the Julius Rosenwald 
Fund. School officials had attempted to get money from the 
Rosenwald Fund since 1923.41 Interest by the Fund 
coincided with the school board's issuance of three million 
dollars in bonds for school construction. The board voted 
in February 1930 to use $275,000 from the bond money to 
construct a black trade school. At the time the figure 
represented the largest amount of money allocated for a 
black school by the board.42 Rosenwald Fund officials then 
pledged $125,000 to the proposed $400,000 project.
Some members of the black community did not support 
the plan to build a trade school. John Guillaume, 
president of a proprietary business college, argued that 
blacks needed academic high schools more than a trade 
school. "A trade school building is not our greatest need 
in the line of school facilities," Guillaume stated in a 
letter to Superintendent Bauer.43 In an editorial titled 
"We Need It," the Louisiana Weekly disagreed with 
Guillaume: "The trade school idea is a good one; if not,
the white children would not have two in our city while we 
are getting one. If the idea is good for the opposite 
group, where they have one hundred chances to our 
children's one for positions by which they are to earn 
their daily bread, then why condemn something that will 
have a tendency to put our children on an equality with
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those of other groups."44
Blacks welcomed financial support from the Rosenwald 
Fund and noted with some satisfaction statements made by 
Dr. Franklin Keller, an executive of the Fund. Dr. Keller 
met with leaders of the black community in February 1931 to 
discuss the trade school project. He assured the 
delegation that "in New Orleans there will be as fine a 
trade school for Negro children as there is now for either 
whites or Negroes anywhere in the United States." Keller 
attempted to allay the concerns of blacks regarding the 
type of courses to be offered. He maintained the trade 
"school will continue to introduce new courses of study 
along with the development of new trades during the 
constant revolution of industry."4S He cited the city's 
need for bricklayers and automobile mechanics and argued 
that the trade school should train blacks to meet those and 
other labor needs of the community.
Viewing vocational education in a broader context, 
blacks wanted vocational courses to go beyond the narrow 
dictates of the New Orleans labor market. The recent war 
and the northern migration of blacks convinced many black 
leaders of the need for training local blacks for a 
national labor market. The South's hold on the black 
population grew less tenacious as the years passed. "If 
the school disregards equipping the Negro for the needs of 
the forty-eight states," charged the Weekly "and holds to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148
the theory that brick-laying and plastering is sufficient 
thereof, we are compelled to ask 'to what aught is this 
waste'?1,46 The black community did not feel constrained by 
the policies or actions of the majority population. They 
knew the proper education of black children involved a 
struggle of seemingly endless duration.
Many whites, on the other hand, wanted a very limited 
vocational curriculum for blacks. Racism and 
discrimination involved more than a cerebral or emotive 
ideology; it enabled white workers to maintain a favorable 
position in the labor market. Since race antipathy 
prevented the inclusion of blacks in most local skilled 
unions, white workers had a vested interest in suppressing 
the development of black skilled workers. Attempts at 
black-white worker solidarity had already succumbed to the 
" color-line. "47
Board members like Isaac Heller, who displayed some 
sympathy for black education and led the campaign within 
the school board for a black trade school, had to contend 
with the feelings of the white community. A month after 
school officials annonced their intention to build a trade 
school, Heller tried to mollify white fears with the 
assurance that the school would not increase occupational 
competititon between blacks and whites. Heller maintained 
the trade school curriculum would reflect traditional black 
employment patterns. Although he spoke in general terms,
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his statements prevented the formation of organized and 
sustained white opposition.48
Conflict and concern over the proposed curriculum 
became moot when school officials allowed the project to 
die a slow death. With the assistance of the Rosenwald 
Fund and the money from the bond issue, school officials 
had sufficient revenues to erect the trade school. To the 
chagrin of the black community, the school board purchased 
a former hospital building on Carondelet Street to serve as 
its central office. Part of the money for the acquisition 
came from the funds set aside for the trade school.49 Why 
did the board suddenly change policy?
Support for the project among the members was tepid 
at best and rested to a considerable degree on the efforts 
of Heller and Superintendent Bauer. A $400,000 school for 
blacks, even if it promised to train them for the "right" 
jobs, was too large an expenditure for black education. 
Additionally, the lingering fear of potential job 
competititon between the races convinced the school board 
to abandon the project. The effects of the depression all 
but eliminated reconsideration of the project for several 
years.
In the meantime the board, with bitter irony, or 
disdain, decided to build an inexpensive elementary school 
on the site previously purchased for the trade school. The 
new school, constructed in less than two months, alleviated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
overcrowding at three schools in the area. Ordinarily 
black leaders and parents expressed joy at the addition of 
new schools. This time they knew that they had lost more 
than they had gained. With justifiable indignation blacks 
wondered: "Did they decide to give a 25,000 dollar
temporary building on a site selected for a trade school in 
order to avoid erecting the needed trade school?"50
Black leaders, however, continued the effort to 
secure a trade school. Throughout the 1903s the Colored 
Educational Alliance, the New Orleans NAACP, and the 
Federation of Civic Leagues kept the issue before the 
school board.51 Funding through the Works Progress 
Administration eventually made the trade school a reality. 
In 1940 construction started near the previous site which 
had been purchased amidst much fanfare and hope. In honor 
of the man who a half-century earlier had placed his 
approval and life's energies in industrial education, the
coboard named the school after Booker T. Washington.
Victories in the struggles to get black high schools, 
evening schools, and a trade school greatly increased 
educational opportunities for blacks. Black leaders though 
wanted limitless educational opportunities; as soon as they 
claimed victory in one battle they moved on to eliminate 
other educational deficiencies. What type of instruction 
the students received also mattered to parents and
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community leaders. Although the city operated a dual 
educational system, in many subjects a common curriculum 
existed for blacks and whites. In other words, a black 
first grader taking arithmetic had the same curriculum as a 
white first grader.53 Disparities in the content of black 
and white education occurred because whites received 
instruction in many more subjects than blacks and had 
programs not available to blacks.
From the first year of school, discrimination 
affected the content and scope of black education. For 
example, school officials provided kindergarten classes for 
whites but failed to give blacks the same opportunity until 
the 1940s. In a response to a request for kindergarten 
classes for black students in 1900, the Committee on 
Teachers established the tone for several decades when it 
informed blacks "it is the sense of this committee that 
under the existing conditions it is not feasible to 
inaugurate said system at present."54
School officials continued the division of the grades 
started in the nineteenth century, elementary (primary and 
grammar), high, and normal. The primary grades remained 
one through four, and grammar grades consisted of five 
through eight. High school students had a three year 
curriculum, except for the 1900-1901 school year when 
officials increased it to four years. Some dissatisfaction 
with the three year plan lingered, and occasionally,
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someone proposed changing to a four year curriculum. 
Opposition from educational pressure groups effectively 
overcame such sentiments.55 But in the end the decision by 
some colleges not to accept students without four years of 
high school forced a change. Even then the ever 
resourceful school board transferred the eighth grade from 
the elementary division to the high school division.56 The 
curriculum at the normal school for prospective teachers 
remained at two years. With the advent of evening schools 
and increased interest in vocational training, the 
organizational divisions changed to meet those needs.57
The elementary schools provided instruction in 
language arts, reading, spelling, mathematics, science, 
history, civics, art, and physical training. In each 
subject teachers expected a specific mastery of certain 
skills. In language arts students acquired "freedom and 
facility in expression," and the ability to "differentiate 
between thought, exprssion, and the mechanical side of 
language work." Memorization remained in vogue; teachers 
had a list of stories and poems for each grade they 
taught.00 First grade teachers exposed their students to 
works such as Longfellow's Hiawatha. Jacob's Fables of 
Aesop, and Holbrook's Book of Nature myths. "To secure 
mastery of the printed page, and easy effective expresssion 
of thought; to develop appreciation of literature, love of 
books, power to select and use them wisely...," grammar
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school students read Rip Van Winkle. The Legend of Sleepy 
Hollow. The Shell and the Brook, and The First Snowfall.59
As the number of supervisors and administrators 
increased, the school board devoted more time to curriculum 
development. Teachers received bock-length guides that 
provided detailed outlines and suggestions for teaching as
CQwell as for tests and measurements. Students spent about
fifty percent of the school day on their English-related
subjects. Time devoted to mathematics and science was
61eighteen and ten percent respectively. Students usually
spent the remainder of the school day studying history,
geography, and drawing.
Attempts to improve the curriculum or to up-grade
facilities were frequently undermined by lack of funds.
Resistancce to taxes for education, a fixture in nineteenth
century New Orleans, continued into the twentieth. New
Orleans consistently spent less on education than cities of
comparable size. The state's contribution to local schools 
62remained small. Inadequate funding retarded the entire 
system, but blacks suffered to a much greater extent since 
they received a much smaller share of the public school 
budget.63
An indiction of the inequities of school board policy 
can be gleaned from examining the number, condition, and 
value of various schoools. In the 1901-1902 session blacks
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had twelve schools and whites sixty. In 1910 New Orleans
had sixteen black schools and sixty-eight for whites.
Moreover, school officials generally spent more to maintain
white schools than to maintain black ones. Whites also
benefited disproportionately from new construction.
Between 1900 and 1910, school officials erected twenty-one
schools. Even though white schools already numbered far
more than black, only three of the new schools served the
black population. The estimated site and building value of
the new black schools averaged $25,000. By contrast, the
value of the new white schools averaged $42,500. The three
black schools were frame structures: twelve of the
eighteen white schools were brick. Whites not only
received more schools, they received better schools.
Ten years later, the Superintendent's report for the
1920-1921 school year revealed similar statistics. Out of
the eighty-six public schools in the city, fewer than
twenty served the needs of blacks students. Again, city
leaders had erected new schools. Fourteen went up between
1910 and 1920. Only one, however, served black students.65
Black and white leaders knew that often the number of
available schools affected total black enrollment; limited
facilities equaled lower enrollment. "It is evident,"
Superintendent Warren Easton reported in 1903, "that the
full seating capacity has been reached and a further
%
increase in the enrollment cannot be expected until the
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school accommodations are enlarged."66 After 1920 black 
enrollment outpaced available facilities, which placed 
additional pressure on school officials and provided them 
with tangible evidence of black educational interest. 
Increased enrollment and interest also placed pressure on 
black leaders to fight for better schools. To meet the 
educational needs of the black community, black leaders had 
to become more aggressive in their attack on the status 
quo.
The need for additional black schools persisted 
throughout the period. Leaders of the black community 
continually kept the issue before school officials. In the 
main, the school board was a reactive body, seldom making 
decisions until some type of community interest or pressure 
developed. In matters related to black education, this 
tendency was even more pronounced. Black activism, 
therefore, became an even more crucial element in the 
campaign for improved schools. Blacks residing in the less 
developed sections of the city fared worse in the quest for 
schools. Residents in the Milneburg area, an outlying 
district near Lake Ponchartrain, on several occasions 
petitioned school officials, without success, for a school. 
Others living in the more populous areas also kept their 
needs before the board. A 1913 petition from the Colored 
Educational Alliance requested the erection of several
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Table 8
Average Cost of Operations Per Pupil, 1922-1940s7
ar Ending Black White Differer
1922 36.77 74.26 $37.49
1923 32.50 70.05 37.55
1924 39.41 69.20 29.79
1925 34.82 63.09 28.27
1926 43.35 73.77 30.42
1927 42.72 77.65 34.93
1928 41.38 79.31 37.73
1929 41 .47 78.08 36.61
1930 40.82 77.59 36.77
1931 37.78 74.52 36.74
1932 37.82 75.99 38.17
1933 29.03 56.15 27.12
1934 27.33 52.10 24.77
1935 27.67 56.21 28.54
1936 27.88 69.49 27.81
1937 37.73 79.34 31 .76
1938 41 .86 85.19 37.48
1939 42.18 8.615 43.01
1940 44.32 86.15 41 .83
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annexes to relieve overcrowding as well as new schools.68
The petitioners pointed out that money spent on black 
education would benefit the entire community. In a city 
that often displayed hostility to any form of black 
education beyond the primary level, it made sense to link 
the educational aspirations of blacks to the development of 
the larger community. Black New Orleanians did not invent 
this strategy; blacks in other cities employed similar
CQtactics with a degree of success. Black leaders and 
parents emphasized that they wanted a fair share of the 
community's educational revenues. Fair and equitable meant 
the resources spent on black education should approximate 
the black percentage of the population.
Adherence to the latter part of the separate but 
equal doctrine had long ago succumbed to racism and 
budgetary constraints. Black leaders like Reverend Dunn 
and Dr. Hardin hoped that investigation and exposure of the 
conditions in the schools would lead to improvements. They 
also used the many investigations as a means to keep the 
black community involved in educational issues. Blacks 
gained few absolute educational victories, but parental and 
community interest increased because of the emphasis placed 
on education by black leaders.
Unsanitary and unsafe conditions existed at most of 
the black schools and received the attention of black 
leaders. Beginning in 1925 the black owned newspaper, the
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Louisiana Weekly, made improved education a top priority. 
When blacks petitioned for improved school buildings they 
sought not an upgrading of buildings from adequate to good 
or good to better; rather they had to fight to improve 
schools from deplorable to adequate.70 In 1913 blacks and 
school officials considered several of the schools 
unsanitary— Oleander, Fisk, Fisk Branch, Bayou Road, and 
Miro. After city health authorities condemned the Oleander 
School, school officials rented a building to accommodate 
the students.71
Renting building served only as a temporary measure, 
modern brick structures represented the real answser to the 
problem. School officials, however, rarely allocated 
enough money for such permanent solutions. When officials 
finally transferred students from "the broken down church 
building which formerly housed Fisk Branch School," 
conditions improved marginally. A school hygienist 
considered the building unfit for a school. According to 
one report: "All of the rooms are filled with desks. The
windows have not been changed, but are the same windows 
usuallly found in residences. No desk space for the 
teacher is possible, as the rooms are too small for both 
teacher's and pupils desks."72
As late as 1927 blacks had only one modern school 
building, Joseph Craig located in Faubourg Treme, the 
city's oldest black residential area. Most of the other
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schools were wooden structures in poor condition.73 A 
large delegation of blacks, including Dr. Hardin and 
members of the Seventh Ward Civic League, appeared before 
school officials in 1928 to discuss conditions at Jones.
Dr. Hardin presented pictures of the school that supported 
his statements, and Superintendent Nicholas Bauer informed 
the board that conditions were as bad as Dr. Hardin 
indicated. Bauer recommended immediate relief and 
suggested the construction of a modern school for that 
section of the city.74 The board members assured the group 
that relief would follow, and this time they kept their 
promise.
Several months later school officials accepted bids 
for the construction of the new school at Annette and Miro 
Streets.75 In October 1929, over two thousand individuals 
attended dedication ceremonies for the new Valena C. Jones, 
"considered one of the best equipped school buildings in 
this section of the country." The lengthy program included 
speeches by Superintendent Bauer, board member Isaac 
Heller, community leader Hardin, and Jones' principal 
Fannie C. Williams. Heller gave the keynote address and 
used the theme "The New Negro" as his topic. Miss Williams 
encouraged the crowd to tour the school and "note the 
modem equipment, which includes a radio in the school 
auditorium, an electric refrigerator and gas stoves and 
ovens in the domestic science room, a fire-chute, and a
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well equipped infirmary."76 Doubtlessly, many parents in 
attendance shared Miss Williams' joy, heightened by the 
realization that the school began in the early twentieth 
century in a "lowly tenement house."77
The number of blacks enrolled in school increased 
dramatically between 1900 and 1945. Except for a 
significant and, to a degree, unexplained fluctuation in 
enrollment from 1901 to 1906, black enrollment demonstrated 
sustained growth. In 1900, blacks accounted for 17.5 
percent of total enrollment, by 1920 the percentage had 
increased to 21.3 percent. The increase occurred despite 
the fact that increased enrollment invariably contributed 
to overcrowding which forced many students to attend school 
on a part-time basis. Moreover, increased enrollment often 
exasperated an already critical teacher-to-pupil ratio. In 
a superintendent's report that acknowledged some of the 
needs of black schools, Joseph Gwinn stated, "practically 
all of the schools for Negroes are overcrowded." As a 
remedy he suggested that "additions are needed at McDonogh 
32, Bienville, McDonogh 6, and Thorny Lafon." Throughout 
the period blacks complained of the endemic overcrowded 
conditions in their schools.
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Table 9
New Orleans Public School Enrollment, 1900-194079
Year Ending Black White Total
1901 5,509 26,038 31,547
1902 5,072 26,133 31,205
1903 4,856 26,228 31,144
1904 4,949 26,751 31,700
1905 4,558 27,331 31,889
1906 4,847 27,125 31,972
1907 5,659 28,605 34,265
1908 6,295 31,710 38,005
1909 6,717 33,687 40,404
1910 6,616 36,117 42,733
1911 7,674 38,151 45,825
1912 8,105 38,499 46,604
1913 8,367 40,080 48,447
1914 8,706 39,161 47,867
1915 8,736 40,244 48,980
1916 9,656 39,161 47,868
1917 9,404 40,244 48,990
1918 9,685 41,836 41,647
1919 9,362 40,182 49.544
1920 10,984 40,611 51,595
1921 12,996 49,923 53,920
1922 15,256 44,662 59,918
1923 16,103 47,325 63,428
1924 16,128 47,087 63,215
1925 17,052 47,401 64,453
1926 16,500 47,952 64,452
1927 19,625 48,732 68,356
1928 21,025 50,165 71,189
1929 21,911 52,927 74,839
1930 23,018 52,891 75,909
1931 22,572 56,834 79,406
1932 24,987 55,948 80,935
1933 25,130 57,364 82,494
1935 26,640 58,968 85,608
1936 29,256 59,587 88,843
1937 29,062 57,496 88,558
1938 27,537 54,797 82,334
1939 28,322 54,140 82,402
1940 27,787 53,657 81,444
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Schools recently built often became overcrowded. The 
new Thorny Lafon School, erected In 1906, was overcrowded a 
year later, which necessitated an annex. McDonogh No. 32, 
built in 1907, had to conduct some of its classes in a 
rented church building that constantly needed repairs.60 
School officials responded to overcrowding by renting or 
building annexes. Renting church buildings, though popular 
with school officials, worked a hardship on teachers and 
students. Unlike residences, school officials could not 
build partitions or even place desks in the rented 
churches. Although vacant during the week, the buildings 
had to be in condition for use by their congregations on 
Sundays. Nevertheless, the practice of renting churches 
continued.61
When the board could not find suitable buildings to 
rent or did not have the funds to construct annexes, it had 
blacks attend school only part of the day. The idea of 
part-time classes developed slowly but became widespread in 
the 1920s. Students at McDonogh No. 6, however, had their 
school day shortened as early as 1915. In the beginning of 
the 1922-1923 school year, 5,396 black students attended 
school part-time. Only 192 white students, however, had 
less than a full day of school.62 School officials 
attempted to limit part-time classes to the primary grades, 
but that often proved impossible as the number of blacks in 
grammar and secondary schools increased. Students forced
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to attend part-time averaged 2 1/2 to 4 hours of school.
No official policy or regulation existed regarding the 
length of the school day for students attending classes 
part-time. School officials reacted to conditions as they 
arose. They made no effort to defend the practice as a 
remedy for overcrowding, citing as a reason the familiar
83refrain— insufficient revenues.
In 1927, a survey of black schools conducted by 
reporters for the Louisiana Weekly, disclosed overcrowded 
conditions in most of the schools. Craig School, one of 
the better facilities, had part-time classes, and the 
paper's reporter lamented that "It is to be pitied that an 
almost perfect school should be marred by this evil."84 
Craig served a large district; some of its students 
traveled over twenty-five blocks to attend. Thorny Lafon, 
in uptown New Orleans, hailed derisively as the "largest 
elementary school in the world," resorted to part-time 
classes as the only way to accommodate the large number of
DCstudents. A writer asked, "When, oh when, shall we come 
across a school where enough room is provided for giving 
all the children full time in the classroom?"86
The decision to resegregate the schools in 1877 did 
not result in the elimination of white teachers from black 
schools. In a community that claimed to want to enforce 
the color line in all aspects of human interaction, the
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presence of white teachers in black schools appeared 
contradictory. Nonetheless, despite a board resolution 
passed in 1890 calling for the removal of white teachers, 
the practice continued into the twentieth century.87 Both 
black and white groups opposed the practice and frequently 
petitioned the board to have it stopped. In the face of 
such widespread dissatisfaction, why did it persist? At 
various times one or more factors influenced the board's 
decision. First, native white teachers steeped in the 
tradition of the region's racial mores could be counted on 
to reinforce the dominant position of the majority 
population. Second, the use of white teachers in black 
schools increased employment opportunities for white 
females, a significant consideration because of the absence 
of professional jobs for women. Third, the number of 
qualified black applicants lagged behind demand until the 
1900s.88
The number of black schools staffed by whites 
fluctuated; on at least two occasions board members 
considered expanding the practice rather than phasing it 
out. In 1906 two board members, Knickerbocker and Brennan, 
tried to win board support for replacing the entire corps 
of black teachers with whites. Neither Brennan nor 
Knickerbocker offered a reason for their proposal and their 
motives remained unclear. Whatever their rationale, the
OQboard voted against the measure. School officials built
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an annex to the always overcrowded Lafon in 1910 and 
proposed staffing the annex with white teachers. They 
justified their decision by claiming that the annex 
represented a new school. When blacks learned of the plan 
they quickly registered a protest. They contended that the 
new building was am annex to Lafon and so should have black 
teachers. The board subsequently voted to place black 
teachers at the new annex.90
Attempts by blacks to remove all the white teachers 
proved just as elusive as Brennan and Knickerbocker's 
effort to remove all black teachers. Blacks residing in 
Algiers persistently, but unsuccessfully, tried to get only 
black teachers at McDonogh No. 32. Yet their brethren in 
the Second and Fourth Districts did achieve that goal at 
Bayou Road and First Street Schools.91 As late as the 
1912-1913 school year, four black schools still had white 
teachers— Lawton, McCarthy, McDonogh No. 6, and McDonogh 
No. 32. The same sentiment that made whites support 
residential segregation contributed to a more concerted 
effort to remove white teachers from black schools. The 
board voted to make the change at McDonogh No. 6 and 
McDonogh No. 32 in August 1913. Two years later Lawton 
became an all black teacher school and in 1916 McCarthy did 
too.92
One researcher believed "the establishment of a 
completely colored division of the New Orleans Public
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School was and still is an educational triumph for the 
Negro race."93 Blacks believed that the racial views of 
the white community made it virtually impossible for white 
teachers to provide quality instruction to black students. 
The number of qualified black teachers increased durinq the 
early twentieth century. Fannie C. Williams, O.C.W.
Taylor, Lucian Alexis, and John Hoffman were only a few of 
the young teachers who joined the public schools. The use 
of more black teachers also increased the number of 
professional positions available to blacks. The dearth of 
professional positions for blacks actually helped the 
development of black education. College bound students had 
few options in choosing a professional career, so the 
majority studied to become teachers.94
Despite the willingness of blacks to pursue teaching 
as a career, several obstacles existed. The absence of a 
free teacher training school posed the biggest problem.
The school board sponsored a normal school for whites but 
not, until 1923, for blacks. Additionally, the board, in 
cooperation with Tulane University, conducted a normal 
school in the summer for white teachers which afforded them 
an opportunity to improve their teaching skills. Black 
teachers recognized the importance of the summer normal 
programs and looked for ways to obtain those advantages for 
themselves. In 1915 Reverend Dunn and Reverend Jones, led 
a successful effort to establish a summer normal program
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for blacks. The school board contributed 250 dollars to 
help defray expenses, and Straight University donated the 
use of its facilities. Superintendent Gwinn selected 
Alfred Lawless as the first director and named an advisory 
committee composed of Sylvania Williams, Hattie Feger, and 
Thomas Sherrard. Lawless, along with the advisory 
committeee, recommended the faculty with approval of the 
superintendent. Lawless conducted a successful program and 
the next year Gwinn recommended its renewal. Registration 
for the 1919 session reached 230 and the board's 
contribution rose to 500 dollars.95
The separate and unequal doctrine extended to teacher 
salaries as well as school facilities. In the midst of the
1900 campaign to reduce black education to the primary
grades, the Committee on Elementary Schools considered a 
proposal to equalize the salaries of black and white 
teachers. The plan never reached fruition; the practice of 
paying black teachers less than whites became entrenched, 
despite the protest of black teachers and their 
supporters.96 Black teachers usually received 
approximately twelve percent less than white teachers. For
example, in 1920 a first year white elementary school
teacher earned eighty dollars a month; a black teacher with
the same qualifications received seventy dollars. The 
differential remained throughout the years of service. A
white teacher with six years of experience received 120
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dollars a month and a black teacher 110 dollars.97 Given 
the low and often late salaries paid to black and white 
teachers, both groups had a right to complain— and they 
did.
Black teachers throughout the South also suffered
gobecause of discriminatory salary scales. The salary 
"differentials amounted to a loss of approximately 10 
million dollars to Negro teachers."99 Through individual 
effort and eventually through the coordinated assistance of 
the NAACP, black teachers used the court system to 
challenge salary discrimination. The campaign started in 
Maryland in 1936 and resulted in the 1939 consent decree to 
equalize teacher salaries in that state.100 The stirring of 
change in the distant state of Maryland had no effect on 
the local school board. The salary schedule for the 1937- 
1938 school year continued past inequities. An editorial 
in the Weekly placed the issue in a broader context and 
argued that more was at stake than additional money for 
black teachers: "...if the Negro teachers employed by the
Orleans Parish school board accept without protest this 
most recent discrimination, we fear for children who enter 
their classrooms, so humble and lacking in dependence will 
they doubtless be due to the attitude of their 
instructors.1,101
With assistance from several organizations— the league 
for Equal Rights and Justice, the Colored Educational
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Alliance, and the New Orleans NAACP— black teachers through 
the New Orleans League of Classroom Teachers and later the 
New Orleans Citizens' Committee for Equalizing Educational 
Opportunities, attacked salary discrimination.102 Following 
what by then had become a traditional approach, in 
petitions to the board the teachers first outlined their 
grievances and requested changes. They sent one such 
petition in January 1938 and another that July. Using 
statistical information published by the board, they 
pointed out that a first year white teacher with a B.A. 
degree received an annual salary of $1,000. On the other 
hand, a black teacher with a B.A. degree had a starting 
salary of $909 a year. The disparity increased with the 
level of experience. Thus by the eleventh year in the 
system, the white teacher received $2,200 dollars annually, 
$760 dollars more than a black teacher of the same rank.
"The added strain of financial worries," the teachers 
argued, "takes from us energy which we strongly desire to 
use in rendering the highest degree of efficient service to 
our children.1,103 They expressed confidence in the board's 
willingness and ability to eliminate the inequities.
But this time, the teachers decided to do more than 
simply submit a petition and hope. Between the mailing of 
the first and second petitions they hired a lawyer to 
pursue a court challenge. Unfortunately their enthusiasm 
exceeded their judgement in the selection of an attorney.
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They secured the services of a white attorney who "informed 
the teachers that they needed a plaintiff; and besides he 
had not had much experience in that type of law."104 
Dismayed but not discouraged, the teachers next sought the 
aid of Thurgood Marshall, the attorney responsible for the 
salary equalization victories in Maryland. Marshall, a 
graduate of Howard University Law School, had joined the 
NAACP as a staff attorney in 1936.105 Marshall, who had 
visited New Orleans several times in the past, arrived in 
March 1939 to assist in the pay equalization fight. A 
meticulous organizer and strategist, Marshall informed the 
group "that certain steps should be taken before filing 
suit. The teachers should organize a special committee, 
raise money, and find suitable plaintiffs." Before 
returning to New York Marshall selected the local black 
attorney Alexander Tureaud to help him in the case and he 
assured the group that Tureaud would receive his constant 
assistance.106
The New Orleans Citizens' Committee for Equalizing 
Educational Opportunities, chaired by Donald Jones, a 
community activist, provided funds to fight the case.
Forming an organization proved easy but finding a plaintiff 
took more care, given the threat of reprisals by school 
officials. Officials in some southern communities 
dismissed black teachers who took similar action.107 Unlike 
most black professionals and businessmen in New Orleans,
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teachers worked at the pleasure and discretion of whites. 
Despite the possible loss of his position, Joseph McKelpin, 
a non-tenured teacher at Ricard School, agreed to act as 
the plaintiff.108
Two years elapsed between Marshall's visit and 
definitive action by black teachers. The most plausible 
explanation for the delay was that the teachers thought 
school officials, cognizant of successful challenges in 
other areas, would abolish salary discrimination without a 
court fight. They failed to realize that what may have 
started out as just another form of petty discrimination 
had become in New Orleans a means of holding down the cost 
of black education and therefore of subsidizing white
109education. Once on the back of the tiger it was 
difficult for school officials to dismount without a push. 
The push came on 9 May 1941 in the form of a four point 
petition presented by Attorney Tureaud on the behalf of 
Joseph McKelpin. It requested:
1. That the board abolish the present discrimination 
schedule of teachers' salaries.
2. That petitioners and all other Negroes employed by 
the board as public school teachers and principals 
be paid compensation equal to that paid white 
teachers with the same qualifications and experience 
and performing the same services.
3. That a salary schedule free of all racial 
discrimination or differential be established by the 
board and made applicable to the compensation of all 
teachers and principals in public schools in said 
city.
4. That because this matter has previously been before 
this board prompt action is respectfully requested 
in order that the petitioner's legal rights in the 
premises may not be jeopardized by delay.
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The five member school board, led by President Henry C. 
Schaumburg, assured Tureaud that the board would consider 
the petition. Tureaud seized the intitiative, however, and 
filed suit in June, 1941. Schaumburg then called a special 
meeting to consider what actions the board should take.
One board member, George Treadwell, believed that Tureaud 
filed the suit prematurely because the board had not 
refused to grant the requests raised in the petition. 
Neither Treadwell nor the other members, however, proposed 
to eliminate or narrow the differential between the 
salaries of black and white teachers. Instead they 
referred the suit to the City Attorney, Howard Lenfant, and 
instructed him to litigate.111 On 7 July Lenfant filed a 
"Motion for Extension of Time to Plead" and the court 
granted his request. Faced with precedents recently 
established in other states, Lenfant had concluded that a 
strategy of delay and dismissal represented his only 
option. After receiving a delay, he next filed a motion of 
dismissal in September.
In addition to doing the routine legal work on the case 
in New Orleans, Tureaud remained in constant communication 
with Marshall in New York. Tureaud wrote asking Marshall 
to "indicate the time at which you would like to argue the
119motion to dismiss." This was Tureaud's first important 
civil rights case, and he feared the motion to dismiss 
might have legal merit. Marshall, on the other hand, a
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veteran in the legal crusade for black civil rights, 
considered the dismissal motion "completely without
113foundation." Marshall assured Tureaud that any points 
Lenfant could raise had been attempted and lost in the 
other cases. Meanwhile, the case, assigned to Judge Wayne 
Borah, remained dormant for several months. Tureaud called 
the judge's clerk several times hoping to hear encouraging 
news only to be told that Borah had not reached a 
decision.114
Dismayed over what he considered Judge Borah's 
inordinate delay in reaching a decision, Marshall proposed 
that he and Tureaud meet with the Judge in hopes of 
expediting the matter. Before the meeting took place,
Borah threw out the motion to dismiss and later scheduled a 
trial for August 1942. The prospect of a trial and almost 
certain defeat led school board officials to attempt a 
settlement. August J. Tete, who became Superintendent in 
January 1942 after Nicholas Bauer resigned, presented 
Tureaud with a proposal. Tete offered what he considered a 
"better proposition" because his plan would eliminate not 
only the differential between white and black teachers but 
between degree and non-degree teachers as well.115 
According to Tureaud's figures, about thirty percent of the 
black teachers did not possess at least a B.A. degree, and 
under Tete's plan they would also receive a salary 
increase. Tete requested five years to implement the plan;
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black teachers would receive twenty percent of the 
differentiation in salaries each year until they equalled 
those of whites.116 Tureaud lacked the authority to accept 
or reject the offer and forwarded Tete's plan to Marshall. 
The man with the authority minced few words: "I think the
plan submitted by the school board stinks," he declared and 
outlined his reasons. "In the first place five years is 
too long. In the second place, there are too many catches. 
And in the third place, I am sure that our teachers are 
opposed to it."117
Rebuffed, Tete changed his approach and asked Marshall 
and Tureaud to suggest "terms" they could accept. Neither 
Tete nor the school board envisioned equalizing the 
salaries in one step. Tureaud also endorsed the concept of 
gradual equalization. "I still believe," Tureaud wrote, 
"that we could with some propriety fix at least a maximum 
time we would grant them, and leave the details of the plan 
to be worked out after they have indicated their acceptance
11ftof any suggested plan." Why did Tureaud give tacit 
support to a compromise that clearly favored the school 
board? Unsubstantiated charges would later surface that 
Tureaud received a bribe from school officials for his 
endorsement of a compromise. Tureaud was a man of 
impeccable integrity and labored without compensation in 
the black struggle for civil rights for over fifty years.
A bribe was definitely not the reason. He supported a
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compromise for the same reason the black teachers 
eventually accepted one— litigation was costly, sometimes 
was lengthy, and its outcome was uncertain. Although 
Marshall refused to propose terms to school officials 
because "the pressure at the present time is on the school 
board, and not on us," he, too, would later support a 
compromise.119
"Unless they propose a plan that is satisfactory to us, 
they will have to go to trial in August; and this they do 
not want to do," Marshall wrote in July 1942.120 Marshall's 
instincts proved correct; in August school officials came 
forward with an offer satisfactory to the black teachers 
and to Judge Borah. The opposing sides agreed to a two 
year equalization plan. The board promised to reduce the 
differential by fifty percent in September 1942 and the 
remainder in September, 1943. Black teachers were 
understandably happy, but Judge Borah's ruling contained a 
broader implication for the entire black community. Borah 
had partially resurrected the principles of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, principles that had at one time held such 
promsie and hope. Borah stated that the differentials in 
white and black salaries were "in violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States...."121 Not unmindful of 
the implicaation of this statement, the Lousianan Weekly 
placed the issue in the larger context of the development
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of the black community. "The teachers won equal pay. Why 
should not equal facilities for Negro children be the next 
step?"122
It was the "next step," and a study conducted by Alonzo 
Grace provided additional support for black claims of 
educational inequality. Beginning in the mid-1930s various 
white individuals and groups started to question the 
efficiency of the city's public schools. Out of their 
concern emerged the Citizens' Planning Committee. The 
school board agreed to hire an educational expert to study 
the entire school system and selected Dr. Alonzo Grace, the 
Commissioner of Education for Connecticut, to head the 
effort. His investigative team started work in April,
1938, and published its final report in December, 1939.
Some blacks feared that Grace and his staff would either 
ignore black education or minimize its deficiencies. Their 
fears proved groundless, however, and the Weekly considered 
the completed study "open, fair, and extensive.1,123
Published as Tomorrow's Citizens: A Study and Program
for the Improvement of the New Orleans Public Schools, the 
report contained seven monographs covering a wide range of 
subjects: school facilities, administration, finance,
teacher training, curriculum development, and 
recommendations for the improvements of the school. It 
painted an unflattering portrait of public education in New 
Orleans. Many of the problems cited by Grace resulted from
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a history of inadequate financial support for the schools. 
An assessment of school buildings, for example, stated:
"New Orleans has serious problems in trying to provide 
safe, sanitary and adequate buildings for its school 
children... ."124
More than a lack of money, the report added, 
contributed to the building problem. Inadequate planning 
caused "a great overlapping of circled areas [attendance 
districts], many children living within a half-mile of
1£Cthree or four schools." A utilization survey disclosed 
that the white schools had enough unoccupied classroooms to 
accomodate 2,310 students. The researchers thought "a 
judicious shifting of district lines would make it possible 
to fill some of those rooms, and buildings thus vacated 
could be discontinued or converted to other uses."126
Only four of the twenty-five black schools received a 
"fairly good" rating. The remaining schools were in such 
poor condition that Grace recommended complete replacement. 
In many ways the Grace report merely reiterated the 
deplorable conditions blacks had complained of for over 
half a century. The four "fairly good" schools— Craig, 
Lockett, Jones, and Landry— possessed serious shortcomings 
of their own. The classrooms at Craig showed signs of 
extensive water damage caused by leaks in the roof or 
walls. The desks, chairs, blackboards, and toilets were in 
poor condition. Overcrowding rather than under-utilization
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plagued the black schools. "The rooms were very badly 
crowded, and many classrooms did not have seats and desks 
enough for the children present. In one classroom, there 
were fifty-four children present and only forty-seven 
seats. This condition is not peculiar to the Craig 
School," the researchers concluded, "but may be found in 
any number of colored schools."127
More important than overcrowded and inadequate school
buildings was the educational performance of black
students. Like their white counterparts, black students
performed below the national norm in most categories.
Approximately sixty-five percent of the black students were
"overage" for their grade. A typical student entered the
first grade at the age of six, and with normal promotion,
progressed one grade a year. Thus, for example, at the age
of nine the student should have been in the fourth grade
and in the eighth at the age of thirteen. Out of a total
of 2,377 blacks in the fourth grade, 1,727 were "over age" 
128for their grade. The imbalance in the age-grade 
distribution became more pronounced as the student 
attempted to advance through the system.
An analysis of the promotion rates of 3,674 black 
elementary school students revealed that 73 per cent of 
them had failed at least one semester, 53 percent at least 
two semesters, and a discouraging 10 percent had failed 
five to fifteen semesters. Black high school students
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fared little better. Approximately 75 percent of the 
students who entered eighth grade in 1934 left school
• 129without graduating. Like many New Orleanians, the report 
viewed the problems of withdrawaal and non-promotion of 
black and white students as an indication that the school 
system failed to adapt to the needs of the students. The 
Grace study put it bluntly: "This training-to-be-a failure
..., raises a grave question concerning its justice, its 
common sense, and its cost in terms of heartache and 
disappointment to pupils and parents."130 The research team 
recommended, among other items, a thorough revision of the 
curriculum and promotional practices to include vocational 
training.
The Grace study generated a considerable amount of 
discussion, but unfortunately little action.131 Budgetary 
constraints precluded the immediate implementation of the 
building replacement program recommended in the study. The 
current curriculum remained as it was except for minor 
changes that did little to reverse the high non-promotion 
and withdrawal rates. More might have been done had the 
report not come amid America's growing concern with the war 
that raged in Europe. After the United States joined the 
war, neither blacks nor whites were as vocal in their 
criticisms of school policies. Blacks embraced the war 
effort with the ever present pangs of "twoness."132 On the 
eve of America's entry into the war many blacks attempted
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to reconcile their plight with the promise of democracy.
The black American said the Louisiana Weekly; "Is faced 
with the challenge to take up the task of the outraged 
democracies..on the other hand he stands face to face with 
a danger just as real...as any outside."133
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Chapter Five
Education and the Pursuit o£ the Golden Fleece, 1945-1960
After the end of World War II black New Orleanians 
became more aggressive in their attempts to gain a better 
education. Their determined approach resembled that in 
other areas of the country; they first sought to force 
school officials to equalize black education within the 
framework of separate but equal. A quiet, cautious, and 
legal attempt to equalize educational facilities, of 
course, predated the war. Since its inception in 1909 the 
NAACP had followed a strategy of using the courts to extend 
full citizenship to blacks. In the early 1930s, through 
the efforts of lawyers such as Charles Houston, Thurgood 
Marshall and Robert Carter, the NAACP embarked on a legal 
campaign to undermine the separate but equal doctrine by 
forcing southern states to provide blacks with educational 
facilities equal to those of whites.
The idea took concrete form in a report prepared by 
Nathan Margold, later modified by Houston, that called on 
the NAACP to focus on an "area where the whites were most 
vulnerable and least likely to respond with anger"—  
graduate and professional training. "If graduate schools 
were peaceably desegregated," one historian of the strategy 
has explained, "then the NAACP could turn to undergraduate
181
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colleges. And then secondary schools. And grade schools. 
Each new gain would help the advance to the next stage.
That the South would know this, too, and therefore fight 
accordingly in the courts, Houston had no doubt.1,1 The 
South did fight, but blacks fought also on the national and 
local levels. Black New Orleanians joined the struggle and 
grafted the new initiative onto their long-sustained guest 
for improved education.
Faced with law suits filed by the NAACP and with court 
mandated remediation, school officials throughout the South 
attempted to narrow the gap between black and white 
educational facilities. "Southern states spent money, 
almost desperately, on Negro schools," explained historian 
John Hope Franklin, "Within a few years some of the most 
modern schools to be found anywhere in the United States 
had been constructed for Negro children in Southern 
communities. Southern leaders pledged themselves to 
equalize white and black schools as rapidly as possible."2 
New Orleans school officials proved no exception, but did 
not start until blacks provided a certain amount of 
prodding.
After World War II, black leaders continued to attend 
school board meetings in cn effort to obtain better 
schools. In January 1945, Mrs. Charles Young, representing 
the New Orleans Parent Teacher Council, complained about 
the busing of students to McDonogh No. 24 School. Some
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students lived as much as six or seven miles from the 
school, she told school board members, and often had to 
wait for buses in the cold and rain. Mrs. Young asked 
school officials to provide an elementary school for 
children living in the area instead of busing them to 
McDonogh No. 24. At the same meeting another black, 
Reverend Morris Burrell, requested a new school for the 
same area. School board member Robert Haas told the 
petitioners that the war had forced the school system to 
place its building program on hold.3
Such pronouncements failed to dampen the resolve of 
black leaders. In March 1945, the Colored Educational 
Alliance presented one of its many petitions to school 
officials. Anticipating the approaching end of World War 
II, the Alliance suggested the school board make provision 
in its postwar construction budget for gymnasiums for 
Booker T. Washington, McDonogh 35, and L.B. Landry, a high 
school to replace Albert Wicker, and a downtown high 
school. School board members received the request but 
failed to commit themselves to financing the improvements. 
After the war ended, returning veterans put increased 
demands on the education system. Dr. Cruezot and other 
black leaders urged school officals to furnish a training 
center for the ex- soldiers. Their request was partially 
heeded; school officials funded a twelve month veteran 
training center at Booker T. Washington.4
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A petition submitted to schools officials in May 1946 
indicated a new departure by local black leaders. This 
petition charged that deficiencies in black schools existed 
because of racial discrimination. The lengthy petition 
listed eleven areas in which school officials discriminated 
against blacks— the number of kindergarten, special 
education, and vocational classes, the number of visiting 
teachers, the number of gymnasiums, the use of city parks, 
teaching loads, the high school academic curiculum, the 
quality of school buildings, expenditures, and business 
education. Each section of the petition started with the 
phrase "discrimination in" and summarized the particular 
deficiency. More important, blacks contended that failure 
to remedy the problems represented "a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the 
Constitution.1,5 Without granting the legal point, the 
school board accepted the petition and promised to schedule 
a meeting. Alexander Tureaud then met with school 
officials on 25 July 1946 to discuss the petition. School 
officials continued to stress their commitment to solve the 
problems but claimed a lack of adequate revenues hindered 
their attempts.6
Over the next several years (1946-1951) Lionel J. 
Bourgeois served as superintendent of the school system and 
attempted to address some of the inequities in black and 
white education.7 After a meeting with Tureaud and other
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black leaders, Bourgeois asked Tureaud to "bear with me a 
little longer and give your fullest cooperation in my 
attempts to better facilites for Negro youth and to advance 
the total program of education in this city."8 A school 
board report in December 1947 revealed the enormity of the 
task Bourgeois faced. It disclosed "that the number of 
classrooms available for the accommodation of the Negro 
school population is entirely inadequate, and that adequate 
provisions never have been made in the past for this school 
population." In addition, "numerous old school buildings 
previously used for the white population have been 
converted into Negro schools and have not yet been kept in 
a good state of repair."9 Assessing the problem, however, 
proved easier than finding solutions that satisfied the 
black community.
The critical issues remained a lack of classroom 
space, the poor condition of existing facilities, and an 
insufficient number of teachers. To address the problem of 
inadequate classroom space, school officials considered a 
program called consolidation and conversion. Under such a 
policy, the student body at white schools with low 
enrollment would be consolidated and the schools no longer 
needed for whites would be converted for use by blacks.
The plan, which on the surface appeared sound, encountered 
stiff opposition from whites and, for different reasons, 
criticism from blacks.10
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Comments by the leader of a parent group concerning 
the conversion of HcDonogh 16 typified the reaction of the 
white community. The parent group presented school 
officials with a petition signed by 1,782 persons opposed 
to the conversion. Its spokesperson argued that the 
proposed conversion would force white students to cross too 
many busy streets. If school officials continued to pursue 
the conversion, the group threatened to sue. School 
Superintendent Lionel Bourgeois informed the petitioners 
that black leaders had placed increased pressure on school 
officials to equalize facilities. Bourgeois added that 
blacks also had threatened to sue. Doubtlessly, Bourgeois 
viewed the threatened suit by blacks with graver concern 
than one by the white group. Bourgeois told the white 
group that if school officials failed to equalize school 
facilities, the courts would compel school officials to 
admit blacks into white schools. The spokesperson informed 
Bourgeois that the group "certainly did not intend that 
Negroes should be housed" at white schools.11
Following the group from McDonogh No. 16, Mrs. H.J. 
Smith, president of the William 0. Rogers Parents' Club, 
spoke in opposition to the conversion of that elementary 
school. Bourgeois, aware of a possible suit by blacks and 
fearful of a court mandated solution to the school 
equalization issue, told the white protestors "that the 
board has the humanitarian and legal obligation to provide
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school facilities for children regardless of race...." He 
considered his plan reasonable though implementing it would 
"require a great deal of courage" by the school board and 
white groups.12 Bourgeois appealed to the white groups for 
support and again reminded them of the possibility of a 
court mandated solution that whites would prefer much less 
than his own plan of consolidation and conversion.
Despite Bourgeois' assessment, school board members
assured the Rogers delegation that they would consider the
petition and the group would have another opportunity to
speak before the board reached a decision. Buoyed by the
board's responses to the Rogers and McDonogh No. 16
delegations, other groups attempted to prevent the
consolidation and conversion of their schools. On 18 March
1948 a large number of whites attended a special meeting of
the school board to protest the possible conversion of
several schools, including two vacant white elementary
schools, Zachary Taylor and Edward White. Bourgeois
offered to withdraw his controversial plan if whites helped
to campaign for a millage increase to build additional
black schools and dropped their objections to the
13conversion of the two vacant schools.
Concessions to whites invariably brought angry 
protests from blacks. Attorney Alexander P. Tureaud, who 
along with Thurgood Marshall had successfully litigated the 
teacher equalization suit, appeared before the school board
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in Hay 1948. Tureaud charged that the board had not done 
enough to equalize school facilities and that the 
educational demands outlined in the 1946 petition, which 
had alluded to the Fourteenth Amendment, had not yet been 
met. In his opinion, blacks were entitled to additional 
facilities. Tureaud reminded the board of a case in which 
the Supreme Court ruled against a school board in Virginia 
and mandated the equalization of black and white school 
facilities. In addition, Tureaud made it clear that blacks 
did not want dilapidated, "hand-me-down" buildings unfit 
for school use. He threatened to sue unless school 
officials took steps to improve school facilities for black 
New Orleanians. School board members assured Tureaud that 
they were aware of the problems and planned to raise forty 
million dollars with the major portion dedicated to black 
school facilities.14
That same month, over sixteen hundred blacks had 
gathered at the Booker T. Washington Auditorium and heard a 
refutation of the Washingtonian philosophy of the 
separation of the races in non-economic pursuits. The 
featured speaker, Thurgood Marshall, told the crowd "the 
issue is not for separate but equal facilites, the real 
fight is against segregated schools."15 Yet less than a 
month later Tureaud filed suit against the school board 
asking for equalization of facilities. Tureaud's actions 
appeared in direct conflict with Marshall's speech, and
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(since Marshall spoke as a representative of the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund) to the NAACP position as well. In 
fact, the suit represented an integral part of the NAACP's 
strategy to initially undermine "separate but equal" and 
then to attack it directly.16 Although the national NAACP 
office provided legal expertise, direction, and 
encouragement, the equalization and desegregation suits 
depended on local initiatives and conditions. Marshall's 
speech in May 1948 outlined the basic philosophy; Tureaud's 
suit signaled the beginning of its implementation.
Since the filing of the May 1946 petition to the 
school board, the destiny of black education in New Orleans 
was linked to the local branch of the NAACP. By 1946 
blacks had decided to use the courts if protest and 
petititon failed to produce equality. The Colored 
Educational Alliance, the New Orleans Federation of Civic 
Leagues, and the various ward based organizations 
willingly passed the mantle to the NAACP. For nearly half 
a century those organizations had served the black 
community well. Using protest, petitions, and constant 
agitation, their efforts produced improvements in black 
education. The transition from offering protests and 
petitions to seeking judicial redress occurred without 
friction, animosity, or any noticeable splits within the 
community's black leadership.17 This was so because the 
NAACP was an inclusive organization which drew its
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membership from throughout the city. In addition, the new 
strategy was more evolutionary than revolutionary. Black 
New Orleanians had used the federal courts in the past to 
eliminate discrimination. With ties to a national 
organization, the local NAACP branch had access to the best 
civil rights attorneys in the country. The success of the 
NAACP in integrating professional and graduate schools, as 
well as success in the teacher equalization suits, brought 
prestige and members into the fold. Daniel Byrd and others 
knew, though, that the members would remain in the fold 
only if the NAACP supplied aggressive leadership and a 
constant attack on segregation and discrimination.
Daniel Byrd, a native of Arkansas, moved to New 
Orleans at the age of 27 and quickly emerged as one of the 
city's leading civil rights activists. He joined the New 
Orleans NAACP, helped to organize the state chapter, and 
later became president of the NAACP State Conferences of 
Branches. Byrd possessed enormous energy, intelligence, 
and courage and established the tone for an aggressive 
NAACP. At a school board meeting on 12 August 1949, Byrd 
expressed the mood of the new leadership. He questioned 
the board's decision to spend hundreds of thousands of 
dollars on improving white schools when black children 
still attended school part-time because of overcrowding.
He wanted to know "if the members of the board realized 
that if a parent of a colored pupil living in the district
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of an overcrowded school took a child to a white school and 
asked for admission, that in accordance with the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution local discrimination statues 
would not apply...." Noting the refusal of the school 
board to convert many of the underutilized white schools to 
black use, because of white opposition, Byrd wanted it 
known that "if the school board reacts to pressure and 
antagonism, then we are ready, and ready now, to start our 
antagonism; and pressure." Byrd reminded the school board 
members that talking with representatives of the NAACP was 
"not the same as talking to groups of black principals and 
teachers."18
Byrd, along with local and national black leaders, 
realized the difficulties associated with a legal assault 
on segregated elementary and secondary schools and 
proceeded cautiously as they built support within the black 
community. In this connection the organizational structure 
of the NAACP became important. Unlike the other groups 
that had fought for improved schools, the NAACP held 
regular monthly meetings, had officials elected by the 
community at large, and boasted a dues-paying membership.
The monthly meetings provided a forum in which to discuss 
issues related to education and the appropriate strategy to 
win improvement. The NAACP kept the members informed about 
the activities of other communities and the proposals and 
strategies recommended by the NAACP National Office.
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Additionally, the monthly meetings provided the opportunity 
for the regular members to voice their views on school 
equalization and desegregation.
Seventy-five years of broken promises and the general 
hostility of the white community to equal educational 
opportunities for blacks led many blacks, especially those 
in the NAACP, to conclude that the federal courts offered 
the only solution. As early as 1945 several black parents 
had asked the local NAACP branch to sue to compel the board 
to equalize black and white education. Partly because of 
the efforts of Bourgeois to allocate more money to the 
black schools, black leaders delayed the suit.19 As fall 
1947 approached, however, several leaders had become 
restive and wanted an equalization suit filed. Among those 
advocating filing was Daniel Byrd, who by 1947 had become a 
NAACP Assistant Field Secretary.20 Byrd acknowledged 
Superintendent Bourgeois' good intentions but made it clear 
to Tureaud that he thought "some action should be 
forthcoming."21 Much of Bourgeois' plan to improve black 
schools depended on the passage of a bond issue to finance 
the construciton of new schools, Byrd believed. But "the 
proposed Twenty Million Dollar Bond issue is something 
which may not materialize unless some action is taken to 
aid the Superintendent in what he terms his willingness to 
equalize the educational system."22
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Byrd soon became incensed with the apparent reluctance 
of the local NAACP leadership to file suit. He confided to 
Tureaud "that too much effort and sweat has been put into 
the New Orleans Branch by both of us to permit weak 
leadership [to] kill the branch. And we both know that the 
[membership] campaign this year was not properly organized 
and the only possible way it can be pulled out of the hole 
is by some issue being attacked."23 Simple logic convinced 
Byrd that a suit against the school board would provide the 
needed issue. Byrd's experience had convinced him that 
blacks' guest for full equality would necessitate a resort 
to the judicial system and that the NAACP had to take the 
lead. A suit against the board would perform a dual 
purpose— focus attention on and win support for the NAACP 
and address inequality in education.
Like Byrd, Superintendent Bourgeois favored an 
equalization suit but for different reasons. Would white 
voters go to the polls and increase taxes, especially if 
the majority of it was dedicated to black schools, in the 
absence of a crisis? Bourgeois thought not. White schools 
were not overcrowded; indeed, many of the elementary 
schools were underutilized. If the bond issue failed, 
white education would suffer slightly— if at all. On the 
other hand, improvements in black education depended on the 
passage of the bond issue. Bourgeois hoped that an 
equalization suit would spur white voters to reasses their
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position and support the bond issue. Bourgeois made it 
clear on several occasions that the failure to move forward 
on educational equalization would result in black demands 
for integrated schools.24 He outlined the choices in stark 
terms: vote for increased taxes or prepare for
integration. Bourgeois' efforts did not go unappreciated 
by the black community. "During the fifteen years I have 
lived in New Orleans," Byrd observed, "no other 
superintendent has ever approached the problem of public 
education on such a determined and fair basis.1,25 But 
Bourgeois attempted to bring school officials and white New 
Orleans to a place they were as yet unprepared to go.
Tureaud made one last attempt at a direct appeal to 
the board before he filed suit. On 20 Hay 1948 Tureaud 
forwarded a letter to the school board listing ten areas of 
discrimination. He reiterated the complaints contained in 
the May 1946 petition and warned the board that "unless 
these inequalities are immediately removed, we shall be 
compelled to take such legal action as may be
Of%warranted....1 Board members told Tureaud that they 
shared his belief that tax dollars should be spent equally 
among black and white students.27 Nevertheless, hoping to 
put pressure on school officals and the white community, 
Tureaud filed the equalization suit against the school 
board on 2 June 1948. The board responded with a 
declaration of commitment to the principle of educational
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equality and endorsed several proposals to upgrade black 
education. Board members also agreed to ask the 
legislature for additional money to improve black schools. 
Nonetheless, school officals failed to grapple with the 
urgency of the situation. Perhaps fearful of racial 
tension and white hostility, they continued to refuse to 
convert underutilized white schools to black use.28 
Instead, they adopted the unrealistic approach of trying to 
solve the problem by the construction of new schools.
School board members had neither sufficient money nor time 
to pursue such a strategy. A building plan of sufficient 
scope to address existing inequities would cost millions of 
dollars and take approximately a decade to complete. They 
should have realized that black patience had just about run 
out.
The equalization suit filed on behalf of Wilfred 
Aubert and other black parents was based on concrete needs 
as well as abstract principles. Few black children in New 
Orleans realized they suffered from some of the many 
behavioral maladies the noted black psychologist Kenneth 
Clark would later assign them during arguments in the Brown 
case. They did know, as their parents did even more, that 
they attended overcrowded schools, and many did that on 
only a part-time basis. Many of them also knew that their 
small legs often grew weary before reaching schools miles 
from their homes. Kindergarten classes, a fixture in the
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white schools, existed in only nine of the black schools. 
When black leaders evoked the abstract principles contained 
in the Fourteenth Amendment they did so to address concrete 
needs.
A century of exclusion or segregation had produced 
educational inequalities which affected all phases of black 
education. Inadequate school buildings, overcrowding, and 
high pupil-teacher ratios were just three of the many 
problems black leaders had attempted to solve. Only during 
the brief period of political empowerment during 
Congressional Reconstruction had blacks received an 
equitable share of the city's educational revenues. Since 
then, black leaders and parents had formed many 
organizations to fight for improved schools. Their 
strategy of protest and petition had yielded significant 
gains. But black educational interests and needs continued 
to surpass available opportunities within the public school 
system. School officials and the white community appeared 
unwilling to make a final effort to equalize black and 
white educational opportunities. Blacks hoped to gain, 
through the federal courts, the educational parity that had 
eluded them using the tactic of protest and petition.
Since the 1920s overcrowding had been the major 
complaint of the black community. During the 1946-1947 
school year, some black elementary schools had a pupil to 
teacher ratio of sixty to one. At the high school level,
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the ratio was thirty to one. In contrast, white elementary 
schools enjoyed a pupil to teacher ratio of thirty to one 
and white high schools, twenty-one to one. Moreover, 
fifteen of the fifty white elementary schools had less than 
53 percent utilization. For example, Allen School built 
for 1,085 students had an enrollment of 381, or 35 percent 
of capacity. Kruttschnitt School had 201 students enrolled 
and a capacity of 630, a utilization percentage of 32 
percent. One of the largest white elementary schools, Live 
Oak, had a utilization percentage of 44 percent. At the 
close of the 1947-1948 school year, blacks could only 
attend three high schools, McDonogh No. 35, Booker T. 
Washington, and L. B. Landry.29
In an attempt to eliminate some of the inequities in 
black and white schools, in 1948 the board appealed to the 
voters of the state to approve a three mill tax increase 
for New Orleans. Bourgeois made over one hundred and sixty 
speeches in behalf of passage of this millage proposal.If 
voters approved the measure, school officials planned to 
use approximately sixty-five percent of the money on black 
schools. Whether that fact persuaded New Orleanians to 
vote against the tax is unclear. The outcome in the city, 
however, was clear— on 2 November 1948 New Orleans voters 
rejected the millage increase by a majority of 24,000.
Voters throughout the state proved more cooperative and the 
measure passed statewide. Thus, even though the increase
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failed in New Orleans, its passage statewide made it 
possible for the school board to levy the extra millage. 
But, the November election also brought two new members to 
the New Orleans Board; both had run on a platform opposing 
the millage increase. Consequently, they thought it was 
their moral obligation to continue to oppose the tax 
hike.30 Superintendent Bourgeois often reminded them of 
another moral obligation— providing adequate school 
facilities to all school children.31 Over the next few 
years the board assessed part of the three mill tax, but 
did not link the millage to a comprehensive building plan.
An analysis of the consolidation and conversion plan 
to equalize black and white education revealed mixed 
results. School officials often yielded to pressure to 
prevent the closing of white schools. Moreover, white 
leaders went beyond mere rhetoric and petitions. They 
turned to the courts and area legislators for help.
Senator Arthur O'Keefe of New Orleans sponsored a bill to 
prohibit the conversion of a school from white to black use 
without the consent of seventy percent of the property 
owners in the area. The bill, Act 463, passed the 
legislature and Governor Earl K. Long signed it into law in 
July 1948.32
Armed with Act 463 white leaders hoped to block any 
additional closings and conversions. Undeterred, school 
board members voted on 30 November 1948 to convert the
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Edward White School from white to black use. White leaders 
opposed to the plan reacted swiftly. Attorneys for Mrs. 
Marie Theard, a white parent, filed suit to halt the 
planned conversion. Their judicial pleadings fell on 
unsympathetic ears; the court ruled Legislative Act 463 
unconstitutional. It issued its decision on 28 February 
1949, and school officials immediately proceeded with the 
conversion plan. Another suit filed by patrons of 
Kruttschnitt School suffered a similar fate. These two 
conversions did not mean school officials had abandoned the 
interests of the white community. Indeed, on several other 
occasions whites successfully prevented the closing and 
conversion of their schools by protesting to the school 
board.33
Since blacks had begun to shift from their goals from 
that of equalization to integration, no amount of parity 
under a segregated system proved acceptable. Between the 
filing of the equalization suit in 1948 and the suit to 
desegregate four years later, school officials, especially 
Superintendent Bourgeois, believed equalization would 
satisfy the black community. Racial segregation hindered 
the formation of a consistent dialogue between blacks and 
whites. White leaders failed to grasp the changing mood of 
the black population. As a result, Bourgeois frantically 
attempted to raise school revenues to finance a massive 
building program. He was also the architect and main
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proponent of consolidation and conversion. Bourgeois' 
motives were clear— he wanted to equalize facilities before 
local blacks decided to sue for desegregation.
Despite Bourgeois' sincere attempts to equalize black 
and white school facilities, his efforts failed. The board 
refused to provide the strong leadership Bourgeois thought 
the situation warranted. Even after blacks filed suit, 
Bourgeois advised the board members that if they displayed 
a good faith effort in working towards equalization, blacks 
would not press the suit. He cautioned the board that 
blacks were determined to achieve equal opportunity in 
education and pointed to the increasing number of blacks 
attempting to register to vote. Law suits and voter 
registration aside, Bourgeois thought school officials 
"should be motivated by the moral values involved in the 
board's policy promulgated only a few months ago which 
states boldly that it stands for equality of educational 
opportunity for the children of New Orleans regardless of 
race or color."
Throughout his tenure as Superintendent, Bourgeois 
remained committed to the idea "that all men of every race, 
condition and age have an inalienable right of
«JCeducation." Pursuing that goal occasionally placed him 
at odds with the white community as well as with the school 
board members. The quick-tempered Bourgeois, who had an 
unshakeable sense of right and wrong, and school board
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members disagreed on many issues besides the consolidation 
and conversion plan. Over a matter not related to his 
stance on improving black education, board members Clarence 
Scheps and William C. Fletcher led a successful movement to 
remove Bourgeois from office. During his travails with the 
board, teachers, parent groups, and organizations wrote to 
express their support. Many of the communications came 
from blacks. The president of the L. B. Landry Parent- 
Teacher Organization "heartily endorse[d] the 
Administration of Superintendent Lionel J. Bourgeois and 
requeste[d] that he be retained as superintendent."36 
After months of harassment and charges of incompetence 
stemming from the purchase of substandard meat, Bourgeois 
resigned in May 1951. The board appointed 0. Perry Walker 
interim superintendent and started a search for a permanent
37replacement. Walker served for nearly two years before 
the board named James Redmond as the permanent 
superintendent. By the time Dr. Redmond assumed the 
position, the educational demands of the black commmunity 
had changed.
When the school year started in 1951, black leaders 
had made the commitment to desegregation. They would spend 
the next ten years working toward that end. In September 
of that year when Marshall and Byrd discussed various 
strategies they would employ, Byrd stressed the need for 
providing the community with as much detailed information
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as possible. Byrd wanted to ensure that the black 
population fully understood and supported the new 
initiative.38 On 12 November Tureaud presented another 
petition to the school board— as he and other blacks had 
done for over three quarters of a century. Tureaud's 
petition again detailed the substantial inequalities in the 
educational opportunities available to blacks and whites. 
Declaring that his petition "represented the sentiments of 
the entire Negro citizenry," Tureaud demanded the 
integration of the New Orleans Public Schools. The 
president of the board, Dr. Clarence Scheps, thought 
Tureaud had raised "a very grave question" and promised to 
"study the petition and prepare an answer in due time."39 
Two weeks later the board issued a unanimous response.
"After careful study of the petition," the resolution 
began, "the board is of the firm opinion that such a 
radical change of policy could not, at this time, serve the 
best interests of the system. The board believes, rather, 
that such a departure from tradition and custom, quite 
apart from the fact that such action by the board would be 
illegal, could result in chaos and confusion and further, 
quite possibly cause a very serious worsening of race 
relationships in the community as a whole."40 The school 
board's statement did not come as a surprise to Tureaud; by 
the time he submitted the petition, he was formulating 
desegregation strategy with Robert Carter and Thurgood
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Marshall. Why did Tureaud present a petition he knew the 
board would reject? Tureaud could not sue for desegregtion 
without first attempting to desegregate the schools. The 
petition to desegregate and the subsequent resolution 
rejecting the request enabled him to pursue a judicial 
remedy.
By 1952 the school board operated twenty-eight black 
and forty-six white elementary schools. At the secondary 
level the disparity continued— eleven schools for whites 
and six for blacks. Still faced with overcrowded, 
unsanitary, and generally insufficient school facilites,
Mew Orleans black leaders again sought judicial relief.
This time, however, they were not only seeking physical 
parity, but something more. Earl Benjamin Bush, and 
several other parents, on behalf of their children and 
through their attorney Alexander P. Tureaud, filed suit 
against the Orleans Parish School Board on 5 September 
1952. The sponsors of the suit requested complete 
integration of the New Orleans Public Schools. At the 
next school board meeting, the board members ordered 
Superintendent Walker to forward the suit to the State 
Attorney General. They also "approve[d] the recommendation 
for additional platooning [at several black schools] 
necessary to reduce the pupil to teacher ratio below forty- 
five, with an expression of profound regret that a 
situation existed which called for such action."42 Such
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decisions served to reinforce black claims that it was 
easier to discriminate against them in a segregated system 
theui in an integrated one.
The Bush desegragation suit was one of several filed 
under the auspices of the national office of the NAACP. 
Three months earlier, the Supreme Court had agreed to hear 
two similar cases that originated in Kansas and South 
Carolina. In October and November of 1952, the Supreme 
Court justices added three more cases from Virginia, 
Washington, D.C., and Delaware. The justices would use
those five cases, consolidated as Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka. Kansas, to rule on the continued 
legality of segregated elementary and secondary schools, or
in a larger sense on "whether the white people of the
United States might continue to treat the black people as 
their subjects. ',44
Neither the filing of the Bush suit nor the decision 
by the Supreme Court to hear the five desegregation cases 
affected the manner in which New Orleans school officials 
administerd the schools. Segregation represented law, 
tradition, and custom, and the school board remained 
determined to uphold the status quo. The commitment to 
desegregation, however, created a dilemma for the black 
community. What should they do in the interim between 
filing suit and a favorable court decision? Should they 
press for improvements under the present segregated system
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as they awaited court action? To do so, might undermine 
their position on desegregation. On the other hand, to 
take no action in the face of persistent, inequalities in 
black and white education seemed unconscionable. In 1950 
the NAACP National Office recommended not continuing 
efforts to equalize separate facilities. To individuals 
like Byrd who had set their sights on high principles as 
well as immediate needs, improvements had to be sacrificed 
to the ultimate and more important goal of integration. 
Responding to a request for assistance from a black leader 
in the central part of the state, Byrd made his views 
clear. "I understand your problem but I can do nothing to 
assist you in asking for an increase for a segregated 
school... as long as schools are segregated, inequalities 
will exist.1,45 Other black leaders remained wedded to 
Byrd's unerring principles but at the same time sought an 
increase in school facilities under the segregated system. 
The outcome of the school desegregation cases was unclear, 
and blacks still needed an education. Again, pragmatism 
and principle continued to exist side by side.
On 17 May 1954, in a unanimous decision the nine
members of the United States Supreme Court ruled "that in
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal1 has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.,|46 Blacks throughout America were
predictably pleased with the Supreme Court decision.
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Tureaud called It "a very momentous decision and one which 
will go down in the annals of our American 
jurisprudence...." Another local black attorney considered 
the decision a "victory for Negroes in particular, and 
Americans in general."47 Both men believed the Brown 
decision would facilitate school desegregation in New 
Orleans. But the guardians of racial separation remained 
determined to keep the intent of the Brown decree out of 
"the city that care forgot."
Within days of the Brown decision, the intransigency 
which would characterize the white South's response to
40Brown began to appear. All elements within the white 
community voiced dissatisfaction with the Brown decree. 
Governor Robert F. Kennon vowed to maintain segregated 
schools and noted that "Louisiana has done a great deal in 
the past few years to develop a good parallel school 
system."49 Louisiana congressman F. Edward Hebert assailed 
the decision and joined the forces of resistance. Members 
of the Louisiana House of Representatives voted 84 to 3 
"that the abolition of segregation would be intolerable to 
both the white and Negro citizens of Louisiana...." In a 
letter to a New Orleans paper, one white citizen claimed 
that "the Negro in America has not evolved to a point where 
he is entitled to some of the considerations that some of 
their aggressive agitators are trying to make them 
believe."50 Another condemned the Court's action as
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"vicious despotism" and endorsed non-compliance.51
After the Brown decision, the Louisiana legislature 
became an active ally of the school board and soon assumed 
the dominant role in the fight against desegregated 
schools. The newly created Joint Legislative Committee on 
Segregation, chaired by Senator William M. Rainach of 
Summerfield, coordinated the assault. The school board's 
and state's adherence to the so-called strategy of 
"legislate and litigate" effectively prevented the 
desegregation of New Orleans public schools for six years. 
Before the year ended, the legislature had passed several 
bills designed to keep the schools segregated. Acts 555 
and 556 served as the centerpieces of the legislative 
initiative. Act 555 prohibited local school systems from 
establishing desegregated schools. Failure to comply with 
the law would result in the loss of accreditation and 
funding. Act 556 established a pupil placement law 
designed to prevent desegregation. A proposed 
constitutional amendment also would allow the state to 
exercise its police power to operate segregated schools.52
Acts 555, 556, and the proposed constitutional 
amendment represented the first legislative attempts to 
maintain segregation. Letters to the editors and the public 
pronouncements of politicians are not always the best 
indicators of public opinion, but when the legislature 
submitted the segregation amendment to the people for
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approval, Louisianians had an opportunity to express their 
sentiments directly. On 2 November 1954, they did so: 
217,992 voted in favor of the amendment and only 46,929 
against it. The amendment passed in every parish, 
including Orleans, where the vote was 54,728 to 16,467. 
Pleased, Senator Rainach announced the "election certainly 
show[ed] what the people of Louisiana want and I think 
they're going to get it. Blacks in New Orleans, on the 
other hand, could only take solace from the refusal of the 
city's legislative delegation to formally endorse the 
amendment. Mayor deLesseps S. Morrison also took a neutral 
stand on the Amendment.54
The New Orleans School Board endorsed and encouraged 
the state's segregation legislation. School Superintendent 
James Redmond expressed the opinion that segregation was a 
state and local issue and questioned the propriety of 
federal intervention. After the Brown decision he asked 
the school board to provide "some further direction on how 
to proceed in preparing the budget." Board member 
Celestine Besse noted the recent decision failed to provide 
methods or guidelines for implementation and in fact gave 
the parties involved in the case until November 1954 to 
present information concerning implementation. Given that 
schedule, Besse expected no specific demands would be made 
by the court until the next spring or summer. Therefore, 
he "moved that the board instruct the Superintendent and
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the staff to prepare all preliminary budgets and plans for 
organization of the 1954- 1955 school year on the basis of 
the same kind of organization and programs as the board was 
currently operating...." Theodore Shepard seconded the 
motion and it passed without opposition, but not before the 
board made it clear "that by this action the Superintendent 
would be directed to operate schools on a segregated 
basis."55 Later in the year school board president Dr. 
Clarence Scheps announced that he favored continued 
segregation and said that he believed "rapid integration in 
the public school system would do irreparable damage to the 
children of both races." Scheps wanted to see integration 
"postponed for another 50 years."56
The Supreme Court's 31 May 1955 decision on 
implementation led to another flurry of activity. The 
Court's ruling that desegration should proceed "with all 
deliberate speed" gave all the interested groups reason for 
optimism. The extreme segregationists saw it as a sign of 
judicial retreat and moderates interpreted it as a mandate 
to desegregate the schools gradually. The President pro 
tempore of the Louisiana Senate, Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. 
of New Orleans, recognized as much and "welcome[d] the new 
orders mild tone which furnishes us an opportunity to 
examine local conditions and act accordingly to get our 
house in order." On the other hand, state representative 
John Garrett saw the decision as a victory for the
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segregationists. Garrett "firmly believe[d] the justices 
realized that they had made a mistake...and this was their 
easiest way out, putting it back on the local level." 
Leander Perez charged that the decree represented "a 
disgrace to the country." Tureaud also expressed some 
disappointment because he "expected the Supreme Court to 
put a time schedule beyond which local school boards may 
not delay in carrying out the decree.,l57
As the state marshalled its resources to prevent 
desegregation, the black community, marshalled its own 
resources. On 22 and 23 May 1954, Daniel Byrd attended a 
NAACP meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, comprised of 
representatives from the seventeen states and the District 
of Columbia still operating legally segregated school 
systems. When the meeting concluded, the participants 
issued a statement known as the "Atlanta Declaration." 
Though brief, only one page long, the document indicated 
that black leaders were determined to see Brown 
implemented. They urged all Americans to support the Brown 
decision and took encouragement from "the pledges of 
support and compliance by governors, attorney generals, 
mayors, and education officials...." They offered "to wcrk 
with other law abiding citizens who are anxious to 
translate this decision into a program of action to 
eradicate racial segregation in public education as 
speedily as possible." They asked local black communities
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and NAACP branches "to petition their local school boards 
to abolish segregation without delay and to assist these 
agencies in working out ways and means of implementing the 
court's ruling." They expressed their commitment to "resist 
the use of any tactics contrived for the sole purpose of 
delaying desegregation." But the ninety-two conference 
participants were experienced civil rights activists; they 
realized that even as they met vitriolic white opposition 
had crystallized.58
Over the next several years blacks in New Orleans had 
to counter many tactics designed to prevent the 
desegregation of the schools. Even as they did so, New 
Orleans black leaders pursued three objectives. First and 
foremost, they continued to litigate the Bush suit. The 
1954 Brown decision and the 1955 implementation decree, 
coupled with the state legislative resistance, led to a 
costly and time consuming legal battle. The school board 
refused to pursue any desegregation plan; black leaders had 
to sue to force compliance with the Brown decision.
The second and third objectives were related to the 
first. At the local level blacks needed to display enough 
militancy and aggressiveness to keep the desegregation 
effort going forward. Blacks responded by submitting 
petitions and filing applications for admission into white 
schools. They also raised money to help pay for the 
litigation. Individuals, along with social, fraternal, and
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professional organizations contributed to the effort. 
Finally, black leaders attempted to win support from 
elements within the white community. That proved difficult 
because almost immediately staunch segregationists had 
gained the ascendancy. Except for the Bureau of 
Governmental Affairs, a private civic group which 
investigated and lobbied for improved government 
efficiency, integrity, and accountability, and high 
officials within the Catholic Church, notably Archbishop 
Francis Rummel, sustained white support proved difficult to 
find.59
On 27 June 1955 Tureaud filed with the school board 
another petition seeking desegregation. In part it stated 
that "the May 31 ruling means that the time for delay, 
evasion, or procrastination is passed, and it is the duty 
of the school board to seek a solution in accordance with 
the law of the land." Board members refused to act, 
claiming in the words of their vice president, Celestine 
Besse, that they were "responsible to the state government, 
and our state laws do not allow integration." Tureaud 
had no choice but to continue litigation in the Bush suit, 
which was scheduled for a hearing in September. Tureaud 
had to amend the suit to include arguments against Acts 555 
and 556 of 1954. Shortly before the scheduled hearing,
Judge J. Skelly Wright requested that a three judge panel 
hear the suit because the case involved the
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constitutionality of state law. Herbert W. Christenberry 
and Wayne G. Borah joined Wright in hearing the case.61
In the meantime the legislature, under the growing 
influence of William Rainach and the Joint Legislative 
Committee on Segregation, received a $100,000 dollar 
appropriation from the Board of Liquidation of the State 
Debt to hire special counsel to assist in the legal attack 
against the Brown decision. "The state should step in and 
assist local school boards everywhere," Rainach charged,
"in defending themselves against suits by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People seeking 
to destroy our policy of separation of the races." The 
Attorney General's Office administered the fund, and the 
Orleans Parish School Board received some of the money to 
pay part of the salary of its special counsel, Gerard 
Rault.62
Meeting in New Orleans, the three federal judges heard 
arguments on the constitutional issues from Robert Carter 
of the NAACP Legal Defense staff and Alexander Tureaud for 
the plaintiff and Gerard Rault and W. Scott Wilkinson, 
representing the school board. Tureaud and Carter 
continued the original argument in the Bush suit that 
school segregation by race was unconstitutional. They also 
charged that the Brown decision rendered Acts 555 and 556 
unconstitutional as well. Rault and Wilkinson countered 
that the entire matter rested outside federal jurisdiction
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and argued the state had acted within its "police power" to 
maintain health, safety and educational standards. They 
produced witnesses who supported their claim that health 
and education problems would result from integrated 
schools. After hearing both sides, the judges took the 
case under advisement and issued their ruling in February 
1956.63
Judges Borah and Christenbery removed themselves from 
the case after ruling Acts 555 and 556 unconstitutional and 
noting the case posed "no serious constitutional 
questions....1,64 Their withdrawal again left Wright as the 
sole presiding judge; he issued the court's opinion on the 
specific issue of desegregation. Judge Wright recounted 
the facts of the case and noted the several petitions 
blacks had submitted asking the board to desegregate the 
schools. Clearly the board had demonstrated its 
unwillingness to grant relief. Wright acknowledged the 
difficulties associated with desegregation and thought the 
problems were "considerably more serious than generally 
appreciated in some sections of our country." To solve the 
problem "will require the utmost patience, understanding, 
generosity, and forbearance from all of us, of whatever 
race." Nonetheless, "the magnitude of the problem may not 
nullify the principle. And that principle is that we are, 
all of us, freeborn Americans, with a right to make our 
way, unfettered by sanctions imposed by man because of the
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work of God.1 Citing the Brown decision, Judge Wright 
ruled the Orleans Parish School Board's practice of 
assigning children to schools based on race 
unconstitutional. After sixty years black New Orleanians 
had removed the onerous burden of Plessy.
Reaction in New Orleans and around the state varied, 
but generally the forces of resistance were the most 
outspoken. Celestine Besse, who had become president of 
the school board, vowed to appeal Judge Wright's ruling and 
reiterated the board's commitment "to use every legal and 
honorable means to preserve segregation."66 The newly 
elected governor, Earl K. Long, refused to reaffirm his 
campaign pledge that he would close the schools before 
allowing integration. He did, however, assert that the 
South needed racial separation. Rainach, along with Perez, 
remained the chief spokesman for the segregationists. 
Rainach planned to adopt a different strategy featuring the 
doctrine of interposition and the placing of all local 
school systems under the jurisdiction of the state. With 
tacit approval from Governor Long, Rainach easily guided an 
interposition resolution through the legislature without 
recorded opposition. The House voted 82 to 0 for approval 
and the Senate 37 to 0.67
The interposition resolution attempted to revive the 
untenable position of state sovereignty in areas "not
COspecifically enumerated to the federal government." For
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the purpose of the present crisis, the legislators 
maintained that Louisiana had retained its right to 
administer its public schools. As a result, the 
desegregation decisions violated the state and United 
States constitutions. The resort to interposition, despite 
the bellicose rhetoric to the contrary, revealed the legal 
weakness of Louisiana's position. The Brown decision and 
Judge Wright's ruling left little doubt that neither 
legislative subterfuge nor outright defiance could prevent 
implementation. Interposition was at best a delaying 
tactic, but delay no matter how brief seemed more palatable 
to most whites than integration. Then, too, many 
Louisianians may have shared Senator Harry F. Byrd's view 
that, "if we can organize the Southern states for massive 
resistance to this order I think that in time the rest of 
the country will realize integration is not going to be 
accepted in the South. In interposition the South has a 
perfectly legal means of appeal from the Supreme Court 
order."69
Over the next four years blacks remained resolute, the 
federal courts refused to retreat, and desegregated 
education slowly became a reality in parts of the South.
To forestall desegregation in New Orleans, the legislature 
continued to pass segregation laws, but blacks continued to 
challenge them in court, and the federal courts continued 
to declare them unconstitutional.70
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New Orleans' resistance to desegregation extended 
beyond the polemics of public officials like William 
Rainach and John Garrett, the segregationist leader in the 
State House of Representatives. The rapid rise of white 
citizens' councils attested to the depth of segregationist 
sentiment. The initial Louisiana Chapter organized in 
Rainach's home parish of Claiborne in April 1955, a second 
chapter formed in New Orleans in September under the 
leadership of Louis Porterie, Jackson Ricau, and Dr. Emmett 
Lee Irwin. The three council leaders were professionals—  
Dr. Irwin was a respected surgeon and former president of 
the Louisiana Medical Association, Ricau was a former 
public school tecacher, and Porterie was a member of a 
prominent New Orleans family.71
Spokesmen for the council quickly made their presence 
and ideology known. Appearing at a 26 September 1955 
school board meeting, Porterie produced a petition with 
nearly 15,000 signatures "requesting that the board not 
abandon segregation in the schools." Porterie assured the 
board that if necessary the council could have secured even 
more signatures.72 Several months later, on 20 March 1956, 
over 8,000 whites attended a pro-segregationist rally at 
the Municipal Auditorium to protect Archbishop Joseph F.
73Rummel's urging acceptance of integration. The Council 
followed that with a 17 May parade and rally at which over 
4,000 whties "gustily cheered what sounded to most like a
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call to re-fight the Civil War before submitting to 
integration.1,74 The Greater New Orleans Citizens' Council 
predicted it would enroll over 50,000 members.75
The growth of citizens' councils coincided with 
efforts to undermine or eliminate the NAACP from the 
desegregation fight. Rainach had earlier lashed out at the 
"arrogant, alien NAACP and its hirelings, who woulld 
completely destroy the friendly relations now existing 
between our races." He "deeply resent[ed] the carpetbag 
NAACP so cynically exploiting our colored people only as an 
instrument to an end to be discarded when their ignoble 
purpose is served."76 Governor Earl Long insisted that 
"our colored people will get a square deal without the 
NAACP. We don't need it."77 Louisiana ironically invoked 
a 1924 state law, originally enacted to curtail the 
activities of the Ku Klux Klan, to suspend NAACP 
operations within the state. The law required most 
organizations, with the exceptions of churches and the 
National Guard, to file their membership list with the 
state. When the NAACP refused to submit its membership 
list the Attorney General filed suit against the 
organization. As a result, a state court prohibited the 
NAACP from operating until it filed a list of its 
members.78
The state court order against the branches presented 
NAACP leaders with a dilemma. They could not defy the law
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in the midst of a legal and moral campaign to force the 
South to adhere to the letter and spirit of the Brown 
decison. Although condemning the ruling as "illegal and 
unjust," Roy Wilkins, the executive secretary, ordered the 
NAACP branches in Louisiana to suspend all activities. 
Clarence Laws, the state field secretary, expressed 
confidence higher courts would overturn the ruling.
Tureaud attempted to have the case transferred to federal 
court where he anticipated a more favorable ruling. In the 
absence of an order to overturn the ban, State Attorney 
General Jack Gremillion stated his intention to prosecute 
any member who met in defiance of the ban.79 A 
confrontation almost developed in December 1956 when the 
NAACP held two meetings, one in Alexandria and the other in 
New Orleans. Enough legal ambiguity existed, however, to 
prevent the arrest of the persons attending the meetings. 
The case proceeded in both the federal and state courts, 
and lawyers for the state and the NAACP had a difficult 
time comprehending the status of the case.80 Nonetheless, 
the NAACP branches remained banned until February 1960 when 
a three judge federal court ruled against the state.81
The legal attempt to reduce the NAACP's effectiveness 
was accompanied by a strident campaign to brand the 
organization and its members communists. The terms 
subversive and un- American became "buzz" words used to 
discredit NAACP members and white moderates. The threat of
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being labelled a communist prevented many whites from 
speaking out in favor of even gradual or token integration. 
The success and widespread acceptance of the anti-communist 
campagin also forced most black leaders to distance 
themselves from any person or groups suspected of communist 
or socialist sympathies. Beginning in 1954, segregationist 
leaders labeled "communist" on most groups supporting 
desegregation.
In the main, white New Orleans opposed desegregation 
with the same force and conviction as its supposedly less 
cosmopolitan neighbors. But some anti-segregation elements 
did exist in the white community, and they increased as the 
state exhausted its legislative and legal options. It is 
significant, however, that throughout most of the period, 
no political figure in the city advocated compliance with 
the Brown decision. The moderates, to the extent that they 
mobilized, had to rely on businessmen and professionals 
rather than politicians and did little to influence the 
segregation struggle. It was not that they were feeble or 
insincere in their efforts; they were simply too few in 
number and too far outside the white mainstream's views on 
race relations. For example, on the same day that 
approximately four hundred persons attended a meeting in 
favor of desegregation, 8,000 whites gathered in support of 
segregation.82 In September 1955, a group of moderates 
presented the school board a petition favoring
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desegregation, with 179 signatures. Two weeks later,
however, the segregationists countered with a petition in
support of the status quo signed by 14,962 people.83 Under
the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that white
moderates failed to accomplish much.
The same force that started the fight against
desegregation in the schools sustained it throughout the
crisis— the black community. When asked where the NAACP
would get the money to litigate thousands of cases
throughout the nation, Thurgood Marshall answered, from the 
0 ,1black community. He spoke the truth. An indication of 
the black community's commitment to school desegregation 
and the principle of equality was provided by the Louisiana 
Education Association, the state's black teachers'
aeorganization. Even the most optimistic supporters of
school desegregation acknowledged that black educators
would suffer job losses and demotions. Indeed, as early as
1953, the NAACP recognized the need to assist black
educators during the transition to a unitary system and
later created the Department of Teacher Information and
Security to do so. For several years Daniel Byrd served as
86Assistant Director of the new agency.
Yet despite the prospect of economic and professional 
injury the Louisiana Education Association, which, of 
course, included teachers from New Orleans, provided 
leadership and financial support to the desegregation
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effort.87 Between 1942 and 1955, J. K. Haynes of Ruston 
served as president and worked closely with Byrd, Tureaud, 
and the NAACP. The LEA, like the NAACP, depended on 
membership dues and contributions to sustain its 
operations. Haynes' active support of desegregation 
occasionally drew criticism from some LEA members. "I am 
especially concerned about Louisiana," Byrd disclosed to 
Marshall, "because it seems that some 'rednecks' must have 
reached certain conservative Negroes in the LEA and they 
have started a campaign...against Haynes." Byrd feared 
that the conservatives would attempt to replace Haynes at 
the next LEA convention scheduled for November 1953.88 But 
Haynes retained his post, and the LEA remained in the
OQdesegregation struggle.
The persistence of the NAACP, the LEA, and other 
segments of the black community helped to make 
desegregation a reality in New Orleans. After three 
unsuccessful attempts at reversals in the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and twice in the United States Supreme 
Court, New Orleans by the end of 1958 still refused to obey 
Judge Wright's order to desegregate the schools "with all 
deliberate speed."90 Board members apparently believed 
that if they ignored the court order it would go away. 
Tureaud's frequent trips to federal court should have 
convinced them otherwise. On 18 June 1959, Tureaud again 
asked Judge Wright to compel the school board to devise a
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desegregation plan consistent with his previous ruling on 
15 February 1956. Judge Wright scheduled arguments on the 
issue for the following month.91 In a decision finally 
issued that July, Wright abandoned the vagueness of "with 
all deliberate speed" and ordered the school board "to 
prepare, present and file in the record of this case by 
March 1, 1960, an overall plan covering the complete 
desegregation of the public schools in this city." He 
anticipated white response by suggesting that "the board 
consider a plan under which the first grade would be 
desegregated the first year, the first and second grades 
the second year, and so on until all grades have been 
covered by the plan."92
Judge Wright hoped that the "responsible influences on 
our community life will take their places, as they have in 
the past, on the side of law and order," but the school 
board ignored Wright's request for a desegregation plan, 
board president Matthew Sutherland took refuge in the 
myriad state laws designed to create a legal buffer between 
the board and federal judicial authority. Another board 
member, Emile Wagner, a member of the White Citizens'
Council and a virulent Catholic critic of the 
integrationist pronouncements of Archbiship Rummel, spoke 
more directly. Wagner preferred to see the public schools 
closed and segregated private schools established and 
financed by the state rather than allow any type of
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integration.93 All of the five board members in i960, and 
those who preceded them, adhered to the staunch 
segregationist view. Wagner differed from his colleagues 
only in his active association with the Greater New Orleans 
Citizens' Council and his willingness to close the schools 
as the last effort to prevent desegregation.
Judge Wright extended his deadline for the submission 
of a desegregation plan, but the board still refused to 
comply. Through its special council, Gerard Rault, the 
board tried to get the order set aside.94 School officials 
also mailed a questionnaire to parents seeking to ascertain 
whether they wanted the schools closed or opened if the 
court forced the school system to integrate. It 
instructed parents to indicate their preference for one of 
the following: "I would like to see the schools kept open 
even though a small amount of integration is necessary. I
would like to see the schools closed rather than be 
integrated even in small numbers.”95 Parents returned 
slightly more than 27,000 of the 70,000 that were 
distributed, and they voted 14,114 to 12,978 to keep the 
schools open. Less than a week after announcing the 
results, school board president Lloyd Rittiner stated he 
would disregard the survey because 11,407 of the 14,114 
parents who voted to keep the schools open were black.
Among whites 12,229 had voted to close the schools and only 
2,707 to keep them open in the event of integration. By
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contrast, black parents voted overwhelmingly (11,407 to 
679) to keep the schools open. Considering the racial 
composition of the vote, Rittiner felt justified in his 
position "because whites are the people who support the 
system.1,97
Having granted the school system an inordinate amount 
of time to formulate a desegregation plan, Judge Wright 
issued his own in May 1960. Following his earlier 
suggestion to the school board, Wright called for the 
gradual desegregation of the schools starting with the 
first grade when schools reopened for the 1960-1961 school 
year. School board members reacted to Wright's modest 
proposal with defiance. The board again vowed to resist 
desegregation and declared its intention "to fight this 
order in the courts of the land and... use every legal 
means known to it to preserve a segregated school system." 
Board members also met with Governor Jimmie Davis and 
received his commitment to help preserve segregation in the
» 98city's schools. The 1959-1960 school year came to an end 
amid the possiblity that the regular school vacation might 
exceed well beyond the usual three months.
In June the United States Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals refused to grant relief from Judge Wright's order. 
With that avenue closed, the board voted four to one to 
"call upon the Governor of Louisiana to interpose himself 
between the federal court and the school board and keep the
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public schools of New Orleans open on their present 
segregated basis." Wagner voted against the resolution 
because he believed the board had some legal options 
remaining and interposition should be used only as a last 
resort. Matthew Sutherland pointed out that six years of 
litigation had produced delays but no legal victories. In 
the absence of interpostion, Sutherland warned the 
community to prepare for either desegregated schools or no 
schools at all.99
The NAACP, operating again after the federal court 
lifted the ban, wasted little time in attacking the school 
board's position. In a letter to the board, branch 
president Allison Chapital strongly denounced its actions 
and questioned the propriety of elected officials openly 
advocating disrespect for the law. During this time, 
however, the New Orleans NAACP did far more than write 
letters. Under the direction of Chapital, the branch held 
meetings designed to keep the black community informed 
about the integration effort. Furthermore, the NAACP 
coordinated the effort of black parents who planned to send 
their six year old children to schools that did not want 
them.100
During June the branch held more than ten meetings, 
often conducting two or three on the same day in different 
parts of the city. For example, on 6 June a meeting to 
"clarify the issues for the parents" was held at Law Street
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Baptist Church and at the Central Congregational Church. 
Others were held at Shaw Temple Methodist Church, 8 June; 
St. Augustine High School, 10 and 20 June; St. John 
Institutional Missionary Baptist Church, 10 June; and 
Carver-Desire Baptist Church, 15 June. At all of these 
gatherings, NAACP representatives stressed the importance 
of the desegregation effort and reminded parents that the 
court's victory was not complete until blacks actually 
attended the schools of their choice.101 For most black 
children that day remained in the distant future, but 
events unfolded which placed the opportunity to attend the 
school of their choice within reach of a few of them.
During the summer recess, four of the school board 
members— Lloyd Rittiner, Louis Riecke, Theodore Shepard,
Jr., and Matthew Sutherland— started a slow retreat from 
their previous refusal to consider desegregation. The 
other board member, Emile Wagner, Jr., continued to 
champion segregation at all cost.102 What caused the four 
board members to change their opinion and move the school 
system toward desegregation? The increased visibility of 
the white moderates and repeated losses in court influenced 
their decison. They also began to fear the uncertainty and 
dislocation associated with closing the schools to prevent 
desegregation. Moreover, they labored without compensation 
and served on the board because they believed they could 
make a contribution to public education. Another
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compelling reason, and possibly the most important, Judge 
Wright's grade-a-year plan, assured only a very gradual 
increase in the number of blacks into white schools.
Faced with either closed schools or token
desegregation, white moderates finally entered the
103desegregation struggle. The board's new position, and 
that of the white moderates, found institutional expression 
in Save Our Schools. S.O.S. organizers refused to endorse 
desegregation, and made it clear they wanted to keep the 
schools open. In May 1960 they opened their public 
campaign and painted a bleak picture of the consequences of 
school closure. "The closings of public schools inevitably 
means an increase in juvenile delinquency," the group 
maintained, "as thousands of youngsters are left to their 
own devices." Taxes would increase because of a loss of 
federal funds and children would be deprived of the 
school's "health protecting services" if the schools 
closed. In addition, the economy would suffer "because new 
industries refuse to move into an area in which the public 
schools have been closed,"104 The moderate activists, like 
the radical racists, conducted a negative campaign— the 
evils of school closure were worse them the evils of 
desegregation. Few moderates took a stand on the lofty 
heights of equality. Archbiship Joseph Rummel, however, 
was one of the few exceptions.
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Many south Louisianians were Catholic and most took 
their religion seriously. Archbishop Rummel attempted to 
use the power of the pulpit to convince his fellow 
Catholics that racial segregation contradicted the teaching 
of Christianity and, therefore, was morally wrong. Rummel 
explained that "the Church will continue to declare and 
maintain the correctness from the spiritual and moral 
standpoint of integration in principle in the various human 
relationships where enforced segregation is now imposed, 
notwithstanding our profession of faith in democracy."105 
In June 1960 he appealed to the school board to keep the 
schools open and "accept the moderate form of gradual 
integration proposed by Judge Wright as a sound, temperate 
interpretation of the American way of life...." New 
Orleans Catholics, however, not only refused to embrace 
Rummel's position but successfully opposed his attempts to 
desegregate the parochial schools.107
Although the board rejected the moral stance of 
Archbiship Rummel, it continued to move towards the 
pragmatism of the groups opposed to closing the schools and 
began to formulate a desegregation plan. The 
segregationist forces, however, retained control of the 
state legislature. With a more energetic ally in newly 
elected Governor Jimmie Davis, its members continued the 
offensive against desegregation. In a last desperate 
effort to prevent school desegregation in New Orleans, the
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legislature passed numerous segregation bills in 1960. The 
most important of these, Act 496, gave the governor the 
power to assume administrative control of any school 
districts under a court order to desegregate. On 17 August 
Davis exercised that power and placed Superintendent 
Redmond in charge of the New Orleans schools. Davis 
directed Redmond to open the schools on 7 September and 
outlined a lengthy registration process. The NAACP and a 
group of 31 white parents filed suits in federal court to 
prevent Governor Davis and Attorney General Jack Gremillion 
from assuming control of the schools.108
A three judge panel acted quickly and on 27 August 
ruled "that all Louisiana statutes which would directly or 
indirectly require segregation of the races in the public 
schools for the Parish of Orleans, or authorize the closure 
of such schools, or deny them public funds because they are 
desegregated, are unconstitutional...." The ruling 
returned the schools to the authority of the school board 
and kept in place Judge Wright's desegregation order 
requiring the opening of school in September. Redmond, 
seeking "to eliminate as much confusion [as possible] for 
everyone concerned," met with the school board members to
1QQassess and respond to the most recent court order.
At a special meeting held on 29 August attended by 
Superintendent Redmond, special council Gerard Rault, and 
all of the board members except Emile Wagner, the board
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members discussed its options. Gremillion had already 
indicated the state would appeal directly to the United 
States Supreme Court, and Rault said the board could join 
in the appeal. He admitted, however, success was 
unlikely. The board members postponed a decision on 
whether to appeal and authorized Rittiner to see if Judge 
Wright could meet with them or their attorney. "If the 
conference is granted," Reicke stated, the board should 
attend in good faith without any mental reservations."110 
Despite the discussion of an appeal, the board had finally 
accepted the inevitability of desegregation.111 They then 
moved to minimize its effect.
The board wanted to meet with Judge Wright in order to 
impress upon him the need to delay his ruling for a year. 
With schools scheduled to open in less than two weeks, the 
board members once again sought more time. They pursued 
their new strategy without Emile Wagner who remained "so 
convinced that integration as required by the court's order 
would be an evil far worse than closing the school" that he 
announced he was "going to advocate shutting down the 
public school system."112 Wagner refused to attend the 
meeting held on 30 August between the board and Judge 
Wright. Over the protest of Tureaud, Judge Wright granted 
the school board a delay, until 14 November 1960, in 
beginning desegregation. It had asked for a year, and 
expected to receive at least 4 1/2 months, but gladly
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accepted any respite that pushed the order beyond the 
opening of school. The delay enabled the board to 
institute a pupil placement plan that further reduced the 
number of blacks admitted to white schools.113
In 1960 the legislature had approved Act 492, which 
gave local school boards the authority to assign students 
to district schools. The board's pupil placement plan 
conformed to state law and the guidelines contained in 
Judge Wright's desegregation order. Superintendent Redmond 
recommended retaining the existing school districts; those 
students wanting to attend a school outside of their 
district had to request a transfer. All students had to 
start school in their district and could only apply for a 
transfer during a brief period between 27 September and 7 
October I960.114
During that time school officials received 208 
requests for transfers. They automatically rejected nine 
of the applications, eight because they arrived after the 
deadline and one because it contained inadequate 
information. The remaining 199 applications included 137 
from blacks requesting transfer to white schools, 15 from 
blacks asking to change to another black school, 46 from 
whites seeking a new white school, and one from a white 
wanting to go to a black school. To protect the safety of 
the students and their families, school officials did not 
release the names of the students applying for transfers.
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The board established a four-step procedure to screen the 
199 applications.
It prepared guidelines for each step shoving who would make 
the decision and on what basis:
1. The first step by:
First Assistant Superintendent 
Two Assistant Superintendents in Charge of . 
Districts, Director, Research, Census and Planning 
Consider:
Verifications
Proper age (birth certificate)
Nearness of school to child's home 
Request or consent of parent and reasons 
assigned thereto 





After considering the above factors, the 
applications will be referred to the 
second group.
2. Second step by:






Results of Metropolitan Readiness or
Achievement Tests already administered.
Procedure:
Secure available test records 
Administer necesary group and/or individual 
tests.
Refer all information compiled about each
applicant to the third screening group.
3. Third step by:
Assistant Superintendent, Instruction
Director of Special Services




Effect of new pupil upon academic program 
Suitability of established curricula for 
pupil
(in terms of grouping within the class)
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Adequacy of pupil's academic preparation or 
readiness for admission to school or 
curricula
Psychological qualification of pupil for 
type of teaching and associations 
Effect upon academic programs of other 
students
Effect upon prevailing academic standards 
Psychological effect upon the pupil 
Home environment of the pupil 
Maintenance or severance of social and
psychological relationships with pupils 
and teachers.
Procedure:
Review tests results and other information 
on child
Arrange home visits and/or interview 
Review to Medical Department where necessary 
Refer to administrative review team all
applications. Each application to be 
marked either "recommended" or "not 
recommended."
4. Final step by:
Administrative Review Team
The Superintendent
The First Assistant Superintendent
The Assistant Superintendent, Instrution
Consider:
All information previously collected on each 
applicant 
Choice of and interest of pupil 
Possibility of threat or friction or 
disorder among other pupils 
Possibility of breach of peace or ill will 
or retaliation within community.
Procedure:
Review all information and formulate
recommendations to be presented to the 
Orleans Parish School Board.
Four of the parents— three blacks and one white— chose 
to withdraw their applications rather than run this 
administrative gauntlet. Two of the withdrawals came from 
blacks seeking admission to white schools. After the 
exhaustive administrative review, school officials approved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
235
only five of the remaining 135 applications.116 The five 
black students approved for transfers to white schools were 
all females, one of whom withdrew before the 14 November 
transfer date.117 Therefore, in the end, four six year old 
girls stood poised to do what no black New Orleanian had 
legally done since 1877— attend a desegregated school.
They did not stand alone.
Despite the last minute maneuvers of Governor Jimmie 
Davis, State Attorney General Jack Gremillion, and the 
state legislature, four black students— Tessie, Leona,
Gail, and Ruby— entered the previously all white William 
Frantz and McDonogh 19 schools on 14 November 1960. They 
entered accompanied by their parents and escorted by armed 
federal marshalls. In addition to the marshalls, local 
police stood guard at each school. The presence of law 
enforcement officials, however, did not prevent mobs of 
whites from shouting obscenities and racist remarks at the 
four students. Police officers did prevent the students 
from suffering physical harm, but did nothing to disperse 
the unruly and hostile crowds.118
After the students received their classroom 
assignments white "mothers clad in slacks and pedal pushers 
arrived to take their children home." Shouting the "south 
will rise again" and "two, four, six, eight, we don't want 
to integrate," large crowds remained at the two 
desegregated schools the entire day but dispersed without
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• 119violence. On the second day, a crowd of hundreds of 
teen-agers attempted to force their way past police to 
enter McDonogh No. 19. Police made arrests at both schools 
and Police Chief Joseph Giarrusso sent additional officers 
to the schools. Over the next several days mob action and
• • • liftinterracial violence occurred throughout the city. New 
Orleans at last reaped, in lawlessness and negative
national publicity, what six years of defiance and racist
» 121 rhetoric had sown.
With the legal battle for desegregated public schools
virtually won, the New Orleans NAACP started to concentrate
on the task of ensuring that the four students were not
harmed physically or psychologically. Under the direction
of branch president Allison Chapital, the NAACP conducted a
massive campaign to obtain moral support for the students.
In order to shield the children and their parents as much
as possible, the branch requested that all correspondence
to the children be sent to Chapital at the NAACP office.
The response to the NAACP's effort was overwhelming.
Cards, letters, and small donations began arriving almost
immediately. Typical was a letter from Mrs. A. J. Shaw of
Brookline, Massachusetts, who sent five dollars for "candy
for the children." A Parent Teacher Association group from
New York City sent a resolution indicating its support of
• • 122integrated schools m  New Orleans. A letter from Chester 
W. Hartman of Cambridge, Massachusetts epitomized the
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response the NAACP attempted to generate. Hartman thought 
the girl's "daily anguish must be so great that it was very 
important to try to offset this with some expression of 
friendliness." He therefore collected several thousand 
signatures, including that of noted economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith, on a "huge greeting card" and sent it to the 
four girls. Hartman pledged that he and a group of friends 
would also publicize the need to send additional letters of
123encouragement.
Why did the parents of the four little girls agree to 
send their children to schools that had been previously all 
white? Why did Arthur Chapital, Sr., a postal worker for 
forty hours a week and a civil rights leader during the 
remaining hours, expose himself to death threats and hate 
mail? Why did the black attorney, Alexander P. Tureaud, 
file thirty-eight suits to force the end of segregated 
schools, often to the neglect of his private practice?
And, finally, why did the black community support the drive 
for integrated education? Part of the answer to those 
questions could be found in the persistent inequality of 
black schools on the eve of limited desegregation.
In the 1959-1960 school year, 50,135 blacks and 41,191 
whites attended the public schools. The school board 
operated forty elementary schools for blacks and forty- 
eight for whites. The number of white junior and senior 
high schools stood at sixteen; blacks had twelve such
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schools. The lack of adequate schools forced many black 
students to attend overcrowded schools. Yet the students 
attending overcrowded classes fared better than the ones 
who only attended class three or four hours a day because 
of massive overcrowding. During the 1957-1958 school year, 
9,695 blacks attended school on a part-time basis. The 
number declined to 2,165 in 1958-1959 and 1,687 in 1959- 
1960. During the 1959-1960 school year, no white students 
attended school part-time. School officials managed to 
reduce the number of black students on part-time by 
increasing class sizes.124
Class size had concerned black parents throughout the 
twentieth century. Statistics for the 1958-1959 school 
year revealed that only 5.4 percent of black children 
attended classes with fewer than thirty students per class. 
By contrast, 38.7 percent of white classes had fewer them 
thirty students per class. Moreover, 30.7 percent of black 
classes had over forty students per class; only 1 percent 
of white classes did. Indeed, ten black classes had over 
51 students each. It was not unusual for black students to 
walk long distances to attend overcrowded black schools, 
although living a stone's throw from white schools that 
were often utilized less than 70 percent of capacity. The 
school board's five year construction plan, unveiled in 
March 1958, offered no relief for the overcrowded 
conditions of black schools. Black leaders believed
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complete school desegregation provided the only solution to 
a long festering problem for black students.
That only four black students attended white schools 
in November portended how slow the pace of desegregation 
would be in New Orleans. The black community, again led by 
the NAACP, continued to monitor the desegregation process. 
Black leaders assisted parents attempting to enroll their 
children in previously white schools and pressured school 
officials to accelerate the desegregation. During the 
1962-1963 school year, only 107 blacks attended twenty 
white schools. When school opened in 1963 the number rose 
to 347. School officials did not remove the last vestiges 
of segregated education until the 1968-1969 school year.
Moreover, desegregation gave rise to new problems—  
charges of discrimination by black students and accelerated 
white flight to private and parochial schools. The new 
problems, however, did not lessen the importance of 
desegregation. Desegregated schools transcended the 
quantitative count of buildings, textbooks, and the number 
of students actually attending mixed schools. The campaign 
for school desegregation was a fight for full inclusion 
into American society, free from legislative 
discrimination. No matter how slow the pace, black New 
Orleanians had again embarked on the Reconstruction goal of 
a nation of "one people."
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For nearly a century New Orleans' blacks linked the 
development of their community to improvements in public 
education. To assist in their campaign for better 
education blacks formed many community organizations. The 
loss of suffrage in the 1890s, however, forced them to rely 
on protest and petition to win concessions from school 
officials. This strategy produced a few positive results, 
and only because black leaders and parents had remained 
persistent to their efforts. Each decade brought an 
increase in their commitment. Escalating black school 
enrollment placed such a strain on the educational 
facilities that school officials often remedied deplorable 
conditions. As a result, white board members made 
concessions that undermined their own policy of limited 
black education. Nevertheless, black school facilities 
continued to lag far behind those for whites.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, only 
slightly more than five thousand blacks attended public 
schools in New Orleans, with less than four hundred 
enrolled beyond the third grade. In fact, school officials 
did not provide black education beyond the fifth grade 
until 1908, and the first black high school did not open 
until 1917. Blacks complained continually about the
240
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inadequacies of their high school facilities. Despite 
protests by black leaders, school officials refused to 
provide blacks with better secondary school facilities 
until the 1940s. The doctrine of separate but equal 
remained just that: a doctrine, but in practice separation
without equality.
The campaign for expanded educational opportunity 
indicated that blacks never willingly accepted the role of 
second class citizens. They viewed education as a means of 
sharing fully in the American ideal of equality. From the 
beginning, black leaders had advocated education for the 
masses, not just for the black elite. Education became a 
community goal pursued by individuals regardless of whether 
they had children within the public school system. From 
Louis Roudanez and P. B. S. Pinchback to Alexander Tureaud 
and Daniel Byrd, and many black leaders in between, 
education reform remained an important goal. The fight for 
improved education produced a degree of continuity from one 
generation of leaders to the next. In the twentieth 
century each generation of leaders brought the black 
community a little closer to educational equality.
In the 1940s the pace for improved education quickened 
considerably; in fact, by the end of the decade blacks had 
changed their demands from mere equal facilities to total 
desegregation. In less than three decades, America had 
fought two world wars and a cold war in which it extolled
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democracy and freedom in contrast to Russian tyranny. But 
black leaders thought the time had come to extend the 
benefits of freedom and democracy to black Americans. 
Separate facilities no matter how equal were unacceptable, 
and in 1952 black New Orleanians filed suit to desegregate 
the public schools. Eight years would pass, however, 
before the first black student attended a desegregated 
school. In the interim, blacks had extended the assault on 
Jim Crow to include transportation and public facilities. 
Later the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 further transformed race relations and the 
black community.
The Voting Rights Act produced unparalleled black 
advances in politics and civic involvement. In 1968 New 
Orleans sent the first black to the state legislature in 
the twentieth century. During the 1970s the rising black 
vote contributed to a marked increase in the number of 
black elected officials. Dr. Mack Spears, a black former 
teacher and principal, won a seat on the school board, 
which gave the black community a voice in formulating and 
implementing school policy. Protest, petition, and 
judicial redress for enhanced black education now were 
augmented by coalition politics.
When the four little black girls entered McDonogh No.
19 and Frantz elementary schools on 14 November 1960, they 
had unknowingly set in motion an eventual end to an era in
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black New Orleans. The effort for educational equality and 
desegregation was a part of the larger black struggle for 
equality in America. Inadequate schools within a 
segregated school system represented only one of the most 
glaring consequences of discrimination and segregation. 
Another major consequence, perhaps less discernible, but 
not less real, was the apparent solidarity of the black 
community throughout the period of Jim Crow. Shared civil, 
economic, political, and social disabilities produced a 
commonality of purpose— the fight for full citizenship.
That struggle joined the wealthy with the poor, the 
educated with the illiterate, the Creoles with the blacks, 
and the "downtowners'' with the "uptowners. ” The NAACP and 
other black organizations received spiritual and financial 
support from all segments of the black community— from 
custodians to physicians. The Brown decision and the civil 
rights gains that followed, however, highlighted class, 
differences that eventually fractured much of the unity of 
the New Orleans black community. Political empowerment and 
the increase in the size of the black middle class 
undermined, to some extent, a community agenda that focused 
exclusively on racism to explain the status and dynamics of 
the black community. The prosperity of some blacks existed 
next to the poverty of others. As housing became more 
accessible to blacks, they, too, fled the inner-city.
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Middle class blacks found common cause, through 
professional, political, and civic involvement, with 
members of the white middle class. The struggle for black 
inclusion that occurred between 1900 and 1960 gave away to 
the pursuit of specific individual or group goals. The 
fullest expression of middle class black and white 
coalitions first occurred during the administration of 
Mayor Moon Landrieu. Landrieu involved blacks at all 
levels in his campaign and in his administration, which at 
one time included the city's first black chief 
administrative officer. The high profile of blacks in 
Landrieu's administration and an increase in black voters 
helped Ernest Morial to become New Orleans' first black 
mayor. Morial's election indicated that the transition 
from a purely race conscious society in New Orleans to a 
class and race conscious society had occurred. Morial 
shrewdly ran a race-specific campaign within most of the 
black community. Nevertheless, he appealed to and won 
support from some of the white middle class. In fact, his 
campaign stressed typical middle class political values 
such as government efficiency and business expansion.
Whites held many important positions in his administration, 
including the head of the police and fire departments.
Many lower class blacks were just as unrepresented with 
Morial as mayor as they had been with his white 
predecessors.
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The emergence of a seemingly permanent black 
underclass led to a reassessment of the civil rights 
effort, including the effort to desegregate the schools. 
Some critics of school desegregation actually charged that 
black educational attainment declined in the aftermath of 
Brown. They defended their claims by pointing to the 
number of black students suspended from school, the high 
failure rate, and the number of drop-outs. The 
quantitative gains alone, however, appear to justify the 
fight for school desegregation. Black students no longer 
had to pass by schools located only a few blocks from their 
homes to attend school miles away solely because of the 
color of their skin. When school officials made plans 
regarding the maintenance and repair of school buildings, 
decisions reflected need rather than the prejudicial whims 
of racism. Many black children finally had access to the 
best education the public schools could provide. Race was 
no longer the main determinant in the quest for a quality 
education. The struggle that had started as a question of 
race had become one of race and class. The struggle 
continues still.
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